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1. Introduction 
 The Congolese Conflict 
 
The hole of the serpent should always be feared.1 
- André, demobilised kadogo, 19 May 2005  
They call it a country. In fact it is just a Zaire-shaped hole in the middle of Africa…to 
describe it as corrupt implies some health somewhere. 
- Economist, 8 July 1995 
Since the early 1990s the geo-political construction known as the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (henceforth: the Congo, see Map 1.) has been wracked by 
seemingly endless periods of communal violence, state violence, massacres, 
insurgency and regional warfare. Two major regional wars have been fought on 
Congolese soil, and since 1996 countries from all corners of Africa have been 
involved, either militarily or diplomatically or both South Africa, Namibia, and 
Zimbabwe in the south; Libya, Chad, the Central African Republic, and Sudan in the 
north; Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania in the east; and 
Angola and Congo/Brazzaville in the West. In addition, the international development 
establishment has furnished huge resources for a multitude of humanitarian relief 
operations and development interventions, while the Mission des Nations Unies en 
République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC) is presently the largest in the world. 
The first regional war lasted from October 1996 to May 1997. It is generally known as 
the “War of Liberation” because a group known under the aegis Alliance des Forces 
démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL), heavily supported by the 
regimes of Rwanda and Uganda and to a certain extent Angola and Burundi too, 
rebelled and succeeded in overthrowing the incumbent regime of Mobutu Sese Seko 
and installing as the country’s new president the head of the movement Laurent-
Désiré Kabila.2 The movement’s success was hailed by many African statesmen as a 
truly “African Revolution” that justifiably toppled the corrupt and tyrannical regime 
of Mobutu – long allied to the West during the Cold War – and resuscitated dreams of 
Pan-African unity. For a while Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who since the great 
revolutionary upheavals of the 1960s had been the front man of a little known Maoist 
inspired resistance movement, became a symbol of African renaissance and 
emancipation. 
 
Two years prior to the outbreak of the first war, a “human wave” of Hutu refugees 
had crossed the border from Rwanda into the Congo – then known as Zaïre – fleeing 
the advancing Armée Patriotique Rwandaise (APR), the army of the primarily Tutsi 
Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR). It is estimated that the refugees numbered in 
                                               
1
 Interview, André, Bukavu 19.05.05, Maï-Maï, demobilised kadogo. 
2
 To the local population, the War of Liberation was also known in the local population as the 
Banyamulenge Rebellion a name given to it because the rebel army incorporated a large number of 
combatants from a Tutsi-community living on the Itombwe Plateau in Fizi in South Kivu who identify 
themselves as the Banyamulenge. 
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between 1.1 and 1.25 million3, and the international community hastily set up refugee 
camps to shelter them (Emizet 2000: 165). As they spilled over into the Congo in 
mid-1994, the refugees quite literally brought with them the trauma of postgenocide 
Rwanda. The impact was volcanic, and its effects have yet to ebb. Amongst these 
refugees there were former members of the Hutu governing party, the Mouvement 
Républicain National pour Démocratie et le Développement, government personnel 
and some 20,000 to 25,000 heavily armed regular soldiers from the Forces Armées 
Rwandaises (ex-FAR) and 30,000 to 40,000 Hutu militiamen, known as the 
Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi4 (Halvorsen 1999: 310; Emizet 2000: 165). The 
forcibly expatriated Hutu forces regrouped and started launching attacks into Rwanda 
from their “humanitarian shelters” in the Kivus5 to “finish the job”, that is to defeat 
their Tutsi opponents (Halvorsen 1999: 312; Kabamba and Lanotte 1999: 105-6). 
 
During the AFDL’s march to Kinshasa, the refugee camps that were set up on the 
border between the Kivus and Rwanda were systematically attacked and emptied by 
its forces and especially those of the APR; as a result 500,000 to 600,000 people to 
Rwanda and more than 200,000 refugees were massacred on the spot, died during 
flight, or were killed when the AFDL and the APR caught up with them later on 
during the campaign (Bradol and Guibert 1997; Emizet 2000; Garretón 1997; 1999; 
UNESC 1997; UNHCR 1998; Wilkinson 1997). Somewhere along the road the dream 
of liberation had turned into another nightmare involving mass-murder. 
 
The Second Congo War began on 2 August 1998 and is often referred to as “Africa’s 
Great War” or “Africa’s World War” (see, for instance, International Crisis Group 
2000; Kabamba and Lanotte 1999; Reyntjens 2000; Shearer 1999; Weiss 2000). A 
once united coalition of African states became divided into two geo-political blocks 
and fought each other on Congolese soil. The Congo became the geo-political 
location for a large-scale war involving the armies of seven African countries. The 
Congo, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, local resistance groups known as the Maï-
Maï and a number of armed groups opposed to the regimes of Rwanda, Uganda and 
Burundi6 fought a war against a “Congolese rebellion” backed by Rwanda, Uganda 
and Burundi. The “Congolese rebellion”, in fact, was fought by a conglomerate of 
groups, the most important of which were the “Rassemblement Congolais pour la 
Démocratie-Goma” (RCD-Goma) supported by Rwanda and the “Mouvement de 
Libération du Congo” (MLC) and “Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-
Kisangani” (RCD-K) both supported by the Ugandan government. During this period 
the Congolese war was increasingly rendered intelligible by the belligerents as a 
regional war between the Bantus of the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Zimbabwe 
and Uganda and the Tutsi Hamites or Nilotes of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. 
                                               
3
 In total the number of Hutu refugees fleeing Rwanda to Burundi, Congo, Tanzania and Uganda 
following the defeat of the Hutu regime have been estimated to be in the vicinity of 2.1 million (Emizet 
2002; Mamdani 2002). 
4
 The two terms stand for “group working together for action” and “group planning together” 
respectively. 
5
 This term denotes both the North and South Kivu provinces. 
6
 For Uganda these were Joseph Kony’s Lords Resistance Army (LRA), the Former Uganda National 
Army (FUNA), the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRFII), the National Army for the Liberation 
of Uganda (NALU), the West Bank Nile Front (WNBF), and, finally, the Alliance of Democratic 
Forces (ADF). For Angola it was Jonas Savimbi’s União Nacional para a Independência Total de 
Angola (UNITA). For Burundi it was the Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD) and the 
Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL).   
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By 1999 the war had reached a military stalemate and a cease fire agreement, known 
as the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, was signed on 10 July 1999. However, the war 
continued more or less unabated until 2003, especially in the Kivus and in Ituri in the 
province of Orientale. As a consequence the Congo was divided into four zones where 
the MLC, RCD-K, RCD-Goma and the government in Kinshasa, respectively, 
attempted to imprint their authority (see Map). On 17 December 2002 a “global and 
all-inclusive” peace agreement was signed in Pretoria to end six years of armed 
conflict. The peace agreement was not in fact “all-inclusive”, as the armed groups 
fighting against the governments of Angola, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi were not 
included, and several of these are still pursuing their particular struggles from 
Congolese soil until today. Finally, on 2 April 2003 at Sun City in South Africa, the 
participants in what is known as the Inter-Congolese Dialogue signed the Final Act, 
and a transitional government based on a power-sharing agreement between the 
belligerent groups was established, although violent clashes between these former 
enemies have nonetheless been frequent. Formally, though, the transitional period 
ended on 15 November 2006, when Joseph Kabila was announced winner of the first 
national elections since independence (MONUC 16 Nov 2006). His contender for the 
presidential post and head of MLC, Jean-Pierre Bemba, immediately rejected the 
election result raising fears that the country might yet again lapse into war.  
 
The Congolese conflict is imbued with a lethal rationality of war, where the extinction 
of one’s “ethnic” and/or “racial” enemy becomes the guarantee of one’s own life, 
especially in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu and in Ituri. There are 
numerous examples of this. The massacre of Hutu refugees during the ADFL 
campaign is just one example of this. In the Kivus there is an ongoing conflict 
between the “autochtonous” Congolese population and the “non-autochthonous” 
Rwandan immigrant population, a conflict that has resulted in the deaths of thousands 
of people on both sides since the early 1990s (Bucyalimwe Mararo 1990, 1997; 
Mathieu and Willame 1999; Mathieu and Tsongo 1998; Willame 1997). In March 
1993, for instance, in Masisi in North Kivu, groups of young Hunde, Nyanga and 
Tembo (“autochtonous tribes”) attacked Hutu peasants in the market in Ntoto in the 
western of Walikale, sparking a sequence of communal violence in which 7,000-
14,000 people were killed. 
Analysing the Rationalities of National Liberation 
The current study is a study of the rationalities and the techniques that make human 
and national liberation dependent upon the elimination or on the transformation of 
unsuitable elements in the Congolese body politic. The aim is to analyse the thought-
space within which the Congolese conflict comes life and how human beings act upon 
this reality.  
 
I have chosen to analyse the rationalities that are in motion in the Congolese conflict 
from the perspective of two apparently opposed and incompatible projects: first, 
through the practice of armed resistance by the Congolese militia known as the Maï-
Maï – and more specifically by the Maï-Maï group headed by General David Karendo 
Bulenda, known as General Padiri – that was active in Maniema and South and North 
Kivu before, during and after the two regional wars that were fought in the Congo. 
And secondly, through the quest to bring about development and security in the 
Congo by the World Bank, the United Nations and international NGOs (henceforth, 
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when I refer to this group en bloc I use the term the “international community”).7 In 
essence this mode of problematising is born out of a curiosity that was stimulated 
when I observed these two projects sharing a number of governmental rationalities 
and ways of imagining a free Congo. 
 
The practice of armed resistance by General Padiri’s Maï-Maï militia partakes in the 
rationality of war in which the neutralisation of one’s enemies assures the survival of 
one’s own community. The Maï-Maï have made no effort to hide their anti-foreigner 
attitudes, especially towards the Tutsi. However, the Maï-Maï movement is also 
inspired by liberating, reinvigorating and securing an autochtonous Congolese 
“cultural” dimension. For them, therefore, carving out a space in which the Congolese 
people can live free from foreign influence is considered a vital necessity. 
 
The Maï-Maï have not been the subject-matter of many scholarly studies, but the 
emergence of these groups has often been appraised through general overviews of the 
Congolese conflict. The fact that the Congolese conflict is fought along “ethnic” fault 
lines has not gone by unnoticed and has made ethnicity an understandable focal point 
of most analyses. A large number of reports by different institutions have been 
produced and provided reports to “key-decisions-takers” (International Crisis Group 
2006a). Although these reports are seemingly devoid of any theoretical persuasions, 
they actually are nevertheless loaded with a number of common-sense observations 
derived from different corners of the social sciences.8 It is a remarkably homogonous 
body of knowledge which, broadly speaking, problematise the politics of “ethnicity” 
both as “extremist” and “radical”, and as a convenient “rhetoric” to whip up an 
atmosphere of ethnic hatred in order to serve the parochial politico-economic interests 
of political leaders – in short, as a “racist ideology” (Prendergast and Smock 1999: 7). 
Somewhat paradoxically, though, ethnicity simultaneously emerges as a particular 
Congolese mode of being which produces violent conflict by default – i.e. a cultural 
ontology. This move has given birth to a rich and apparently self-explanatory 
vocabulary organized around the notion of ethnicity. Thus, phrases such as “defensive 
ethnic reflex” (International Crisis Group 1998b: 16), “ethnic killings” (International 
Crisis Group 2004b: 3), “ethnic cleansing” (International Crisis Group 2004b: 2; 
2006b: 4, 5, 8 ), “ethnic purge” (International Crisis Group 2006b: 7) “playing the 
ethnic card” (International Crisis Group 2005a: 13), “ethnic hatred” (Seybolt 2001: 
59); “ethnic Tutsis” (Solomon 1997) and so on proliferate and are used to render the 
Congolese conflict “visible”, even if they are not endowed with the capacity to 
explain the “real” cause of the war. 
 
Another perspective from which the Congolese conflict has been analysed is as a war 
economy. This mode of understanding is richly exemplified by a series of reports 
produced by the United Nations Security Council, the last in October 2003 that 
detailed how the exploitation of resources had funded many of the different armed 
groups (local and foreign) fighting in the eastern Congo, allegedly enriching 
                                               
7
 I use this terminology because it is the label the authors of the texts I have chosen as empirical 
material usually apply to enframe their own identity. 
8
 See for example certain reports by the International Crisis Group (1998a, 1998b, 1999a, 1999b, 2000, 
2001a, 2001b, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005a, 2005b, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e, 2006f) and 
those of the Institute for Security Studies (Solomon 1997; Cilliers and Malan 2001; Rogier 2004; 
Kibasomba 2005). See also Prendergast and Smock (1999); Seybolt (2001); Weiss (2000) and Shearer 
(1999).  
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individual officers of the Rwandan, Ugandan and Zimbabwean armies, as well as 
prominent Congolese actors. These reports have connected such “illegal” activities 
with international business networks.9 They understandably focus on the purely 
economic factors that are allegedly fuelling the war. 
 
Other appraisals of the conflict in the Kivus can be seen as falling within a tradition 
that focuses on the socio-economic factors in the conflict between the autochthonous 
“sons of the land” and the “allochthonous” Rwandan immigrant population. In this 
mode of analysis, the rise of nationalism and ethnic conflict is seen as an effect of a 
prolonged historical process of impoverishment and dispossession of land for the 
“autochthonous” as well as the “allochthonous” peasantry.10 In this type of analysis, 
ethnicity and nationalism, as in the preceding traditions, are relegated to the realm of 
subjective perceptions, that is, as “ideology”. In this grid of intelligibility, objective 
socio-economic insecurity is considered to pave the way for the manipulation of 
ethnic and nationalist sentiments by the political elite in order to “identify and 
eliminate ethnic scapegoats” (Mathieu and Tsongo 1998: 411). 
 
One of the few to have made the Maï-Maï an object of analysis is Vlassenroot,11 but 
although he is the one who has published the most extensively on the subject, he is 
not the only one.12 Vlassenroot’s analyses, grounded in extensive fieldwork and rich 
in concrete empirical findings, are cast within the socio-economic tradition mentioned 
above. According to Vlassenroot, “Maï-Maï militias provide an alternative to 
desolation: their ethnic violence and ideology is a reaction to the effects of a long 
process of social deterioration and political destruction” (Vlassenroot 2003: 133, my 
translation). For Vlassenroot, therefore, “the formation of local militias should be 
considered as a form of bottom-up violence as a solution to social and economic 
marginalization” (Vlassenroot 2000b: 98; see also Vlassenroot 2001). A crucial aspect 
of Vlassenroot’s analysis is the contention that the historical process of “political 
disintegration” is caused by “the nature of the post-colonial state, which for lack of 
mechanisms to bind its citizens to the social order, has produced thousands of 
marginalized people” (Vlassenroot 2001: 9).  
 
Despite the widely different research agendas of the approaches just mentioned, there 
seems to be general agreement on two interrelated crucial points. First, in so far as 
ethnicity diminishes the unity of the nation state it is considered a disruptive presence. 
Secondly, it is generally agreed that the apparatus of what is commonly alluded to as 
the post-colonial “patrimonial” Congolese state has been instrumentalised by various 
                                               
9
 See the reports by the Panel of Experts on the illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UNSC S/2001/49; UNSC S/2001/357; 
UNSC S/2001/1072; UNSC S/2002/565; UNSC S/2002/1146; UNSC S/2003/1027). See also Global 
Witness (2002); Human Rights Watch (2005); Montague (2002); Taylor (2003) for this perspective. 
Jackson (2002, 2003) has provided an analysis of the war economy on the local level. 
10
 See in particular: Bucyalimwe Mararo (1999; 1997); Mathieu et al. (1999a, 1999b) Mathieu and 
Tsongo (1998; 1999); Willame (1997). 
11
 See Doom and Vlassenroot 2001; Van Acker and Vlassenroot 2001; Vlassenroot 2000a, 2000b, 
2001, 2003). 
12
 Other analyses of the Maï-Maï include Jourdan (2004), who from a Bourdieusean perspective 
focuses mainly of the relationship between the social position of being young and marginalised and the 
use of violence as strategy of social becoming; Morvan (2005) who, through extensive fieldwork in 
Bunyakiri and the bordering areas, analyse the interrelationship between the Maï-Maï military 
organisation and the civilian population, and, finally, Mugisho (2000) who analyses the Maï-Maï 
resistance in the “socio-political” context of the regional conflict. 
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actors in order to pursue personal interests or those of their “ethnic” communities, 
thus rendering the state incapable of fulfilling its assumed natural vocation, that of 
ensuring socio-economic welfare. This trend is considered to have thoroughly 
corrupted and weakened the capacity of the state, giving it a lack of legitimacy and 
capacity that underlines the reproduction of crises and stimulate “ethnic” hatred and 
radical Congolese nationalism. What becomes clear is that the above-mentioned 
approaches assume in some form or another that the state is a universal entity that 
necessarily guarantees the cohesion of society. 
 
In the following, I will attempt to develop a different mode of analyzing the 
Congolese conflict. Rather than relegating ethnicity to the realm of “ideology”, or 
objectifying it as an “extremist” form of political mobilization, that diminishes the 
unity of society; I propose that we understand “ethnicity” (and “race”) as an integral 
part of the governmental rationalities at work in the Congolese conflict. It is my 
contention that, if we face the narratives of international development agencies and 
the narratives of the Maï-Maï respectively on their own terms, we will realise that the 
two projects are linked to each other through regimes of rationality that make human 
and national development and security appear as both necessary and desirable. I do 
not seek to justify either the Maï-Maï practice of resistance or the practice of 
international development in the Congo, nor do I wish to imply that any of the studies 
mentioned above are irrelevant. However, I do ask whether they carry sufficient 
critical mass for us to verify the Maï-Maï resistance as either a radical ethnicist or 
racist or nationalist movement or a reaction to local socio-economic processes.  
 
In the narratives of international development, the Congo appears as an undeveloped 
and unruly geopolitical non-space – a so-called “failed state” – the very backwardness 
of which is considered a source of insecurity not only to its own population, but also 
to the order of the international system. As a representative of the African rebel, the 
Maï-Maï combatant is an emblematic symbol of the dangers of the condition of 
statelessness. Drugged and dressed in quasi-military clothing, he strikes dramatic 
postures of defiance and abnormality and he appears to be the anti-thesis of civility. 
This figure of chaos and non-civility is a prominent symbol which structures relations 
of identity and difference through contrast. In this mode of apprehending the African 
Dystopia, savagery is the regrettable, though factual consequence of the failure of 
development. Insecurity and underdevelopment are doubtless uncomfortable regions, 
but should we be guided by our established thought-space when we explore conflict? 
What if we were to grasp these modes of objectification in terms of their productive 
effects rather than seeing them as self-explanatory facts? For instance, does it have 
any effect on the Maï-Maï self to know that he or she is underdeveloped and insecure? 
By the same token, what if the cultural and the socio-economic objectifications 
through which the Congolese conflict is rendered intelligible provide the warring 
parties ways of understanding and relating to themselves and others? What if these 
modes of objectification and problematisation are important elements in the 
reproduction of conflict? 
  
This dissertation attempts to show that it is possible to undertake a critical analysis of 
the ethos of national liberation of the Maï-Maï movement without recourse to a theory 
that presupposes what “ethnic” conflict and the Maï-Maï nationalist project really are 
about. Instead, I will suggest that it is worthwhile to undertake a study of the Maï-Maï 
nationalist rationality as a project that aims to facilitate national and human liberation 
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through different techniques of development and security, thus making the Maï-Maï 
practice of resistance much more closely connected to the humanitarian ethos of 
international development than we like to believe. 
 
I propose an analysis that explores and documents the thought-space that has brought 
an essentially underdeveloped and insecure or dangerous autochthonous Congolese 
identity into concrete existence, and how the different rationalities of this thought-
space are integrated into relations of power and incites programmes intended to 
improve, mould and liberate the Congolese soul. 
 
Hence, what follows is to a certain extent a story about the way the Maï-Maï and the 
agencies of international development seek to liberate the Congolese subjectivity 
through techniques of development and security as antidotes to their opposites. I 
therefore propose here an investigation into how such disparate projects as 
international development and the Maï-Maï resistance have come to detect a self-
evident interest in liberating the Congo from its dangerous state of underdevelopment. 
Problem Formulation and Structure of this Dissertation 
The central concern of this dissertation is to reveal how ways of knowing Congolese 
identity are linked to ways of governing it. I suggest that the technologies of social 
engineering of the Maï-Maï and the international community are both informed by 
and subsist in non-subjective strategies of governing the population, both in its totality 
and as individual member of this social body. I am not trying to argue that the Maï-
Maï project of armed resistance is essentially the same as international community’s 
quest to bring about development and security in the Congo. Although investigating 
the configuration of what freedom, development and security entails for the Maï-Maï 
and the international community respectively keep me focused on the practical 
rationalities of government; I am not attempting to homogenise their respective 
practices. Instead, as a means to re-politicise the self-evidencies that provoke an 
image of the underdeveloped world as radically different from the developed world, I 
will attempt an analysis which reveals how the theme of national and human 
liberation is constitutive of strategies, of the construction of objects and of identities. 
This is also a way of relocating “development” within the Congolese conflict and of 
showing how notions of “development” function as dense transfer-points through 
which power relations are reproduced and reinvented, rather than relying on 
“development” as a deux ex machina.  
 
On the basis of these preliminary reflections and clarifications, the objective of this 
study of the contemporary rationalities of national liberation through development in 
the Congolese conflict can be summarised as an investigation of: 
 
 How different rationalities of liberation create space for security and 
development interventions in the Congolese conflict? 
 
By choosing both the international community and the Maï-Maï’s projects to develop, 
secure and liberate the Congo, I want to show how similar rationalities and practices 
can nonetheless be utilised, adjusted and profited from in radically different ways and 
frameworks. 
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Using these two projects of developing, securing and liberating the Congolese as 
specific entry points into the analysis, I will seek to address the central problem of 
how the problematisations of underdevelopment and insecurity by the Maï-Maï and 
the international community respectively inaugurate programmes intended to liberate 
the Congolese nation from this crisis. Chapter 2 clarifies the research strategy and the 
tools through which the thought-space of the Congolese conflict and the practices of 
liberation are analysed. Chapter 3, the first chapter of the analysis proper, is organised 
around the following research questions: 
 
1. How does the international community seek to make the Congo a secure 
country? 
 
The chapter investigates the conditions of possibility that have allowed countries and 
armed groups such as the Maï-Maï to emerge as sources of insecurity in the eyes of 
the international community. The chapter exposes a cluster of works produced by the 
international community, which has attempted to establish the causal relations 
between “underdevelopment” and “insecurity”. It suggests that, since the early 1990s, 
this regime of truth has invoked a reality within which the state of underdevelopment 
emerges as dangerous and disorderly and shows how this mode of objectification has 
brought about new security-driven development techniques clustered and organised 
around the notion of “human security”. The chapter shows how “human security” has 
recast the problem of the “collective security” of the global population by 
superimposing upon the state-centric notion of international security the imperative of 
making underdeveloped subjects responsible for their own security and development 
as a development doctrine. It shows that, in order to justify its interventions on the 
individual level, “human security” depends on the production of dangerous modes of 
being. This part of the analysis tracks the thought-space that allows “failed states” 
such as the Congo to emerge as entities that pose a problem for “collective” or 
“international security”, and which simultaneously fabricates dangerous communal 
and individual identities in the global population.  
 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 make up the second part of the analysis. Together these two 
chapters expose how the fundamental experience of being underdeveloped, insecure, 
marginalised, threatened by extinction etc., makes it possible for the Maï-Maï to 
undertake not only the project of carrying out armed resistance against the enemies of 
the nation, but also to take responsibility for ensuring the well-being and protection of 
the Congolese population. 
 
Chapter 4 shows how the Congolese mode of being was enframed as underdeveloped 
and insecure by the champions of Congolese independence in the era of 
decolonisation, and how this problematisation of the Congolese mode of being has 
been recast by the Maï-Maï. The research question that guides this inquiry is: 
 
2. How has it become possible for the Maï-Maï to enframe their resistance as a 
project to liberate the Congolese nation, and how do they problematise the 
Congolese mode of being? 
 
The chapter suggests that the formation of a Congolese national identity is dependent 
upon the internalisation of colonial practices of indirect rule, which enframed the 
“native” population not only as racially distinct from the coloniser but also as 
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underdeveloped. The chapter shows how a self-affirmative racial discourse has 
become both a crucial technology of resistance to foreign influence and domination, 
and the pillar around which the Maï-Maï project of nation-building has been forged. 
In addition, the chapter shows how the Maï-Maï problematise the state of the 
Congolese mode of being as underdeveloped and, hence, as insecure.  
 
Chapter 5 picks up on the dual theme of national liberation and nation-building and 
seeks to answer the following research question: 
 
3. How do problematisations of underdevelopment and insecurity inform the way 
the Maï-Maï seek to govern themselves and others? 
 
The chapter argues that problematisations of insecurity and underdevelopment inform 
the Maï-Maï practice of resistance. It show that the Maï-Maï resistance is a project 
that is seeking to liberate the Congolese nation state from its state of 
underdevelopment and insecurity by launching a vast programme designed to awaken 
the nationalist spirit of the Congolese in order to fulfil their destiny as a people. 
Through an analysis of the governmental techniques of the purification and 
unification of the autochthonous mode of being, the chapter shows how the Maï-Maï 
are seeking to attain an ethical closure of the autochthonous mode of being through 
the use of spiritual, disciplinary, sovereign and normalising techniques of 
government. The chapter makes an analysis of the techniques through which the Maï-
Maï seek to constitute themselves as moral agents, and how they seek to transform the 
population into true citizens in service of national liberation.  
 
A vital contention of the dissertation is that we should be less concerned with what 
the Maï-Maï “are” and more concerned with how they engage in different “games of 
truth”. It is a common perception that recourse to “magic” and the belief in 
“supernatural beings” is a testimony to the fact that the “phenomenon” of the Maï-
Maï represents a throwback to traditional African culture. I will argue that this way of 
objectifying the Maï-Maï is suffused with mythologies of the African other that are 
intimately interwoven with the problem of “underdevelopment”. This does not mean 
that there is just a void: neither “African culture” nor “underdevelopment” are just 
figments of Western imagination. The problem is resolutely the converse: it is a 
question of knowing how “underdevelopment” and “African culture”, under the 
various definitions that have been given, are integrated into identities and clusters of 
objects that constitute these as specific realities recognisable to human beings. Indeed, 
as we shall discover, in the practice of resistance of the Maï-Maï, ideas such as 
African primordiality, Congolese autochthony, territorial integrity, 
marginalisation/domination, and generic racial concepts such as “Hamites” and 
“Bantus” function in conjunction with notions of “development” and “security” as 
crucial operators in teleologies of the cultural unity and purity of the Congolese nation 
state. Through a genealogy of the experience of being a subject at war, I will show the 
strategic reversability of such communal notions as “culture”, “nation”, “race” and 
“ethnicity” as well as of “development” and “security”, by revealing how they 
disseminate anxieties of the collapse of social order, and how these anxieties have 
enabled the formation of armed governmentalities and the cultivation of militarised 
autochthonous selves in the eastern Congo.  
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However, before moving on to the analysis of dissertation let me clarify some of the 
theoretical and methodological considerations that will guide my answers to the 
questions posed above. 
2. Regimes of Practice 
Nothing in man – not even his body – is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for the 
self-recognition or for understanding other men. 
- Michel Foucault, 1971 
The scope and purpose of this chapter is to explain from what angle and using which 
tools the analysis will proceed. I will also take the opportunity here to discuss the kind 
of material I have chosen as well as the problems encountered in the process of doing 
fieldwork in the context of acute and sometimes deadly conflict. Finally, I will 
demonstrate the specific strategies that have been employed to balance the different 
priorities of personal safety and acquiring consistent empirical material. 
 
The concepts of genealogy will be presented here as a distinct strategy in analysing 
the rationalities of government in the Congolese conflict. Broadly speaking, this is an 
inquiry of the interface between how we can know and how we become human 
beings; that is, how, and through which precise processes, human beings are 
constituted and constitute themselves. I will be analysing the modalities of 
problematisations that have made national liberation through armed resistance a 
reasonable and desirable a solution. My aim is to determine how processes of 
objectification and subjectification interact with one another in the formation of 
political rationalities and moral practices that make national liberation through armed 
resistance a self-evident solution to problems of underdevelopment and insecurity. As 
such this is an analysis of the interface between modes of knowing, or regimes of 
truth, and the effect these have in the lives of human beings. My genealogical analysis 
is heavily indebted to the work of Michel Foucault, but Foucault is not the only one to 
have made genealogical analyses. Foucault’s genealogical analyses are heavily 
inspired by Nietzsche’s genealogies,13 and there exist today a large number of 
genealogical analyses which have been inspired by Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s works 
(see Dean 1999: 3 for some examples). However, if I have chosen Foucault as a 
source of inspiration, rather than Nietzsche, this is because I find that Foucault’s 
version of genealogy to be more sophisticated especially with regards to the analysis 
of power/knowledge relations. 
 
In my methodological considerations I have focused on the techne – understood in its 
Greek meaning as “a practical rationality governed by a conscious goal” (Foucault 
1982) – of nation-building as a practice of freedom in the context of the Congolese 
conflict. This choice implies that Foucault’s methodological considerations with 
relevance exclusively for the study of knowledge (archaeology) and processes of 
objectification are being scaled down. This does not entail, however, that I exclude 
methodological considerations related to knowledge, but that I wish to include such 
                                               
13
 See in particular Nietzsche’s critique of Judaeo-Christian morality in Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude 
to a Philosophy of the Future (1989 [1886]) and The Genealogy of Morals (2003 [1887]); both written 
partly with the aim motive of providing further explanation to ideas presented in his previous work 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None (1986 [1883]). See also his critical analysis of the 
will to truth in Western science in The Gay Science (Nietzsche 2001 [1882]). 
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considerations only to the extent that they have consequences for the analysis of 
governmental techniques and technologies. 
Genealogy 
My entry into Foucault’s writings takes its point of departure in the notion of 
genealogy as a history of human technology. As such the thesis is guided by the 
conviction that human “government is also a function of technology” (Foucault 
1984b: 255). Genealogy is concerned with “modes of being” or “subjectivities”, but it 
is not an approach that favours a transcendental understanding of the subject – on the 
contrary. In fact, it is a radical critique of the classical notion of the transcendental 
subject, that is, as a solipsist and a non-historic self-constituted and “free” 
consciousness. Instead, according to Foucault, it is necessary to dispense with the 
notion of the constitutive subject and “arrive at an analysis which can account for the 
constitution of the subject within a historical framework” (Foucault 1980 [1977]: 
117). Investigating such processes of subjectification, according to Foucault, is an 
analysis of the different modes by which “human beings are made subjects” (Foucault 
1982: 208). A central concern in the genealogical analysis is to unearth “how men 
govern themselves and others by the production of truth” (Foucault, 2001 [1978b]: 
846 my translation)”. For Foucault, “games of truth are not imposed from the outside 
on the subject according to a necessary causality or structural determinations; it opens 
up a field of experience wherein the subject and the object are constituted only under 
very certain simultaneous conditions” (Foucault 2001[1984b]: 1453, my translation). 
This implies that the genealogical project is concerned not only with processes of 
subjectification but also with processes of objectification and rationalities of 
government for subjectivities are enframed and governed with reference to the truth of 
their nature. 
Genealogy, Truth and Subjectivity 
The theme of “truth” is omnipresent in the work of Foucault, from his earlier 
archaeological work through to the later genealogical work. In his archaeological 
work, Foucault set out to investigate the rules that govern the formulation of 
statements in different systems of objectification. The archaeological investigation is 
an investigation of the relationship between the object and processes of 
objectification, i.e. concerning what can be positively known and the conditions in 
which it emerges. If the task of the archaeologist is to describe the rules governing 
discursive practices, then genealogy is a method of diagnosing and grasping the 
significance of social practices from within. As a tool for attaining a relative degree of 
detachment from the practices and theories of the human sciences, archaeology, while 
it still plays an important role, is subordinated to genealogy: as Foucault stated in 
referring to his previous work “what was lacking here was this problem of the 
‘discursive regime’, of the effects of power peculiar to the play of statements. I 
confused this too much with systematicity, theoretical form, or something like a 
paradigm” (Foucault 1980 [1977]: 113). In the genealogical account truth and power 
cannot be dissociated, for the exercise of power constantly demands truth: “Truth is 
linked in a circular fashion with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and 
to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A ‘regime’ of truth” 
(Foucault 1980 [1977]: 123). 
 
Thus, genealogy is concerned with “truth”, but it does not set out to discover or 
establish the truth; instead it is an analytical ethic which seeks to create “game 
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openings” in established regimes of truth (cf. Foucault 2001 [1978b]: 840). It is, in 
other words, an analytical activity which seeks to “know how and to what extent it 
might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimising what is already known” 
(Foucault 1984a: 16, my translation). As such it seeks to destabilise the universals and 
constants of contemporary regimes of truth by asking the question “[i]n what is given 
to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what is the role of that which is singular, 
contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints?” (Foucault 1984c: 45). 
Genealogy thus seeks to re-politicise, destabilise and breach the self-evidencies 
through which we experience the world; it tries to make visible “a singularity at 
places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, an immediate 
anthropological trait, or an obviousness which imposes itself uniformly on all” 
(Foucault 2001 [1978b]: 842). This preoccupation to re-politicise contemporary 
modes of knowing led Foucault to call genealogies “anti-sciences” (Foucault 1997 
[1976a]: 165). However, this untiring will to reproblematise regimes of truth, 
however, does not imply that genealogy is a sort of interpretation of the endless play 
of free metaphors; instead, it seeks to expose that ontologies are historically 
contingent. 
 
As an extension of the will to reproblematise our current regime of truth, Foucault has 
never tired of reminding us that “Man”, such as we know this being today, is a 
historical artefact. “Man” thus does not exist as a pre-given entity; he is at the most “a 
wrinkle in our knowledge”, a mode of self-recognition that has become possible 
during the last two centuries (Foucault 1966: 15). This does not mean that “Man” 
does not present itself as a reality; on the contrary, this concept is at the foundation of 
the modern individual. When “Man” became the target of expert knowledge within 
such fields of science – or disciplines – as psychology, psychiatry, medicine, 
anthropology, ethnology, sociology, biology, philology economics and so on, “Man” 
became conscious of a vast new domain of truth about the nature of his existence. He 
was no longer an object among other objects in the great table of existence given by 
the Supreme Being:  
The modern themes of a individual who lives, speaks, and works in accordance with the 
laws of an economics, philology, and biology, but who also has received the right…to 
know them and to subject them to total clarification – all these elements so familiar to us 
today and linked to the existence of the ‘human sciences’ are excluded by classical 
thought: it was not possible at that time that here should crop up, on the edge of the 
world, the strange stature of a being whose nature (that which determines it, contains it, 
and has traversed it from the beginning of time) is to know nature, and itself, in 
consequence, as a natural being. (Foucault 1966: 321, my translation) 
As a result of this change in the systems of objectification, which, according to 
Foucault, took place around 1800, “Man” emerged in a field of knowledge as an 
entity whose finitude could be known exclusively by recourse to human reason. 
Hence, events and phenomena were no longer seen as determined by God’s decree, 
but rather, by their own necessity, as dictated by the inherent laws of nature. The 
modern universe emerged as a self-perpetuating functional whole whose explanation 
rested on the laws of that very functioning, making it the objective of Science to 
uncover and understand these laws. Science had provided humankind with a great 
new equaliser, and its instrument was “Man” himself. Foucault argues that, as the 
modern subject began to understand itself as a natural object that knows, the way the 
human subject thought about his own nature changed: 
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What I have tried to maintain for many years is the effort to isolate some of the elements 
that might be useful for a history of truth. Not a history that would be concerned with 
what might be true in the fields of learning, but an analysis of the ‘games of truth,’ the 
games of truth and error through which being is historically constituted as experience; 
that is, as something that can and must be thought. What are the games of truth by which 
man proposes to reflect on his own nature when he perceives himself to be mad; when he 
considers himself to be ill; when he conceives of himself as a living, speaking, labouring 
being; when he judges and punishes himself as a criminal? (Foucault 1984a: 13-4) 
Hence, according to Foucault, the modern subject has, since the invention of “Man”, – 
under the multitude of representations given – been incited to recognize itself as a 
subject, which must constitute itself in each of its actions as a universal subject by 
conforming to universal “natural” rules such as they have been objectified by modern 
science; it is “an attitude of mind” (Foucault 1984c: 39): 
[W]hat might be called a society’s ‘threshold of modernity’ has been reached when the 
life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, man was what 
he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; 
modern man is an animal whose politics places his living being in question (Foucault 
[1976]: 188). 
For the genealogist, modernity is analysed as a critical reflection upon the existence of 
life as such, i.e. that as members of the human species, we are equipped with certain 
natural and self-evident entities (e.g. a psyche, a biological body, a subconsciousness 
and so on) but we also live within a biosphere, which renders our being subject to the 
rules of nature. 
 
I have tried to take seriously the genealogical (and archaeological claim) that reality is 
not an entity existing prior to or outside discourse, secretly controlling our lives until 
we can finally address it when it becomes embodied in a scientific narrative and if I 
have taken the time to explain Foucault’s version of the historical conditions for the 
emergence of such a thing as the modern subject, it is because I have accepted 
Foucault’s pivotal hypothesis that “nothing in man – not even his body – is 
sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other 
men” (Foucault, 1984 [1971]: 87-8). I start from the assumption that both the 
practices of the international community and the Maï-Maï practice of resistance are 
supported by modern ontologies derived from the modern human sciences (including 
the social sciences) which circumscribes what it is possible to be and to do in the 
world today. In this sense, modernity is not so much an epoch or an age. Instead it is a 
mode of relating to contemporary reality with a “desperate eagerness to imagine it, to 
imagine otherwise than it is, and to transform it not by destroying it but by grasping it 
in what it is” (Foucault 1984c: 41). Seeing it as I do, perhaps somewhat 
controversially, the Maï-Maï practice of resistance and the practice of international 
development owe their rationalities to the same modes of objectification which 
delineate the possibilities of changing our contemporary world; that is to say, they 
share a certain thought-space. Be it a World Bank or a UNDP development-
programme intended to rebuild the Congo or a project of armed resistance intended to 
secure, develop and liberate the Congolese nation by the Maï-Maï, they are obliged to 
render their object amenable to government through technical means informed by 
rationalities of nation-building. 
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Genealogy and the Problem of Rationality 
The Maï-Maï make use of spiritual techniques in their practices of resistance. These 
techniques are known as dawa – which literally signifies medicine in Swahili. These 
practices of resistance are routinely described a “magical”, “magico-religious”, 
“occult”, “mystic”, “superstitious” etc. by contemporary social scientist. Moreover, 
these supposed magico-religious practices are considered to be connected with 
Congolese traditional beliefs and customary practices (Morvan 2005 77-9; Mugisho 
2000: 215-6; Van Acker and Vlassenroot 2001; Vlassenroot 2003: 139-40). In the 
words of Vlassenroot: “It seems that these prescriptions are largely developed in the 
mayi-mayi groups which are linked to their ethnic communities by a strong magico-
religious tradition and which uses the same rituals (such as the Batembo and the 
Bembe)” (Vlassenroot 2003: 140, my translation).14 
 
It is only fair to note that these authors recognise that the dawa is neither irrational nor 
a sign of backwardness as such. Instead they see them as both a psychological need 
and as having an important social function:  
It is strongly tempting to consider these practices as a sign of backwardness of the local 
societies, and, thus, as an inferior form of rationality […] but in reality, where the 
military training is lacking, the rites of initiation and immunisation appears here, like 
anywhere, as an indispensable palliative for a psychological and individual need and as 
proscriptions which ensures the cohesion and the discipline of the group. (Mugisho 2000: 
216, my translation)15 
However, even if these authors appreciate the dawa as a practice which answers to a 
basic psychological need and as performing the role of ensuring social cohesion its 
effects are considered to be illusory and providing merely symptomatic relief: 
From the beginning the mayi-mayi militias have had blind confidence in the antidotes 
which are by nature mystical and supposed to protect [the Maï-Maï] from the impact of 
bullets (Vlassenroot 2003: 125, my translation, emphasis). These practices are most often 
associated with drugs which have hallucinatory and anaesthetic effects which gives the 
impression of multiplying the forces [of the combatant]. (Morvan 2005: 78, my 
translation) 
It is definitely worth remembering in this context, as Tambiah (1990) points out, that 
“magic” is a thoroughly Western invention, and that there exists a highly complex 
epistemology directed at objectifying “magic”, inaugurated and elaborated first and 
foremost by the discipline of anthropology. The fact that the assumed magical 
practices of Maï-Maï resistance are enframed not necessarily as backwards, but rather 
as a kind of coping mechanism, endowed with both social functionality and as 
addressing a basic psychological need, situates the contemporary analyses of the 
                                               
14
 It must be noted that Vlassenroot see no automatic link between tradition and the Maï-Maï practice 
of resistance; instead he sees the incorporation of traditional elements in the practice of resistance of 
the Maï-Maï as a way to redefine the social order in its totality: “the new codes of conduct have been 
created, wherein, once again, the traditional social organisation is the principal point of reference, even 
if this type of organization was transformed by the [Maï-Maï’s] perceptions of the exterior world” 
(Vlassenroot 2003 140). Vlassenroot, thus, does not essentialise tradition, but sees it, rather, as 
dynamic. In effect, in my opinion, one of Vlassenroot’s merits is that he, and his various co-writers, 
have consistently argued against reproducing cultural ontologies when analysing the Congolese conflict 
(see in particular Doom and Vlassenroot 2001). 
15
 See also Doom and Vlassenroot (2001: 79); Van Acker and Vlassenroot (2001); Vlassenroot (2003: 
139) and Morvan (2005: 78). 
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assumed magical practices of the Maï-Maï within the sort of critical perspective that 
twentieth-century cultural anthropology has directed at nineteenth-century 
evolutionary anthropology since what Wahlberg calls the “Malinowskian cultural 
immersion in the early part of the twentieth-century” (see Wahlberg 2006: 124-32). 
There is no need to rehearse the exceedingly complex epistemological tradition of 
anthropology here, but it is essential to note that the immense differences in the 
modes of objectification aside, all these different traditions within anthropology take 
it for granted that “magic” as a “primitive” system of belief fall beneath an accepted 
epistemological threshold (see, for instance, Tylor (1970 [1891]), Frazer (1911), 
Mauss (1950 [1902]) Malinowski (1948), and even to a certain extent Lévi-Strauss 
(1962)).16 
 
In light of the above, we can approach “magic” as what Foucault called a subjugated 
knowledge (Foucault 1997 [1976a]: 163-4). These types of knowledges are not 
assumed to be able to speak the truth about what they deal with. In contradistinction, 
genealogy does not explain the inferior position of “magic” as due to any lack of 
rationality on its part. It is not seen as subjugated because it is less rational than the 
modes of objectification that have ascended to the required threshold of 
epistemologisation. 
  
“I think”, Foucault said, “the main problem when people try to rationalize something 
is not to investigate whether or not they conform to principles of rationality but to 
discover which kind of rationality they are using” (2001 [1978b]: 299). From the 
point of view of a genealogical analysis objectifying “magico-religious traditions” as 
a sort of second order remedy to real problems – as a psychological coping 
mechanism in the face of the terrors of the battlefield – it is not satisfactory; instead, 
genealogy seeks to understand these assumed “magico-religious traditions” as 
practical rationalities that are efficacious precisely because they draw on regimes of 
truth. 
  
However, as Moriera points out (Moreira 2001: 96-9), it is wrong to make the 
deduction that the subjugated bodies of knowledge are those of the oppressed, the 
delinquent, the disqualified, the subaltern etc.: “a voice with which individuals who 
are exposed to a certain objectifying power can attempt to oppose the process of 
objectification” (Moreira 2001: 96). I think Moreira is worth quoting in full here, 
because his observation is acutely relevant to the case of the Maï-Maï: 
Any investigation of subjugated knowledges must recognise that the strategy of 
subjugation – the concrete ways in which a certain body of knowledge is disqualified, 
disregarded, forgotten, etc. – is neither homogenous from case to case, nor constant. 
Likewise it must be taken into account how those individuals who see themselves as 
oppressed and subaltern – under the dominance of mainstream objectifying power – need 
not necessarily possess or practice a subjugated knowledge. (Moreira, 2001: 97) 
In other words, there exists no straightforward equation of the type “oppression = 
subjugated knowledge”. What is crucial to the understanding of the interface between 
bodies of knowledge, – whether subjugated or mainstream bodies of knowledge – and 
                                               
16
 It must be said in relation to Lévi-Strauss’ La pensée sauvage, that even if he contends that the 
“magic” of the so-called primitive peoples, is a highly elaborate and rational system of classification, 
which, at least at the level of its internal cohesion, is fully equal to modern science, he nonetheless 
thinks it is inferior to “structuralism” because it does not objectify the laws of structuration.  
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modes of being is that there are no univocal laws governing how bodies of knowledge 
affect modes of being. In other words, as will be shown in the analysis, it is perfectly 
possible to claim that one is “marginalised”, i.e. subjugated – which is very much the 
case with the Maï-Maï – while casting oneself and one’s group in taxonomies of 
human science that circumscribe, individuality, the body, civil society, the state, the 
nation, race, ethnicity etc. My aim here is to emphasise that the techniques and 
practices that are made possible by a cosmological system of objectification, as is the 
case with the Maï-Maï, are not necessarily contradictory to a “scientific” system of 
objectification in search of the iron law of nature: practices can be adapted and 
developed to fit different systems of objectification and its concomitant technologies. 
This is to say that, even though subjugated bodies of knowledge such as magic, 
witchcraft, sorcery, or whatever we choose to call it, are seen as inferior, they do in 
practice provide the subject with concrete, technical possibilities for acting. I 
therefore intend to bypass the assumed opposition between “modern reason” and 
“traditional magic”, for, as we shall see, they have a common history to be written in 
the case of the Maï-Maï. 
 
Unless we adhere to a mode of explanation which relegates the Maï-Maï discourse of 
nation-building to the realm of “ideology” – that is, as a mode of discourse which 
somehow stands in opposition to something else which is supposed to count as truth 
(such as “tradition” or “socio-economic” processes) – this discourse must be 
understood as a modern practice of resistance. From this vantage point, it is more 
productive to analyse the Maï-Maï practice of resistance or liberation as a drawing on 
modern technologies nation-building, that is, as a form of “countermodernity”: 
“[R]ather than seeking to distinguish the ‘modern era’ from the ‘premodern’…, I 
think it would be more useful to try to find out how the attitude of modernity, ever 
since its formation, has found itself struggling with attitudes of ‘countermodernity’” 
(Foucault 1984b: 39). Since modernity is defined as an “attitude of mind”, we can 
note that one does not need to be “modernized” (i.e. to live in a complex industrial 
society, to have a television, to be a “professional”, to be Western – whatever the 
importance of associating oneself with such symbolic goods might play in one’s self-
fashioning process) in order to possess a modern attitude of mind. 
 
If we adhere to the standard dichotomisation of magico-religious modes of thought 
and objective science the Maï-Maï cannot be productive in the formation of modern 
subjectivities. Arguing that pre-modern modes of knowing are essentially “magic” or 
“religious” and modern modes of being are essentially “secular” is to embrace an 
evolutionary view in which secularism is taken as the process in which religious ways 
of explaining the world gradually gave way to science and rationality. If we accept 
this narrative, we must analyse magico-religious modes of knowing as a throwback to 
pre-modern styles of reasoning. 
 
In conclusion here, I would like to emphasise that a genealogical analysis is 
successful insofar if it manages to problematise a range of practices that were 
considered natural, self-evident and just. It is a highly critical project because it 
disturbs the finitude of the present and challenges what we think we can know, and 
hence also what we can be. 
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Genealogy and Regimes of Practice 
This study implicitly owes a lot to anthropology (especially structuralism). Yet, just as 
it must dissociate itself from the anthropological notion of “magic”, it must distance 
itself from the core object of the discipline of anthropology: “culture”. This 
dissociation from the notion of culture is necessary because “culture” in the 
Congolese conflict figures as an overriding principle of authenticity which is invoked 
to protect against interference by outsiders in one’s authentic mode of being. Again, I 
will not go into details about the considerable controversies surrounding the 
application of the notion of culture.17 Suffice it to note here, along with Archer, that 
there exists throughout the most varied of schools of thought (sociological and 
anthropological) a “myth of cultural integration” which “perpetuates an image of 
culture as a coherent pattern, a uniform ethos or a symbolically consistent universe” 
(Archer 1988: xv). According to Herbert, the “radical modernity” of the 
anthropological concept of culture lies in the conviction that “culture” is considered a 
self-contained and self-perpetuating “complex whole”, that is, as a natural entity 
capable of sustaining itself (Herbert 1991: 4). Sperber has argued that the notion of 
culture as a “complex whole” is the foundation of “the most general and the most 
generally accepted theory in anthropology” (1982: 8), namely that of “cultural 
relativism”. “Cultural relativism” for Sperber has contributed to the vision of a 
multicultural world consisting of hermetically closed unities in which human beings 
appear as the carriers of a particular culture (ibid.; see also Malkki 1992; 1995; Gupta 
and Ferguson 1997). The task here is not to deconstruct notions of culture or to 
develop a concept of culture that is more sensitive and fine-tuned in grasping current 
conflicts. Instead the point here is to try and make the notion of culture appear less 
self-evident precisely because it plays a significant role in the Congolese conflict.18 I 
argue that, rather than going along with the cultural ontologies of the Congolese 
conflict, we could analyse them as actively producing the fault-lines of the conflict 
itself. 
  
Rather than analysing a particular culture genealogy seeks to analyse regimes of 
practice. When investigating rationalities and techniques of government, one needs to 
ask what it is that makes their appearance in such different projects as the Maï-Maï 
resistance and the practice of international development not only a haphazard 
coincidence, and without taking recourse to a universalist theory of human behaviour, 
and regardless of their assumed cultural differences. What I am getting at here is the 
socially sanctioned rules for what it is possible to know and do, in short a regime of 
practices: “these forms of practice are not just governed by the institutions, prescribed 
by ideologies, guided by pragmatic circumstances – whatever role these elements may 
actually play – but posses to a certain extent their proper regularities, logic, strategy, 
self-evidence and ‘reason’. It is a question studying a ‘regime of practices’” (Foucault 
2001 [1978b]: 841, my translation). 
 
                                               
17
 See Herbert (1991) for an archaeology-styled analysis of the concept of culture. 
18
 For instance, while I cannot accept Huntington’s thesis of an alleged “clash of civilizations” (1996), 
it is not from a perspective that claims that he lacks erudite theoretical knowledge on the nature of 
religion and culture. Instead, I seek to re-politicise the kinds of objectifications that Huntington’s thesis 
is a most striking example of, which has recast culture and religion as ontologies within political 
science, and subsequently naturalised them as fault-lines of political conflict. 
   
 22
Elsewhere Foucault used the term dispositif19 to designate what a regime of practices 
is: 
[The dispositif] is firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, 
scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the 
said as much as the unsaid […] The dispositif itself is the network of relations that can be 
established between these elements. Secondly, what I am trying to identify in this 
dispositif is precisely the nature of the connection that can exist between these 
heterogeneous elements. Thus, a particular discourse can figure at one time as the 
programme of an institution, and at another it can function as a means of justifying or 
masking a practice, which itself remains silent, or as a secondary re-interpretation of this 
practice, opening up for it a new field of rationality. In short, between these elements, 
whether discursive or non-discursive, there is a sort of interplay of shifts of position and 
modifications of function which can also vary very widely. Thirdly, I understand, by the 
term dispositif a sort of – shall we say – formation which has a as its major function at a 
given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. The dispositif thus has a 
dominant strategic function (Foucault, 2001 [1977]: 299 my translation, emphasis). 
The dispositif is a “system of relations”, that is, generative and regenerative of modes 
of being and modes of knowing. In other words, it is the site of the combined effects 
of the processes of objectification and subjectification which define a “system of 
relations” between the elements included, like a grid that interconnects them, despite 
apparent differences. Drawing on such an approach, the task of the genealogist 
becomes one of making sense of what might appear as oddities, absurdities or even 
atrocities from the point of view of current streams of thought (e.g. the practice of 
forcing children into one’s armed group, “magical” practices, fighting naked etc.) by 
locating these practices within the thought-space which organised or gave credence to 
them. This is not to say that dispostifs comprise a neat and orderly set of 
corresponding rationalities and practices. Rather, within them a multiplicity of 
rationalities and practices meet, interact and come into tension in attempts to address 
very concrete and “messy” problems.  
 
Also, the dispositif can be seen as a mode of strategic reasoning which poses a 
solution to a particular mode of problematisation. As such the mode of 
problematisation is intimately connected to the strategic options available. In other 
words by problematising them in a certain way objects and subjects become 
analysable, intelligible and, crucially, treatable (cf. Foucault 2001 [1984c]: 1412-13). 
It is a strategy without a subject – a “coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is 
no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it” (2001 [1977]: 206, my 
translation). 
 
It is essential that the notion of the dispositif is not conceived of as a pre-given entity 
as it is intended to say “something about practices themselves” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 
1982: 121). It exists, therefore, only in so far as it is given shape by human activity. 
                                               
19
 As Dreyfus and Rabinow have pointed out there is no satisfactory equivalent English translation of 
this term but they suggest the term “grid of intelligibility” as a possibility (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 
120). However, since “grid of intelligibility” fails to encompass the complex heterogeneity of dispositif 
I retain the original French term in order to avoid misunderstanding or unintended connotations. 
Moreover, since Dreyfus and Rabinow acknowledge that their translation of dispositif as “grid of 
intelligibility” detracts from Foucault’s attempt to reveal something about the practices themselves, and 
since it is exactly these very practices that are the object of analysis in the present dissertation, it would 
hardly be appropriate to apply this shorthand term. 
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This implies that it is at once the structure of the practices being scrutinised, and a 
notion designed to capture those practices, for, in genealogical analysis, there is only 
one level of reality – there is no other plane of existence wherein lurks an evasive but 
truer principle of structuration.  
 
Through an analysis of regimes of practice one can shed some light on the social 
logics, strategies, regularities and orders that makes practices as different as the 
human security interventions of the international community and Maï-Maï resistance 
part of an ensemble, even though they appear to belong to two different cultures and 
are projected as two opposite ends of a moral continuum that sets underdevelopment 
apart from development, and, as a correlate of this, the safe and orderly apart from the 
dangerous and non-orderly. 
 
The main point to be made here is that the problematisation of national liberation 
takes place within an array of thought-spaces, where ways of thinking (rationalities) 
are inseparably, linked to ways of doing (regimes of practice). It is within such 
thought-spaces that suitabilites of means to ends are imagined and take form. 
Dangerous elements are being imagined and projected by the Maï-Maï. Both take the 
Congolese population as a whole, and as individuals, as their object of governance. 
Similarly both projects engage in strategies to mould and shape the Congolese 
citizenry. Moreover, they share the same fundamental objective: securing and thus 
liberating the Congolese nation-state through development. In light of this I have 
chosen to refer to the regime of practice that is formative of both projects as the: 
security-development dispositif. 
Genealogy, Ethics and Resistance 
If certain regimes of truth encourage certain ways of knowing and acting upon these 
realities, while they disqualify others this means that the production of truth cannot be 
“neutral” since, inasmuch as it plays a role in shaping the proper conduct of the 
individual subject, “veridiction” 20 will always occur within a domain of morality: “To 
analyse ‘regimes of practice’ means to analyse programmes of conduct which have 
both prescriptive effects regarding what is to be done (effects of ‘jurisdiction’) and 
codifying effects regarding what is to be known (effects of ‘veridiction’)” (Foucault 
2001 [1978b]: 841, my translation). 
 
Thus, moralities emerge as those technical codes of conduct which have become 
naturalised in various regimes of truth that depict the expectations for how one should 
act in order to be a responsible moral agent: “[T]here is another side to the moral 
prescriptions, which…is, I think, very important: the kind of relationship you ought to 
have with yourself, rapport à soi, which I call ethics, and which determines how the 
individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions” 
(Foucault 1997: 262).  
 
Hacking has argued that the classification of humans – for example, into 
primitive/civilised, or alienated/emancipated – has looping effects: “there is a looping 
or feedback effect involving the introduction of people. New sorting and theorising 
induces changes in self-conception and in the behaviour of the people classified” 
(1995: 370).   
                                               
20
 A word that signifies: “truth-telling”.  
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Slightly rephrased, we could say that the different modes of knowing which emerge 
out of the human and social sciences can and do transmogrify into modes of being, as 
they provide individuals with certain ways of relating to, understanding and acting 
upon themselves as certain “kinds” of people. For Foucault, true discourses can 
simultaneously enframe the form of being one should aspire to become – that is the 
telos of one’s existence – and transform themselves into different forms of ethos 
(relationships with your self) carried out through practices of ascesis21 (self-forming 
activity) (Foucault 1997: 263-5; Foucault 2001 [1983]; see also Rabinow 2003). 
 
It is crucial to understand that the moral code is not some kind of immovable iron law 
that subjugates individuals to the point where they live in a state of being dominated 
by it. In fact, for Foucault there is a fundamental relationship between freedom and 
ethics: “what is ethics, if not the practice of freedom, the conscious [réfléchie] 
practice of freedom? […] Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics” (Foucault 
1997 [1984]: 284). From this perspective, it becomes possible to analyse the 
nationalist discourse of the Maï-Maï as techniques of self-formation that enable the 
Maï-Maï to resist foreign influence and rebuild the nation. Through this lens we can 
come to grips with the assumed magico-religious practices of the Maï-Maï not as a 
mystified, metaphysical practice, but as an element in the production of subjectivities. 
As Foucault remarked, “[b]y spirituality, I mean … the subject’s attainment of a 
certain mode of being and the transformations which the subject must carry out on 
itself in order to attain to this mode of being” (Foucault 1997 [1984]: 294). By the 
same token, we can understand the discourses of communal identity, i.e. the 
discourses of race, nation, culture and ethnicity as techniques of resistance or 
liberation. 
Governmentality 
There is not one form of rationality which is somehow representative of modernity. 
Rather, as an “attitude of mind” modernity allows for numerous (at times overlapping, 
at times contradictory) rationalities and regimes of practice to emerge, flourish, 
transform themselves or fall into disrepute. Games of truth are far from globally 
universal and often have quite unique trajectories and particularities in different geo-
political localities, no matter how “globalised” a world we have come to live in. 
Nevertheless, while modernity in this sense can well encompass a multitude of 
interweaving rationalities and regimes of practices, there have been modalities of 
relations between certain ways of knowing and ways of doing that can be linked to a 
modern attitude of mind. It is these modalities of relations between knowledges and 
practices that Foucault sought to apprehend with the term “governmentality” (see 
Burchell et al. 1991). 
 
When Foucault speaks of governmentality, he speaks of it as the arrangement that 
seeks to know and to govern the processes of life in modern society (Rose and Miller 
1992: 173). Governmentality is a form of government in which the government of 
individuals and populations rely specifically on the building up of expert bodies of 
knowledge – disciplines – which have in turn provided grids of perception and 
                                               
21
 Used in this context, Foucault reminds us, asceticism is not necessarily a morality of renunciation, 
whatever part such a theme might play, but an exercise of the self on the self by which one attempts to 
develop and transform oneself, and to attain to a certain mode of being (Foucault 1997 [1984]: 282)  
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prescription for the conduct of these individuals and their aggregates. Where many 
have argued that modernity has been characterised by the gradual rise of the nation 
state and a concomitant statisation and rationalisation of society, Foucault and others 
have countered that it is more a kind of governmentalisation of the art of government 
(including statecraft) – the building up of particular ensembles of institutions, 
procedures, analyses and reflections informed by expert bodies of knowledge – that 
has emerged out of the particular mode of relating to contemporary reality (Barry et 
al. 1996; Rose and Miller 1992).  
 
The focus is not on the state as such, but on relations of power and processes of 
government. Government as an activity could concern the relations between self and 
self, private interpersonal relations involving some form of control or guidance, 
relations with social institutions and communities and, finally, relations concerned 
with the exercise of political sovereignty (Gordon 1991: 3). The term “rationality of 
government” means a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of 
government, capable of making some form of activity thinkable and practicable both 
to its practitioners and to those upon who it was practised, meaning that modern 
societies at all levels were “governmentalised” (Rose and Miller 1992). 
 
In the context of the current study, I will try to show how different rationalisations 
and problematisations of the state of underdevelopment and insecurity inform and 
stimulate how individuals govern themselves and others in the Congolese conflict. In 
the analysis, I will make use of the notion of “armed governmentalities”, which I have 
borrowed from Moreira (2000), in order to capture how a particular militarised 
modality of government emerged through which the Maï-Maï sought to conduct 
themselves and others in order to liberate, secure, build and develop the Congolese 
nation state. If I insist on using the notion of governmentality, it is because I aiming to 
work consistently with the analytical ethos of genealogy, which challenges the idea 
that there exists such as thing as a cultural Congolese, or Maï-Maï, ontology – that is 
to say, an essential Congolese way of being, couched beneath modern political 
rationalities encompassing nation-building. 
Biopower 
In modern mentalities of government in all their diverse complexities life itself is a 
constituent part of political rationalities. Life as a concrete object to be known, 
improved, preserved, prolonged and expanded is a central theme of government. This 
politics of life, or bio-politics, can be characterised as an endeavour “to rationalize the 
problems presented to governmental practices by the phenomena characteristic of a 
group of living human beings constituted as a population: health, sanitation, birth-rate, 
longevity, race…” (Foucault 2001 [1979]: 818). In modern mode of government, 
according to Foucault, power is disseminated through the two poles of biopower: on 
the one hand an “anatomo-politics of the human body” that focuses on the human 
body as a machine has enabled the disciplining and optimisation of individuals, while 
on the other hand a “bio-politics of the population” caring for the social body as a 
species which is the regulation and promotion of the mechanics of life designed to 
increase health, wealth and nutrition (Foucault 1976: 183). Biopower is thus both 
concerned with human beings in their individuality and the population as a total 
phenomenon; that is to say the government of omnes et singulatim (all and each) 
(Foucault 1979). 
   
 26
The Dark Side of Bio-politics 
In modern forms of government, concepts of the norm and normal have played a kind 
mediating role in the formulation and execution of normative projects (Canguilhem 
2005 [1966]; Ewald 1990). It is through the systematic accumulation of knowledge 
about certain social problems and deviations that we come to know the normal and the 
norm that stabilise and indicate it in social contexts (Ewald 1990: 140). By aligning 
delinquent or abnormal subjectivities (through, for instance, techniques of pedagogy, 
health, economic development, human development, spirituality etc.) to the norm, the 
normal order, can be restored allowing normative goals to be considered “for the 
good”: “[T]he good is figured in terms of adequacy – the good product is adequate to 
the purpose it was meant to serve. Within the normative system, values are not 
defined a priori, but instead through an endless process of comparison and 
normalization” (Ewald 1990: 152). Rose has made the point that the “very notion of 
normality has emerged out of a concern with types of conduct, thought, expression 
deemed troublesome or dangerous” (Rose 1996: 26), so that normality can only be 
understood in relation to the abnormal. Therefore, even if the norm has allowed 
modern biopower to transform negative restraints of power into more positive 
controls or normalisation, it is still producing dangerous subjectivities.  
Within liberal forms of government, at least, there is a long history of people who, for 
one reason or another, are deemed not to possess or to display the attributes (e.g. 
autonomy, responsibility) required of the juridical and political subjects of rights and 
who are therefore subjected to all sorts of disciplinary, bio-political and even sovereign 
interventions. (Dean 1999: 134) 
The list of those so subjected would include at various times those furnished with the 
status of the indigent, the degenerate, the feeble-minded, the native, the savage, the 
homosexual, the delinquent, the dangerous etc. Modern so-called “liberal” practices 
of government therefore also entail ‘illiberal’ aspects (see Hindess 2001; Dean 1999 
Chapter 7). Liberalism always contains the possibility of non-liberal interventions in 
the lives of those who do not possess the attributes required to be a “citizen”. 
However, bio-politics is not confined to liberal forms of rule: liberalism just makes 
the articulation in a specific way. Other types of rule, such as authoritarian or 
totalitarian forms, also depend on the elements of a bio-politics that is concerned with 
the detailed administration of life. Rather than denying that non-liberal practices are 
indeed an integral part of all forms of liberal democratic government, we could see 
the will to establish the authority of liberal democracy – this will to power – as an 
element of sovereignty in the heart of the “democracy”. 
 
In modern processes of government, the focus is on the fostering and promotion of 
life, though in certain circumstances this fundamental “security” of the population is 
experienced as threatened. In such circumstances the community calls upon its 
fundamental right to exist as such and thus evokes its right to deny the right to life of 
those who are seen as a threat to the life of that same population. This allows us to 
consider what might be thought of as the dark side of bio-politics (Dean 1999: 139). 
In Foucault’s account, bio-politics, as concrete political method of security, does not 
put an end to the practice of war; it provides it with renewed scope.  
 
This new scope allows the actual neutralization, or even elimination of life at the level 
of entire populations, or micro populations. It intensifies the killing, whether by 
“ethnic cleansing” that visits holocausts upon whole groups or by the mass slaughter 
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of classes and groups in the name of the utopia to be achieved. Governance is now 
exercised at the level of life and of the population, and wars will be waged at that 
level on behalf of the “security” of each and all. This brings us to the heart of 
Foucault’s challenging thesis about bio-politics, namely that there is an intimate 
connection between the exercise of a life-administering power and the commission of 
genocide: “If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers […] it is because power 
is located at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of 
population” (Foucault 1976: 180, my translation). 
 
Thus, there seems to be a kind of inescapable connection between the power to foster 
life and the power to disqualify life which is characteristic of bio-power. The 
emergence of a bio-political racism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries can be 
approached as a trajectory in which the demand for a homogenous social space 
articulated by the norm appears to turn into a life necessity. Through the 
establishment of the norm, abnormality is inscribed upon individual “other” bodies, 
casting certain deviations as both internal dangers to the body politic and as 
inheritable legacies that threatens the well-being of race: 
On behalf of the existence of everyone entire populations are mobilised for the purpose 
of wholesale slaughter in the name of the life necessity: massacres have become vital. It 
is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have 
been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed…at stake is the 
biological existence of a population. (Foucault 1976: 180, my translation, emphasis) 
Bio-politics presides over the processes of birth, death, production and illness. It acts 
on the human species. Within this bio-political practice the sovereign right to kill 
appears in a new form; as an “excess” of biopower that does away with life in the 
name of securing it, and in its most radical form it is a means of introducing a 
fundamental distinction between those who must live and those who must die. It 
fragments the biological field and establishes a break within the biological continuum 
of human beings by defining a hierarchy of races, a set of subdivisions in which 
certain races are classified as “good”, fit and superior (Stoler 1995: 84). It therefore 
establishes a positive relation between the right to kill and the assurance of life. It 
posits that, the more you kill and let die, the more you will live. Thus, in modern bio-
political practice, war does more than reinforce one’s own kind by eliminating a racial 
adversary: it “regenerates” one’s own race (Stoler 1995: 56). It is essential to note that 
racism as a bio-political practice does not draw on a particular theory of race – it does 
not need to. Instead racism designates a much more general practice which introduces 
a rift in the biological continuum that is the human species between those who are 
worthy of citizenship and those who are not. Internal threats to the health and well-
being of a social body come from those who were deemed to lack an ethics of “how to 
live” and thus the ability to govern themselves. It is worth remembering that the Nazi 
concentration camps housed not only Jews, but also Gypsies, homosexuals, 
Bolsheviks and other inassimilable elements.   
 
To sum up, Foucault understands racism as a sort of permanent feature of biopower 
and not as the paroxysmal convulsion of a decaying moral order (Stoler, 1995: 64). 
Foucault’s argument is that racism is not only confined within those obviously racist 
forms of authoritarian government such as the German Nationalist Socialist state, but 
that it is intrinsic to the nature of all modern, normalising governmental rationalities 
and their bio-political technologies. By showing how racism possesses a polyvalent 
   
 28
mobility, he shows that racism is not merely an ideological discourse of exceptionally 
cruel regimes, but a fundamental feature of modern processes of government.  
 
In the context of my analysis I will try demonstrate how both the Maï-Maï practice of 
resistance and the practice of “human security” produce dangerous subjectivities in 
the social body, as well as showing how this problematisation of the abnormal incites 
both to engage in practices of the purification of the social body, which, while 
displaying a certain aversion to physical force, nevertheless considers such measures 
as a suitable means for the final objective of establishing the sovereignty of the nation 
state. 
Governmentality, Sovereignty and Depoliticisation  
By now it should be clear that it is insufficient to adopt the thought-space of a given 
political discourse when making genealogical analyses: in spite of well-meaning, 
universal, egalitarian aspirations these will always be dependent on processes of 
objectification and subjectification and inextricably enmeshed in power relations.  
 
It is a mistake to think that “sovereignty” disappeared with the advent of biopower, 
since what marks the shift from sovereign forms of rule to a normalising biopower is 
that the latter superimposed itself “upon the mechanisms of discipline in such a way 
as to conceal its actual procedures, the elements of domination inherent in its 
techniques” (Foucault 1997 [1976b]: 33 my translation). 
 
Biopower signals a regression of sovereign power inasmuch as it diminishes the 
sovereignty of the monarch and the symbolic of the “power of the sword”. Therefore, 
rather than speaking of a dimunition of sovereignty Foucault speaks of a displacement 
of sovereignty towards a “democratisation of sovereignty”; the putting into place of 
public law articulated in the name of a “collective sovereignty”. 
Thus we have, in the modern societies, [...] on the one hand a legislation, a discourse, an 
organisation of public law articulated around the principle of the sovereignty of the social 
body and the conveyance of sovereignty by each to the state, and on the other a tight 
apparatus of control of disciplinary coercion that assures, in fact, the cohesion of this 
same social body. (Foucault 1997 [1976b]: 33 my translation) 
Sovereignty in modern forms of rule is not claimed on behalf of the sovereign figure 
of the monarch, but of the norm. It is within this society of normalisation that the 
internal enemies will be construed. 
  
My pivotal argument here is that the recourse to violence and sovereign forms of rule 
requires depoliticisation. Once government became an issue of governing in 
accordance with a positive “knowledge of things” (and, here, human beings counts as 
natural “things” (Foucault 2001 [1978a])), it also became possible to claim that 
government was merely the realignment of things according to “human nature”. There 
is, however, a pressing need to re-politicise such scientistic modes of government. 
Normalisation and governmentalisation enables particular rationalities to be bound up 
with what appear to be self-evident truths and to enter a self-referential technical 
framework for deployment. We could say that depoliticizing activities are inherent 
strategic possibilities of any given dispositif. They are bound up with modes of 
knowing and modes of being, which for that very reason are all the more efficient. 
They enable us without hesitation to determine immoral and abnormal behaviour and 
   
 29
to distinguish it from the “norm”; they are modes of knowing and modes of being that 
have become “second nature” – our “habitus”, to borrow Bourdieu’s. Depoliticisation 
can thus be converted without much further ado into the rectification of deviant 
behaviour, or even cashed in to justify the unfathomable “dance macabre” of 
genocide. The naturalization of “norms” is effective precisely because norms do not 
depend on critical reflection. It works through the everyday practices that seem so 
harmless and necessary, the routine that one does not bother to problematise, and the 
most practical “way of doing things”. Depoliticisation, therefore, is a feature of all 
techniques and technologies that make us capable of acting. As the precondition for 
action, depoliticisation is a primary engine for the momentum of the social. Strategies 
of depoliticisation are by definition dangerous because of their ability to give us the 
self-evident – what must prevail and survive for “us” to continue to exist as such – 
which is why, for Foucault, the question we should be asking ourselves is not “what is 
the surest path to the Truth?, but, What is the hazardous route that Truth has 
followed?” (Foucault 2001 [1976]: 31, my translation).  
 
Violent conflict is interesting, not because of the death and destruction that it leaves in 
its wake, but because it accentuates depoliticised truth claims, thus revealing to us, in 
an unusually clear manner, how ontologies are internalised by human beings and how 
they instigate divisions in the subject and between subjectivities. Yet, despite of the 
divisions installed between human beings in terms of their culture, nationality, 
religion, ethnicity, level of development and so on, it seems that what is lost sight of 
is the fact that there nevertheless appears to be a common set of problems at stake – 
how best to secure, liberate, develop the Congolese population(s), individually and 
collectively. Again, this is not to say that everybody is ultimately proposing the same 
thing. Rather it is to suggest, as Foucault has argued, that: 
To one single set of difficulties, multiple responses can be made. And most of the time 
different responses actually are proposed. But what must be understood is what makes 
them simultaneously possible: it is the point in which their simultaneity is rooted; it is the 
soil that can nourish them all in their diversity and sometimes in spite of their 
contradictions. (2001 [1984]: 1416-7, my translation)  
It is from this perspective that I will be analysing practices and rationalities of 
national liberation and nation-building. Building a nation is a problem to which 
countless solutions have been suggested and implemented. From this perspective the 
international community’s efforts to develop and secure the Congo and the Maï-Maï’s 
resistance fight are merely episodes in this great modern millennial project; yet, as we 
shall see, they both represent unique responses to this fundamental problem. Violent 
conflict, because of the severe repercussions that it has in the lives of human beings, 
and because it so clearly shows us what we consider to be untouchable, can allow us 
to re-politicise the depoliticised self-evidencies that are invoked in order to justify a 
given course of action, however murderous it might be. 
The Material and Research Strategy 
The material gathered for this research fall into two broad categories. On the one hand 
there is the material which is intended to shed some light on the governmental 
rationalities of security-driven international development. On the other hand there is 
that which is intended to reveal something about the governmental rationalities of the 
Maï-Maï resistance. My selection of material in both of these two blocks of data are 
intended to reflect the object of the genealogical focus of the analysis – the practices 
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themselves, which in this case, are the concrete techniques employed to liberate, 
secure and develop the Congolese subjectivity. My selection of material has therefore 
been structured with the aim of detecting some of the ways in which processes are 
being imagined and rendered accessible simultaneously as a modality of resistance to 
alienation and a modality of normalization of the global body politic with the 
common objective of securing the health and wealth of the Congolese population. 
The Material of Human Security 
As already pointed out, Chapter three will deal with the governmental rationalities of 
“human security” as employed by international development agencies in the Congo 
today. My analysis of the rationalities of “human security” does claim to be an 
exhaustive account of the complexities of a rapidly growing body of knowledge that 
takes the interrelations between security and development as its object of analysis. In 
the selection of sources, I have focused on the texts of what we may call the 
“development establishment”, primarily the World Bank, and different UN agencies. 
It is crucial to emphasize that in grouping them together I in no way intend to 
homogenise the particularities of these different institutions, nor do I wish to argue 
that all development agencies have the same priorities, use the exactly the same 
methods or are all doing the same thing. Instead, I am arguing that more or less shared 
modes of problematisation have given rise to a techne of “human security” that is 
intended to rebuild the capacities of states and individuals in underdeveloped 
countries. 
 
Three documents in particular have influenced the analysis of the rationalities of 
“human security”. The individual identities are not that important, so stylized are 
these texts, though, like any disciplinary field, security-driven development has its 
authoritative works whose modes of objectification prompt genuflection and ritual 
obeisance. These three documents represent such works. 
 
First, I have chosen the World Bank report Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and 
Development Policy (Collier et al. 2003, henceforth: BCT). The report is a 
compilation of the findings of the work of the Economics of Civil War, Crime, and 
Violence project in the World Bank Research Group, which began in 1998 and ended 
in 2005. The work of this research group has been hugely influential. In effect, the 
notion of “the conflict trap” contained in the title has become something of a mantra 
in contemporary development discourse (see, for instance, UNDP 2005: 157; UNDP 
[Congo] 2004: 13; World Bank [Congo] 2004b: 12). The second document that I 
focus on is the 2005 Human Development Report (UNDP 2005, henceforth: HDR 
2005) because it is commonly regarded as an authoritative source on the “state of 
development” and because “human development” is the parent concept of “human 
security”. The last document that I have focused on is the report of the independent 
Commission for Human security, Human Security Now (UN 2003, henceforth: HSN), 
commissioned during the Millennium Summit in 2000 by the UN. The report is an 
important document of reference within the UN framework and is considered a 
milestone in the promotion of “human security”. These three documents have all been 
written with a view to addressing what are considered to be growing challenges to 
security coming from underdevelopment and have come up with similar solutions to 
this problem. The relevance of these reports does not lie in their status, but rather 
because they tap into and reproduce the normative framework of the security-
development dispositif today. 
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Later in Chapter 3 I will that show that the Congo, from its invention up until today, 
has been considered a space which lacks even the most basic conditions for civic life, 
a mode of problematising the Congolese reality that is reproduced in today’s practices 
of “human security”. For this I will be relying on the one hand on secondary literature 
about the creation of the Congo and on the other hand on contemporary country 
reports and strategy papers written by the international community on the Congo that 
is intended to assist the Congolese with securing and developing their country. These 
include the 2004 Human Development Report for the Congo entitled Conflits armés 
en République Démocratique du Congo: Le rôle des facteurs et les leçons pour la 
reconstruction (UNDP [Congo]) 2004, henceforth: HDR 2004 Congo); the 2002 
Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper; (World Bank [Congo] 2002b, henceforth: 
2002 IPRSP) and the 2004 Transition Support Strategy (World Bank [Congo] 2004b, 
henceforth: 2004 TSS) both of the World Bank. 
The Fieldwork Material 
The second block of material pertains to Chapters 4 and 5 treating, the rationalities 
and mentalities of government of the Maï-Maï. This material was gathered during 
four months of fieldwork in eastern Congo which took place between February and 
June 2005. The fieldwork was an integrated part of an internship at the Congolese 
research centre the Centre d’études et de formation sur la Gestion et la prévention des 
Conflits dans la région de grands lacs22 (CEGEC).  
 
The bulk of the data gathered during the fieldwork was obtained though interviews 
with former and active Maï-Maï combatants at all levels in the military hierarchy, as 
well as civilian personnel associated with the movement. The research was centred 
exclusively on the Maï-Maï group of Joseph David Karendo Bulenda, known as 
General Padiri.23 The Maï-Maï movement was never a unified organisation, and there 
can be no question here of making an analysis of the particularities of the many 
groups in the Congo who consider themselves as Maï-Maï or of making a comparison 
between them. I simply intend to map out some essential rationalities and techniques 
of governing others and the self from the example of General Padiri’s Maï-Maï group. 
I do not claim that my study is representative of the governmentalities of the different 
armed groups that go under the banner of the Maï-Maï. 
 
Much has been written on good scientific practice when conducting inter-subjective 
qualitative research like my own, but I see little reason to indulge in this. Suffice it to 
note here that many of the problems with the use of qualitative interviews for the 
genealogical analysis are identical to those observed in the available literature, but 
that the specific genealogical concern with the interplay between rationality and 
practice should be observed in the interview process (Triantafillou 2005: 22). As 
Triantafillou notes, one of the reasons why the interview can enrich the genealogical 
study is that the interlocutors are able to explain the background and the purpose of 
their practice. By thusly asking the individuals to explain the reasons and the 
objectives of their actions it should in principle be possible to discover something 
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 Centre for the Study and Education in the Management and Resolution of Conflicts in the Great 
Lakes Region. 
23
 Annex A provides an overview of the people interviewed. As a measure of precaution I have chosen 
to retain the anonymity of my respondents by giving them aliases, except for General Padiri who is a 
public figure. 
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about the rationalities of government (ibid.). By establishing a dialogue with the 
subject/object, of analysis, one creates an opportunity to study self-formation, that is, 
modes of self-subjectification (ascesis), as well as the kind of being (telos) that the 
interviewee strives too become. The qualitative interview, then, is a technique for 
studying techniques of the self. It is important to note that the objective here is not to 
understand the psyche of a given individual, but instead to develop a tool to map out 
the general blueprint of a subjectivity. The premise of the genealogical use of 
qualitative interviews is that one has to analyse it in the same manner as a document; 
i.e. treating statements on their own terms, and identifying the modes of knowing and 
modes of being that are assumed and promoted. 
 
Originally it was my intention to conduct fieldwork in the interior of the province of 
South Kivu in the territory of Bunyakiri, the base of Padiri’s Maï-Maï group, for it is 
there that a large portion of the Maï-Maï still remain. However, as we were preparing 
the fieldtrip to Bunyakiri, the Congolese army the Forces Armées de la République 
Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), supported by MONUC, made Bunyakiri a “zone 
of operation” in an effort to demobilise the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du 
Rwanda (FDLR)24 forcibly. This, in effect, rendered fieldwork in Bunyakiri too 
unsafe. Even though I had already gone to Bunyakiri it was only a brief visit, but as it 
turned out it did not represent a major problem because a large portion of the Maï-Maï 
had either been demobilised, and relocated to demobilization centres, been integrated 
directly into the army, or had entered centres de brassage where troops from different 
armed groups and the army were being re-educated together to fit into the new unified 
army structure (i.e. the FARDC). The bulk of the interviews were therefore conducted 
in and around Bukavu, the capital of the province of South Kivu, though we did make 
fieldtrips to Goma, the capital of the province of North Kivu and Kisangani, the 
capital of the province of Orientale. In Kisangani we conducted a series of interviews 
with General Padiri25 and his staff, which paid dividends as it gave me considerable 
recognition within the group. When I discovered that the group was not only a 
military organisation, but in fact had set up a whole administrative apparatus in its 
zone of control, I specifically aimed to conduct interviews with as many different 
branches of the group as possible in order to see how they sought to govern the 
population living inside the territories. I also set out to acquire declarations, 
administrative, legal and programmatic documents produced by the Maï-Maï, since 
these might reveal something about their rationalities and practices of government and 
provide me with a solid empirical data-set from which I could piece together some 
measure of factuality about the movement. These included decrees issued by the Maï-
Maï authorities, administrative reports, memos, political programmes, instructions to 
administrators, statutes, ideologico-educational texts and reports on activities, and I 
was fortunate enough to encounter a former Maï-Maï administrator who had saved a 
large proportion of his administrative paperwork, much of which he graciously 
allowed me to photocopy. 
 
It is essential to point out that, since the commencement of the transitional period and 
the concomitant process of reunification of the national army in 2003, the military 
                                               
24
 The FDLR is the term that Rwandan Hutu insurgents comprised overwhelmingly of combatants or 
refugees that fled into the Kivus in 1994 following the genocide. 
25
 In 2003, after the signing of the peace accords, Maï-Maï General Padiri was appointed a Major 
General in the Congolese army and Commander of the ninth military region, which corresponds to the 
geographical boundaries of the province of Orientale situated in north-east Congo. 
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branch of Padiri’s Maï-Maï organisation has ceased to exist as an autonomous 
organisation, at least officially. In reality, however, my interlocutors still identified 
themselves as Maï-Maï and declared themselves to be servants of the Maï-Maï 
“cause”. I conducted interviews with people from many different branches of the 
movement: civil administrators, “doctors”,26 military personnel (from officers to 
kadogos (child soldiers)), security agents and social activists. In addition I conducted 
interviews with demobilised kadogos in Bukavu at the Centre de Transit et 
d'Orientation run by the local NGO, Bureau pour le Volontariat au service de 
l’Enfance et de la Santé. 
 
The combination of the written material and the qualitative interviews should shed 
some light on the rationalities, mentalities and techniques of the government of others 
and the self in motion in Padiri’s Maï-Maï group. 
 
Doing fieldwork in a locality which has been wracked by constant warfare since 1997 
and in some places as far back is 1993 among combatants who not only participated 
in the war, but who also suspect that another war may break out sooner or later 
(whether true or not) severely restricts what it is possible to say and do as a 
researcher. Therefore, the information and approach taken in this dissertation are 
reflections of a context of profound social conflict. This setting incessantly pushed the 
notion of security to the forefront: if security is an important issue in the dissertation it 
is because security was the main concern of my interlocutors. By the same token, it is 
necessary to note that I did not set out to discover the development rationales or even 
the nationalist ethos of the Maï-Maï, but rather, the rationalities of government in the 
Maï-Maï practice of resistance – what remained was to explore the actual content of 
these. That the practice of resistance was a struggle to secure, liberate and develop the 
Congolese nation was something I realised during my fieldwork:  I did not assume it 
from the outset. 
 
The ever-present concern with security meant that certain types of information were 
withheld from me. I am thinking here particularly of the spiritual techniques of the 
dawa – which, among other things, was used to render the combatant immune to 
enemy fire. In the beginning of the fieldwork I was met with a wall of silence when I 
asked about dawa, the standard response I received being: “all you have to know is 
that it exists and that it works” I was even warned before my first interview with 
someone from the movement that, even if the Maï-Maï would agree to an interview, I 
should not ask questions about what was referred to as their “fetishes”, because doing 
so could render my motives suspect. 
 
From the point of view of the Maï-Maï the dawa is their “secret force”, what gives 
them an edge in their combat against technologically superior enemies. Although my 
interlocutors eventually explained me in general terms the conditions of its proper 
functioning and its rationalities, it was out of the question that I should be told in 
detail the secrets of the techniques involved. Although this obviously presented an 
obstacle to the analysis of the techniques of the government of the self and others, 
because it is a fundamentally important technique of purification of the self, it also 
reflected the rationality of national security. 
                                               
26
 From French docteur. The doctor is also known as a “healer” (bashake) and he is a specialist 
endowed with the legitimate manipulation of spiritual energies. In the Maï-Maï military organisations 
he oversees and performs a variety of tasks related to the dawa. I provide more details on this later. 
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One body of knowledge is conspicuously under-represented in this dissertation. I am 
referring here to the not insignificant ethnographic literature produced by 
missionaries, anthropologists and colonial agents, who have made the traditions and 
cultures of the Kivus the object of their analyses. I have chosen not to include these in 
the present analysis for two reasons. First, for the most part, I consider this body of 
knowledge to be loaded with either, Christian moralities, evolutionary grids or 
cultural relativist assumptions, which this study specifically sets out to re-politicise.27 
I could have chosen to include this field of knowledge as an empirical object in itself 
as a part of the analysis of the relationship between modes of objectification and the 
rationalities of government at work in the Congolese conflict, but while this would 
have been highly relevant, the limited space available in a dissertation would not have 
allowed this. Secondly, since, as we shall see, the scope of resistance of the Maï-Maï 
movement was not mono-ethnic movement, but rather, trans-ethnic, it would hardly 
be appropriate to try to link them with a distinct ethnic group. 
  
Because of the climate of high-tension it was necessary to get obtain guidance from 
someone who had a detailed understanding of the subtleties and actualities of the 
present conflicts. In this I was masterfully guided by the research-team at CEGEC 
especially its Director, Professor Séverin Mugangu Matabaro. In addition it was 
necessary to make contact with someone inside the Maï-Maï movement. I was put in 
contact with Roger Bupiri, whom I hired as a guide and translator for the fieldwork. 
Roger effectively made the research possible of Padiri’s Maï-Maï group possible. The 
fact that Roger is related to General Padiri, is a Maï-Maï partisan, is “100 per cent” 
Mutembo28 and is from Bunyakiri facilitated my research immeasurably. Moreover, 
Roger is a graduate in French and speaks Kiswahili, Kitembo and Kinyarwanda, 
which was necessary since only a minority of the Maï-Maï speak French.  
 
As my experience and friendships with the Maï-Maï deepened, I slowly became 
capable of asking bolder and more challenging questions and found myself in 
situations that I would have never thought possible at the outset of the fieldwork. It is 
crucial to note in this respect that, in the city of Bukavu, even though it is recognised 
that the Maï-Maï are the main reason for eastern Congo today not being in the hands 
of the Rwandan, Burundian and Ugandan governments, the Maï-Maï are often 
depicted as, “primitives”, “dirty”, “foresters”, or “spirits”, in possession of 
supernatural powers, and in any case, as more than a little dangerous. Thus, when I 
informed people that I was studying the local resistance movement, it was not 
uncommon for me to be warned that this could be a hazardous project, for they 
despised foreigners and, while their objective was almost unanimously approved of, it 
was commonly thought that they were being assisted by darker forces. There were 
enough rumours of cannibalism and atrocities associated with the Maï-Maï circulating 
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  For a far from exhaustive overview of the ethnographic accounts of local cultures and traditions see 
Cuypers (1965). Some examples of this body of knowledge are Colle (1921, 1971 [1937]) and Masson 
(1960) on the Bashi; Bourgeois (1954, 1956a, 1956b) on the Banyarwanda and Barundi; Biebuyck 
(1956, 1957, 1966, 1976) and Biebuyck and Mateene (1969) on the Banyanga; Viaene (1952) on the 
Bahunde; Dubuisson (undated, report in the archives of the Musée Royale de l’Afrique Centrale, 
Tervuren) on the Batembo, and Biebuyck (1973) on the Barega.   
28
 In Swahili mu- is a prefix used to signify that a noun is in the singular. Mutembo, therefore, refers to 
an individual member of the Tembo tribe. The prefix ba- is used to designate the plural. Batembo hence 
signifies the entire tribe or several members of a tribe. 
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in Bukavu to shake my confidence severely in the feasibility of carrying out such a 
study.  
 
Nonetheless, my perception of “risk” as a “young white Danish student” without a 
doubt influenced the fieldwork. At times I felt more at risk because of it and I 
hesitated to ask certain questions and go to certain places. It is clear that being a 
muzungu (white) immediately activated racialised power relations. Being muzungu, in 
the eyes of most of my respondents automatically conferred upon me certain qualities, 
most noticeably the assumption that I was rich and powerful. In the eyes of my 
interlocutors, “the Western world” is an almost mythical place of immense affluence, 
as well as being the place from which the world, including their own, is controlled. 
This had the effect that much was expected of me; thus a good number of the Maï-
Maï recognised that I was an important resource, someone to whom they could pass 
on their message to the outside world. For instance, towards the end I was asked to 
facilitate a dialogue between the UN and them in order find a resolution to a military 
stand-off between certain Maï-Maï commanders and the leadership of the 10th military 
region29 for they believed that if I accompanied their delegation to MONUC it would 
influence MONUC’s attitude towards them in a positive way. 
 
The point here is that being a muzungu who is associated with a university in the west 
and also affiliated also with the Catholic University of Bukavu conferred upon me 
significant qualities. While this definitely increased the interest in me, it also brought 
with it certain expectations, which in some cases turned into disappointments when it 
became clear that I was not capable of living up to them, despite my efforts to 
persuade them that I could not do much to change their situation in any significant 
way. Having said that, the great majority of the Maï-Maï that I met were neither 
hostile nor suspicious of my motives, but rather were eager to explain the reason for 
their resistance. I was often met with curiosity and sometimes with befuddlement, 
because, for most Maï-Maï, it was just as unlikely a scenario that a muzungu could 
have found his way into his or her life as carrying out such a fieldwork had originally 
seemed to me. 
 
This was an at times frustrating, agonisingly time-consuming and nerve-wracking, 
but, nevertheless always exciting and highly explorative, even detective-like attempt 
to piece together a solid empirical foundation from which to discern rationalities and 
practices of nation-building and national liberation in the context of the Congolese 
conflict. It was a process which at every turn provided me with new insights, surprises 
and modes of problematisations, which also means that only a fraction of the material 
gathered is represented in the dissertation. It should be noted that, as profound a 
privilege and a pleasure it was for me to engage in a dialogue with my respondents it 
was at times excruciating to share their destitution and suffering. 
 
Ultimately I have ended up with a dispositif which consists of two separate bodies of 
primary empirical material: on the one hand we have the material of “human security” 
consisting of threat assessments, development reports, poverty-reduction strategy 
papers, human development reports, commission reports, UN Security Council 
resolutions etc.; and on the other hand, we have the material of the Maï-Maï resistance 
consisting of the narratives of Maï-Maï officers, kadogos, doctors, security agents and 
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 The tenth military region corresponds to the geographical limits of South Kivu. 
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civilian personnel along with administrative reports, decrees, statutes, letters, memos, 
biblical verses and much more. And what links this heterogeneous grouping together 
are certain presuppositions of how to promote the life of the Congolese population 
collectively and as individuals.  
3. For a Safer World 
On the 14th August, 1879, I arrived before the mouth of this river to ascend it. With the 
novel mission of sowing along its banks civilised settlements, to peacefully conquer and 
subdue it, to remould it in harmony with modern ideas into National States, within whose 
limits the European merchant shall go hand in hand with the dark African trader, and 
justice and law and order shall prevail. 
- Henry Morton Stanley 1885: I 
Statistical patterns are useful in that they can suggest policies that might typically work 
in particular situations. 
- Collier et al. 2003 
 
The objective of this chapter is to map out the problematisations, rationalities, 
strategies and techniques of government that are applied in the international 
community’s quest to bring about “security” and “development” in the Congo. That 
is, I present an analytic of how development’s rationalities and techniques of global 
modelling are actually trying to shape subjectivities in the Congo. The critical 
potential of the approach chosen here lies in its drawing attention towards how 
development makes its object and to re-politicising the sorts of concrete practices this 
objectification stimulates. I argue that, amidst the fashionable tropes of “human 
development”, “human security”, “participation” and “empowerment”, which focus 
on making the underdeveloped develop and secure themselves, there exists a 
distinctly authoritarian strategy, which is certainly not beyond a reflexive recourse to 
military solutions, an which, at any given time, can be invoked to reassert order, 
stability and continuity in the face of global biospheric and societal uncertainty. I 
want to show that, while fundamentally modern in its genesis and character 
development (infused as it is with beliefs in progress, forward movement, the 
unfettered power of modern technology and so on), is not a strategy that will lead us 
unequivocally to a millennial ending, but rather, a bio-political strategy of “healing” 
the individual as well as social body, through mending the “gaps” in the individual-
society relationship in such a way that human activity does not become a constraint on 
development and a liability for international or collective security. I will also argue 
that the telos of the project to secure and develop the Congolese is rooted in the 
fundamental conviction that the Congolese can be guided back into the “family of 
nations” if he is made to discover the essence of what it means to be truly free.  
Desecuritising the Maï-Maï 
UN staff member:   The Maï-Maï, well, none of the civilians that I have spoken to 
support them.   
Author:   What about their claim that they are nationalists? 
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UN staff member:  Yeah, they say they are nationalists, but there is nothing behind it; 
they live on the back of the population.30  
There is hardly anything remarkable about this comment by this UN staff member for, 
as already noted many policy reports passing on recommendations and analyses to the 
practitioners of development and security in the Congolese conflict, consider 
communal political discourses – whether they refer to race, ethnic group, culture, or 
nation – as a veil for less reputable agendas. Thus, from that point of view it was a 
perfectly reasonable statement. However, his brief comment is connected to a wider 
regime of rationality, which is engaged when the international community scrambles 
to steer the Congolese population out of its current state of underdevelopment and 
insecurity. It is a grid of perception in which the Maï-Maï appear, not as liberators of 
the Congo and as champions of Congolese national unity, as they claim, but rather as 
rag-tag “disparate organizations lacking clear political ambitions” that have a 
“capability for nuisance and put any peace process at risk” (MONUC 2004: 1-2). 
Moreover, they are seen as “an ancient defence mechanism” (ibid.) recruited along 
tribal or ethnic lines (International Crisis Group 2000: 4; MONUC 2004: 3 UNSC: 
S/2002/341) (in fact one piece misidentifies the Maï-Maï as an “ethnic group” 
(Ndikumana and Kisangani 2005: 64)), which, according to most observers, makes 
them unlikely to contribute to the national peace process. Importantly, the Maï-Maï 
are considered to be a risk factor because they are believed to consist of marginalised 
youth who lack development opportunities: 
The societies in eastern Congo from where these Mayi Mayi groups originate, have 
experienced a long process of socio-economic decline since colonial times. Despite 
enormous natural resources in the region, the economy remained underdeveloped and 
large parts of the population were completely marginalised in the modernization process 
due to the lack of education and other development opportunities […] Since ancient 
times this led to tribal clashes and to the creation of local defence groups, mostly 
constituted from among the youth who lacked other development opportunities 
(MONUC 2004: 2). 
It is hardly surprising, then, that the Maï-Maï and other armed groups, from the point 
of view of the international community, appear as “the de facto enemy of the civilian 
population and peace” (Kassa 2004: 86). 
 
The singling out of irregular armed groups as a dangerous sub-population has made 
these groups a high-priority object of security-driven development interventions in 
Congo where the Demilitarisation, Demobilisation and Reintegration of combatants 
(DDR) is widely considered a sine qua non for the peace process in the Congo 
(UNDP [Congo] 2004: 65; World Bank [Congo] 2004a: 6-7, World Bank [Congo] 
2004b: 20). Indeed, this constitutes one of the main pillars of the World Bank’s 
Transitional Support Strategy for the Congo, in support of which the Bank has granted 
the government of the US$100 million US$ under the Emergency Demobilization and 
Reintegration Program (World Bank [Congo] 2004a).31 In fact this desecuritisation of 
                                               
30
 Conversation with UN staff member attached to the DDR unit held in Bukavu mid-February 2005. 
31
 The programme in the Congo is part of a wider regional programme known as the The Multi-
Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program and it is financed through two separate but 
complementary sources: World Bank/IDA funds amounting to up to an estimated US$200 million, and 
a Multi-Donor Trust Fund of an estimated US$300 million. This is a multi-agency effort that is 
intended to support the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in seven countries: Angola, 
Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, 
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“armed groups”32 has already been formalised in the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement, which was supported by the UN Security Council  Resolution 1258 
(1999). The agreement described these forces as “bent on destabilising neighbouring 
countries” as “negative forces” (The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 1999: Preamble). 
 
By the terms of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (1999: points 20 and 22) as well as 
the Final Act of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue mechanisms should be put in place to 
disarm armed groups and to ensure the immediate departure of all foreign armed 
groups present in the Congo – by force if necessary (Final Act 2003: point 12). The 
UN for its part was given an exhaustive and ambitious Chapter VII mandate33 under 
the UN Charter, in which it was required to undertake peacekeeping as well as peace 
enforcement missions; an undertaking, which amongst other things, required that the 
UN forces “track down and disarm” the “armed groups” in the interest of national, 
regional and international security (Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 1999: Chapter 8).34 
In the following pages I will seek to expose the style of reasoning that has created 
space for the possibility that the Maï-Maï and other irregular armed groups has come 
to be seen as a source of insecurity international security. 
Defending Global Society 
“Development” is a central concept of in the international government of our time and 
it has produced, it is fair to say, an insatiable thirst for its curative powers on both 
sides of the developed-underdeveloped divide. The United Nations has its 
development agencies, and the World Bank includes development as part of its 
official name – the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. A throng 
of people are in development’s employ and billions are spent each year in its pursuit: 
it would be difficult to find a single nation state in the so-called developed world that 
does not have its departments or ministries of local, regional and international 
development. Nor can any third-world nation expect to be taken seriously without the 
development label being prominently displayed on some part of its governmental 
architecture. International development, such as we know it today, is endowed with 
the power to transform the world and liberate humanity from its chains through the 
redemptive and curative powers of science, technology and human reason. As a 
consequence development has rarely broken free from organicist notion of growth and 
from a close affinity with of teleological views of history, science and progress as 
several critical analyses of development have repeatedly stressed (see, for instance, 
Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1990; Pieterse 2001; Porter 1995, Rist 1990).  
                                                                                                                                      
Rwanda and Uganda. It is the largest programme of its kind in the world and it is being financed by 
eleven governments, the European Commission and the World Bank, and implemented by over forty 
partners.   
32
 Annex C to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement defines the “Armed Groups” as: “forces other than 
Government forces, RCD and MLC that are not signatories to the agreement. They include ex-FAR, 
ADF, LRA, UNRF II, NALU, Interahamwe militias, FUNA, FDD, WNBF, UNITA and any other 
armed forces” (Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 1999: Annex C). There was some confusion about the 
extent of the definition of armed groups, and in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement especially, whether or 
not it included Congolese groups such as the Maï-Maï (see, for instance UNSC S/2002/314)(see, for 
instance,. 
33
 A Chapter VII mandate authorises the Security Council to “take action by air, sea or land forces as 
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” (UN 1945: Chapter VII). 
34
 The mandate of MONUC has gradually increased the scope of MONUC’s activities since its creation 
in 1999. In effect, MONUC has the largest budget of any peacekeeping mission in the world absorbing, 
roughly US$650 million of the global peacekeeping budget of US$2.8 billion a year. 
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Escobar (1995) has shown that post-World War II international development, for all 
its good intentions, is a mechanism for problematising the realities of poverty in ways 
that created the “Third World” as an object for systematic “improvement”. Henceforth 
interventions would be based on technologies and techniques of the government of 
populations and the “self” so that governmentalities would make sure that “realities” 
would always be amenable to the application of expert knowledge. Since then, geo-
political spaces have been differentiated predominantly through the use of teleological 
metaphors, that is, between “stages of development” – difference is a question of 
where a given country finds itself on the ladder of development. 
 
Following Escobar, one could claim that the “Third World” as we know it only came 
into being shortly after World War II, when it became problematised through the 
discipline of economy as an economically underdeveloped geo-political context in 
need of bio-political management: “Almost by fiat, two-thirds of the world’s people 
were transformed into poor subjects in 1948 when the World Bank defined as poor 
those countries with an annual per capita income below 100$ (Escobar, 1995: 24). 
The invention of the Third World, therefore, enframed a vast portion of the world’s 
population as “poor subjects” in need of development. This “War on Poverty” may 
have been well-intentioned, but it was nevertheless a strategy for constituting and 
regulating the subjectivities of the “poor”. International development instituted a 
vision of planetary life as a cohesive social fabric, a body economic, which, even 
though it was compartmentalised into states, slowly began to acquire something of the 
density and complexity of its projected object of intervention: the global population in 
its totality. 
 
From the mid-eighties onwards a more concerted effort to harness the capacities of 
the individual “elements” of the underdeveloped population of the world known as 
“human development” was ushered in (Pieterse 2001: 6; Rist 1997: 204-10). In 1990 
the UNDP published the first of its annual Human Development Reports (HDR), 
which have been instrumental in changing the face of development. “Human 
development” has put a much stronger emphasis on the “anatomy-politics of the 
human body”, the one pole of the bio-politics of the population concerned with the 
optimisation of the human being’s capabilities, the extortion of its potential, in order 
to bring about the health, wealth and happiness of individuals and populations. But 
before we move on, let us see what human development consists of: 
Human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. In principle, these 
choices can be indefinite and change over time. But at all levels of development, the 
three essential ones are for people to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge 
and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living. If these choices 
are not available, many other opportunities remain inaccessible. Human development 
does not end there. Additional choices, highly valued by many people, range from 
political, economic and social freedom to opportunities for being creative and productive, 
and enjoying personal self-respect and guaranteed human rights […] Development must, 
therefore, be more than just the expansion of income and wealth. Its focus is people 
(UNDP 1990: 10, my emphasis). 
The basic definition of “human development”, thus, is “the enlargement of people’s 
choices” – yet in spite of the proclamation of a bold new programme, “human 
development” is cast in terms of “levels of development”, thus linking it to 
nineteenth-century evolutionary epistemologies (see Wahlberg 2001; Cowen and 
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Shenton 1995). The makers of the HDR joined the chorus of critics to the macro-
economic structural adjustment approaches of the late 1970s and the 1980s and the 
Human Development Index was launched, which, according to makers of the report, 
was a better yardstick of the socio-economic progress of nations than the GNP. An 
aggregate indicator of the health, knowledge and wealth of a country’s population, it 
was argued, was a better indicator of human progress than the GNP, because it was 
designed to capture its very formula – the formation and use of capability. Human 
development advocates strategies that not only form capabilities through education 
and health interventions, but concurrently create the conditions in which all capable 
individuals’ “human rights” are secured. It is believed that, through human 
development human beings will be allowed to flourish and develop their full potential 
as human beings, which in turn will be a benefit to the overall progress of their 
societies.  
  
However, the renewed enthusiasm of the early 1990s for the reinvigorated project of 
bringing freedom and stability to the developing world, through human development 
was soon dimmed by the spectacularly violent collapse of states in the former Eastern 
Block, as well as in a number of countries of the “Third World”. Since then we have 
been challenged to understand why “genocide”; this “problem from hell” (Powers 
2002), seems to rear its ugly head time and time again when we were supposed to be 
reaching the “end of history” known as liberal democracy as Francis Fukuyama so 
famously prophesised in 1992 (Fukuyama 1998 [1992]). 
 
These horrific incidents sparked considerable anxiety, and it became clear that, just as 
“international development” had been in need of a reconfiguration, so was 
“international security”. Since then, the agenda for international security has aligned 
itself with the concerns of human development. The 1994 HDR launched the concept 
of “human security” because, as actual events in the world had made abundantly 
clear, states could not be counted on to be the vehicles of orderly development. The 
success of the concept has been astonishing, and today it is a key-concept in 
understandings of “international security”. But what is human security? According to 
the HSN “human security” is the endeavour: 
To protect the vital core of human lives in a way that enhances human freedoms and 
human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms 
that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical and pervasive threats 
and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. 
It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural 
systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity. 
(UN 2003: 4) 
When “human security” is unfolded we see that, inasmuch as it seeks to enhance 
“human freedoms and human fulfilment”, it carries the same fundamental message of 
the parent-concept of human development, namely the “enlargement of people’s 
choices”. There is a difference, though, for whereas “human development” is cast 
largely in terms of cultivating human potential, “human security” is cast in more 
defensive terms as the securing of universal human rights (ibid.: 7-8), as such 
implying that human behaviour and its excesses must be disciplined: “In defining 
security it is important that human security not be equated with human development. 
Human development is a broader concept – defined in previous Human Development 
Reports as a process of widening the range of people’s choices. Human security 
means that people can exercise these choices freely – and that they can be relatively 
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confident that the opportunities they have today are not lost tomorrow” (UNDP 1994: 
23). According to the HSN, the notion of “human development” is “far too upbeat to 
focus on rearguard actions needed to secure what has to be safeguarded”; human 
security, on the other hand, “supplements the expansionist perspective of human 
development by directly paying attention to what are sometimes called ‘downside 
risks’” (UN 2003: 8). “Human security” is thus seen as augmenting the efforts of 
“human development” by defending the pre-given liberties of the human being. 
 
According to the 1994 HDR, the new order of international security must be shifted 
from “territorial security” to “people’s security”. It identifies seven components of 
this new vision: “economic security”, “food security”, “health security”, 
“environmental security”, “personal security”, “communal security” and political 
security” (25). Human security is essentially understood as defence against any kind 
of insecurity in these areas: a human security “paradigm of development enables 
individuals to enlarge their human capabilities to the full and to put those capabilities 
to the full and to put those capabilities to their best use in all fields, economic, social, 
cultural and political” (ibid.). 
 
These areas of security are seen as the universal building blocks of human life. Of 
particular interest to the current dissertation is what is called “communal security”. 
According to the 1994 HDR, for instance, all human beings have an inalienable right 
to live in a community from where they are thought to “derive security” (ibid: 31). 
The HSN finds that the core task of the international community is to: “protect 
individuals and communities and empower them to thrive”, as well as to “fend for 
themselves” (UN 2003: 2).  
 
In the effort to create a global society, the rationale of “human security”, both 
implicitly and explicitly, argues that it is legitimate to overrule the sovereignty of 
states whose activities vis-à-vis other states and/or their own population do not 
promote “human security”. In the words of the authors of the 2005 HDR: 
We have a moral responsibility to address suffering and shared interests in collective 
security provide the two most compelling reasons for rich countries to participate in the 
development of a collective strategy for all. The rights violated by conflict are universal 
human rights that the entire international community has a moral and legal duty to 
uphold (UNDP 2005: 151, my emphasis).  
In the contemporary security-development dispositif the old state-centric notion of 
military security has become too narrow: “international security” no longer means 
carefully constructed safeguards against the threat of a nuclear holocaust, a likelihood 
considered to be greatly reduced by the end of the Cold War. It is nonetheless crucial 
to note that, in spite of the widening of the scope of security, the nation state is still 
considered a functional prerequisite of the system: “The state remains the 
fundamental purveyor of security […]. Human security complements state security, 
enhances human rights and strengthens human development” (UN 2003: 2). 
Moreover, it is believed that “the human security concept strengthens nation building 
by emphasising the community of interests between the state and the people” (Fouinat 
2004: 291, my emphasis). It becomes evident that a necessary part of achieving total 
human and collective security is to restore the state as a principle of organisation of 
world politics. It follows, therefore, that “greater efforts must be made to enhance the 
capacity of States to exercise their sovereignty responsibly” (UN 2004: 22), that 
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“good governance at the local, national, and international levels is perhaps the single 
most important factor in promoting development and advancing the cause of peace” 
(UN 2003: 66), and that “governance issues are closely linked to the empowerment of 
people and communities” (ibid.: 68). 
 
In this grid of visibility the state might no longer be the sovereign entity, but it is 
nevertheless considered necessary to strengthen its empirical texture, that is, the 
capacity of its institutions, since “human security and state security are mutually 
reinforcing and dependent on each other. Without human security, state security 
cannot be attained and vice versa: Human security requires strong and stable 
institutions” (UN 2003: 6). It is significant that, contrary to earlier notions of 
international security, the state is no longer considered immanent with its people, but 
instead now emerges as a complementary institution. “Human security” has instituted 
the global public realm as the seat of the sovereignty of global society. International 
security is no longer something to be resolved only by diplomats in the name of “our 
shared interest”. It is, rather, a transparent realm in which the political global citizen is 
called upon to work in concert with bureaucrats, diplomats and experts to challenge 
the despotism of governments – more than ever we are being asked to engage 
ourselves in the struggle to attain global human security through petitions, donations, 
demonstrations against globalization, volunteering and so on. The postulation of the 
existence of an inviolable interior domain of mental freedom (collective and 
individual) parallels this promotion of an alert global public sensorium of civil 
vigilance. In short, even in the realm of international relations – where the state and 
the population were for so long considered to be isomorphous and inseparable – the 
question dominating the agenda of international security today seems to revolve 
around the issue of how the state can most adequately fulfil its socio-economic 
vocation, that is to say, to create the optimal conditions for the activities that go on in 
civil society as a sort of servo-mechanism. 
  
Within the human security rationale, states that are not equal to their tasks needs to be 
corrected. They must be aligned with the universal demand for human development 
and human security – states need to practice “good governance”. In other words, if a 
given state is not capable of realising the supposed self-longing of its population to 
develop and secure themselves as individuals and as communities so that they may 
become capable of making free choices, it becomes a legitimate object of security-
driven development interventions. In fact this concern with promoting “human 
security” through the correction, normalisation and governmentalisation of the 
practices of the state has prompted the United Nations to take on the de facto 
administration of Cambodia, Timor-Leste and Kosovo, thereby reinventing the old 
colonial “trusteeship” formula. Therefore: “human security” does not supplant 
“state-security”:  it incorporates it in its formula thus making “state security” part of 
its own design. 
 
The emergence of a global public realm has inaugurated a new surface upon which 
security concerns can be imprinted. As we saw, this has effectively recast the state-
population relationship. That “human” security has become analysable has produced 
two major effects: first, “human security” is a concept which does not entail the 
constraints of the old military and state-centric notion of security of international 
relations. Not only has the intense problematisation of “human security” dislodged 
“security” from its foundation in the state, it has been branched out into a vast new 
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terrain. It has become a question of treating “security” not as an indissociable unity 
tied to the state, but of working it “retail”, individually and communally, on the level 
of each and every element of life as an infinitesimal expansion of biopower into all 
aspects of human life on a planetary scale. Secondly, the expansion of the scope of 
“international security” has produced new threats that can be acted upon, which is 
why threats to mankind seem to have multiplied. Behind the unchanged and required 
faith in the necessity of progress there is a “heightened sense of threat among many” 
(Annan 2005: 24), a feeling that “today’s world is marred by a proliferation of 
menace” (UN 2003: 2) and simply that “we live in an increasingly violent world” 
(UNDP 2005: 153). As late as 1987 “collective security” was still thought of in terms 
of “national security” and the pre-eminent threat was considered to be an excessive 
use of the right to national self-defence, especially in the face of a nuclear holocaust 
(UN 1987: 16). Today it can no longer be considered safe to count on the “balance of 
power”, between states since: 
Today’s threats recognize no national boundaries, are connected, and must be addressed 
at the global and regional as well as national levels. No state, no matter how powerful, 
can by its own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today’s threats and it cannot be 
assumed that every State will always be able, or willing to meet its responsibility to 
protect its own people and not to harm its neighbours. (UN 2004: 11) 
We can say that the focus on “human security” has in effect governmentalised 
international or collective security. This, however, does not imply an overruling of the 
state in the international system; instead, as we have seen, human security 
superimposes on the old state the imperative to facilitate the familiar apparatus of the 
social security of the welfare state within its domain. Today international 
development, through the universalisation of human security, has taken upon itself the 
task of governing the global species-population in the name of the security of each 
and all and has become the vehicle of an expanding and reinvigorated biopower.  
Assessing Human Insecurity 
Based on the reports of the World Bank and the UN, the basic diagnosis of the state of 
“collective security” is that the world is becoming less safe. This diagnosis hinges on 
three basic discoveries:  
 
1. Underdevelopment causes conflict; as a consequence, armed warfare is 
concentrated inside the world’s “least developed countries”. This has made “civil 
war”, or “internal conflict”, one of the great scourges of human security (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2002: 2; Collier et al. 2003: 93; UN 2003: 5, 21; UN 2004: 19; UNDP 
2005:153). 
 
2. We live in an increasingly unequal world, a world where the rich get richer and the 
poor gets poorer, both within countries and on a global scale. This aggravates and 
concentrates the dual problem of underdevelopment and insecurity in the least 
developed countries (Collier et al. 2003: 53; UN 2003: 132; UN 2005: 26; Annan 
2005: 7, 53; UNDP 2005: Chapters 2, 5). 
 
3. Global interdependence means that underdevelopment is a threat to underdeveloped 
countries as well as to developed ones. Many new threats are believed to be emerging, 
as a multitude of global population processes creates butterfly effects in all corners of 
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the globe linking threats in the North and the South together on a hitherto unknown 
scale (Collier et al. 2003: 1-3; UN 2003: 12; UN 2004: 2; UNDP 2005: 168). 
 
It is only fair to mention that the UN reports and World Bank reports have two 
distinct modes of problematising the relationship between insecurity and 
underdevelopment. Paul Collier and his research team at the World Bank assess the 
correlation between development and “civil war” through the use of a purely 
econometric model (the so-called “Collier-Hoeffler model of civil war onset”). In 
retrospectively investigating all “civil wars” that took place during 1960-99, Collier 
and Hoeffler (2002) take all the countries in the world and divide the period into eight 
five-year sub-periods. During each sub-period each country could potentially 
experience an outbreak of civil war. The challenge that they set themselves is to 
explain why this has happened in 52 cases but not in the others. They find that: 
Three economic factors are significant: the level of per capita income, its rate of growth, 
and its structure, namely the dependence on primary commodity exports. Doubling the 
per capita income approximately halves the risk of rebellion; each additional percentage 
point on the growth rate reduces the risk by approximately one percentage point; and the 
effect of primary commodity dependence is nonlinear, peaking when such exports are 
around 30 percent of GDP. (Collier and Hoeffler 2002 in Collier et al. 2003: 58) 
This leads to the conclusion that “the key root cause of conflict is the failure of 
economic development (ibid.: 53). 
 
Neither the 2005 HDR nor the HSN are as confident in positing the objective 
correlation between economic regression and insecurity; but while the HSN is content 
with noting that “[m]any countries have simultaneously experienced – and continue to 
experience – economic destitution and inequality and political strife” (UN 2003: 132) 
the UNDP is more ambitious and finds that a low score on the HDI index increases 
the risk of conflict: “there is a strong association between low human development 
and violent conflict. Indeed, violent conflict is one of the surest and fastest routes to 
the bottom of the HDI table – and one of the strongest indicators for a protracted stay 
there. Of the 32 countries in the low human development section of the HDI table, 22 
have experienced conflict at some point since 1990” (UNDP 2005: 154-5). For the 
UNDP, then, the probability of conflict can be measured by scrutinising the combined 
performance levels in the health, education and economy of the given country – the 
indicators of a country’s level of human development. 
 
The World Bank team clearly operate with the notion of Homo economicus derived 
from neo-classic economics, which presupposes that “man”, by nature’s hand, is 
predisposed to obtain the highest possible gain for himself. This is why the team, 
through highly complex statistical manoeuvres, reduces the risk of conflict to a 
function of “atypical opportunities for building a rebel organisation” (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2001: 1). The “risk” of an internal conflict breaking out is therefore 
explained as being determined by the iron law of viability. 
No militarily and financially viable opportunity to promote a political agenda by 
rebellion will be missed…local violence entrepreneurs will set up rudimentary protection 
rackets loosely linked to political demands. In such circumstances the ostensible 
grievance might be any of a wide range of things […]. Whether violence remains 
peripheral…or becomes large enough to generate widespread death and destruction, may 
depend as much upon whether an illegal, private, military organization is militarily and 
financially viable as upon the political issue itself. Although political conflict is common 
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to all societies, civil war is concentrated in the lowest-income countries. In a sense this is 
hopeful. It is an indication that peace does not depend on resolving all political conflict 
and that such conflict is normal. (Collier et al. 2003: 89-91) 
According to the researchers of the World Bank, low economic growth, low per capita 
income, and dependence on primary commodity exports are “atypical” and render 
rebellion economically viable. By recourse to a model that is “in the rational choice 
tradition” (Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2002), the team in effect objectifies 
primitive modes of production and poverty as direct causes of conflict because they 
expose society to the self-rending activities of the economy. The statistical facts are 
believed to be the mirror image of ungoverned self-interest. However, there is an 
inherent contradiction in the argument put forward by the World Bank team, for at the 
same time as they claim to be making a study in the “rational choice tradition”, which 
explicitly presupposes a transcendental subject,  they also claim to be using an 
“agnostic empirical approach” (Collier et al. 2003: 58). In effect, it is this rather odd 
empirico-transcendental hypothesis that allows them to conclude that the root-cause 
of civil war is that it is rational to start a rebellion when circumstances are “atypical”; 
that is, in a situation of “development in reverse”.35 In this mode of objectification, 
the statistical evidence (the empirical) functions as the concrete manifestation of the 
transcendental (rational choice). 
 
In a similar vein, although articulated in less rigorous econometric positivism, the 
2005 HDR sees there being a “cluster of risks” that increase the probability of violent 
conflict, including poverty, inequality, institutional failure, undemocratic political 
structures, economic shocks and political tension between elites (UNDP 2005: 162). 
Therefore, whereas the World Bank sees rebellion as a rational pursuit of self-interest 
when it is viable, the UN understands it principally as a result of complex political, 
social and economic factors (ibid.: 162-8).36 
 
Despite the differences in the modes of problematisation of the UN and the World 
Bank respectively both are underwritten by the assumption that low development 
indicators signify a given country are at a high risk of civil war; in other words, as a 
country descend the ladder of development, the “risk” of conflict increases. If we 
accept the hypotheses of the World Bank and the UNDP in stating that the probability 
of a conflict breaking out in a given country is determined by that country’s level of 
development under the various definitions given, then “danger”, as a synonym for 
risk, is a function of deficiency and backwardness, or underdevelopment. The 
                                               
35
 The epistemological contradiction inherent in this style of argumentation is, according to Foucault, 
characteristic of modern systems of objectification. “Man” is simultaneously viewed as capable of 
understanding the laws of nature and as limited by them. Modern systems of objectification therefore 
begin with the incredible and ultimately unworkable idea of the human being as sovereign precisely by 
virtue of being enslaved (Foucault 1966: 320 pp.). “It is within this vast but narrow space, opened up 
by the repetition of the positive [empirical] within the fundamental [transcendental], that the whole of 
this analytic of finitude – so closely linked to the future of modern thought – will be deployed; it is 
there that we shall see the in succession the transcendental repeat the empirical” (ibid.: 326, my 
translation). Modern social sciences presuppose that human beings are bestowed with an invisible 
universal rationality, which is simultaneously also an empirical fact. The collapse of the economically 
rational being into an empirically observable phenomenon is merely an offshoot of this mode of 
objectification.  
36
 It must be said though that the HDR 2005 relies heavily on the findings of Paul Collier’s research-
team when it explains the causes of internal conflict (155-7). 
   
 46
problematisation of the human security rationale is that “risk” is linked to “capacity”. 
But what kind of reality does the “risk” of internal conflict refer to? 
 
I will argue that the statistical correlation between underdevelopment and internal 
conflict is first of all a rational outline, a means of disassembling, reconstructing and 
organizing reality. Using the numbers of development indicators as indicators of 
danger, this mode of objectifying confronts the world of lived experience (and all of 
its terrors) with the more neutral, predictable and technically accessible world of risk. 
A new sphere of factuality is created as a country’s risk to global peace can now be 
stated numerically and arranged in tables as a function of its level of development. It 
might be fruitful to see this tabulation and compartmentalisation of danger and 
underdevelopment as a printed version of a Benthamite pan-optical monitoring 
mechanism that is, as an epistemologico-political gridwork watched over by the 
experts of “human security”; as a tool of surveillance at a distance. Through the 
expertise offered by statistical measurement, it becomes possible to monitor the 
totality of global society through graphs and tables indicating countries’ level of 
performance and carving out a new space within which bio-political technologies of 
security can work. 
  
As we saw “human security” is seen as “interdependent”. As a result, the “fragile” or 
“failed” states of the developing world have become an object of intense geo-political 
concern and there is a genuine fear of contamination, a fear that the catalogue of 
afflictions at present concentrated and procreating in the “marginalised developing 
countries” (Collier et al. 2003: x) can spread and disrupt the order and stability of the 
global system:  
Conflict-prone states pose an immense threat not just to their own citizens, but to the 
international community. They are a natural locus for warlords, criminal networks and 
extremist groups seeking to exploit a vacuum of governance. From Afghanistan to West 
Africa and beyond, state breakdown opens the door to the creation of havens for groups 
posing security threats to local people and to the incubation of cross-border threats linked 
to flows of refugees, arms trafficking, drug economies and disease. Fragile states matter 
beyond their borders partly because they lack the capacity to effectively control their 
territories, which can become safe havens for terrorists and criminal organisations. 
(UNDP 2005: 168) 
Civil war, terrorism, transnational crime, absence of democracy, bad governance, 
corruption, poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation colludes and 
combines when the order and stability of a functional state is not present. A lack of 
state capacity produces a lack of unity between the sacred trinity of population, 
territory and state. Therefore, when a state is not capable of extending its power over 
its geographical territory, a “vacuum of governance” (ibid.) is seen as unleashing the 
obscure and repeated violence of unregulated human conduct. 
 
Failed states are dangerous disorderly elements because they seem to emanate “rings 
of suffering” that threaten the global equilibrium (Collier et al. 2003: 1-3). This 
realization has prompted an increased consensus that it is necessary to integrate 
defence and foreign policies with development policies. As a consequence one can 
observe a more concerted effort at directing funds towards the world’s “failed states” 
(Department for International Development 2005; United States Agency for 
International Development 2005; Collier et al. 2003; UNDP 2005, UN 2003, G8 
2005).  
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Framing a country as a security risk to other countries by virtue of its low-
development indicators makes the development of the developing countries a matter 
of life and death for the donor countries. If underdevelopment represents a global 
“risk”, it necessarily also presents both the underdeveloped and the developed with an 
ultimatum: eradicate underdevelopment, or face the risk of living in perpetually 
declining security:  
All societies depend much more on the acts and omissions of others for the security of 
their people, even for their survival. This reality is evident in all aspects of life – from 
sustaining the environment, to relieving poverty, to avoiding conflict. Given our moral 
obligations to others, and given our enlightened self-interest, we need to develop 
institutions that allow us to meet our responsibilities to others in today’s interdependent 
world. (UN 2003: 12) 
Within the rationale of human security, state failure and the concomitant resurgence 
in violence not only threatens the physical health of people, it also thwarts the 
promise of progress and order globally. Taking the example of Sudan the 2005 HDR 
explains that: “In Sudan violent conflict has not only claimed lives but has created 
conditions under which human development reversals are transmitted across 
generations” (UNDP 2005: 154-5).  
 
For all the complexity and variations of the human security rationale it seems to be 
revolving around one relatively sustained theme: the danger of untamed human 
nature. As we have seen “human insecurity” grows out of deficiency, and deficiencies 
are considered to be the result of faulty population processes: political, social, 
economic and individual. The World Bank research team, for instance, turns the 
promise of “pure reason” upside down by making “rebellion” a rational endeavour in 
atypical circumstances. There is an assumption within at work in the human security 
rationale that the human being is by nature’s hand free and its circumambient medium 
of its governmental practices therefore must be freedom. In the words of the HSN: 
“The vital core of life is a set of fundamental rights and freedoms” (UN 2003: 3). As 
we saw, however, the ungoverned spontaneous multiplication of liberties leads to 
disorder. The key term here is interest. Interest is endowed with the epistemological 
status of an instinct i.e. an inherent natural condition which is a sort of transcendental 
form of rationality. The word, however, is used with two radically different 
connotations in the discourse of human security. The first use of the word “interest” is 
positive: “enlightened self-interest”, “public interest”, “shared interest”, or “common 
interest”. The second is negative: “narrow interests”, or, plainly “self-interest”. Global 
society and its economy can and must be governed only in accordance with, and in 
respect for, the natural law of human interest (“interest” used in this context is of 
course another way of saying “freedom”). “Interest” is endowed with the capacity to 
generate its own order and progress; “enlightened interest”, however, in 
contradistinction to instinctual interest or freedom, is the elaborate and conscious 
form of this natural instinct. It is true freedom.  The modelling of global society is 
trapped in the game of truth where individual human “interest” is simultaneously 
imbued with the capacity to multiply spontaneously into benign population-processes 
or so-called “virtuous circles” (Stewart 2004: 278-9; UNDP 2005: 48; Collier et al. 
2003: 1), as well as to degenerate into “vicious circles”, which are dangerous self-
devouring population processes during which narrow self-interests perpetually 
outflank the “shared interest of humanity” (Stewart 2004: 278-9; UNDP 2005: 338; 
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UN 2003: 151; Annan 2005: 12). “Vicious circles of lack of development leading to 
conflict leading to lack of development can readily emerge. We can observe this 
situation in many countries in Africa. Conversely virtuous cycles should also be 
possible, with high levels of security leading to development and further promoting 
security” (Stewart 2004: 278-9). The notion of the conflict trap – perhaps the most 
widely recognised qualification of the relation between “underdevelopment” and 
“insecurity” –  is a metaphor for the notion of the vicious circle of poverty and war 
(UNDP 2005: 157; UNDP [Congo] 2004: 13; UNDP 2003: 95; World Bank [Congo] 
2004b: 12). 
 
I would argue, however, that, if there is any intrinsic meaning to the notion of the 
“conflict trap”, then it is as a powerful mystical force of nature that erodes the order 
of society. The following is an excerpt from the BCT: 
Wars are particularly lengthy if a society has extremely unequally distributed income and 
a very low average income, possibly because the cost of sustaining a rebellion is low if a 
country has many destitute people, and possibly because the governments of such 
countries are typically weak. Wars are particularly lengthy if the society is composed of 
two or three ethnic groups, perhaps because this makes creating distinct identities of 
support easier for both rebels and government.  
Over the first four years of war the chances of peace gradually deteriorate. Presumably 
the conflict intensifies hatreds, and it may also gradually shift the balance of influential 
interests in favour of continued conflict. Criminal entrepreneurs do well out of war at the 
expense of other interests, and so in these early stages of conflict the criminals thrive 
while the honest decline […] rebellions have gradually changed their character becoming 
less political and more commercial. Violence entrepreneurs […] may gain from war to 
such an extent that they cannot credibly be compensated sufficiently to accept peace […] 
Asking a rebel leader to accept peace may be a little like asking a champion swimmer to 
empty the pool. […] Hence once a rebellion has started, there appears to be something of 
a trap: powerful forces keep a conflict going (Collier et al. 2003: 83, my emphasis). 
I think it is not overstating the facts to say that the efforts to bring about security and 
development in the world is underpinned by the assumption that certain forces are at 
play – immanent energies – which, in particularly abnormal cases (i.e. cases of 
extreme underdevelopment), has allowed the people to be swept away in bloody 
upheavals. The war itself is not this force, it is just the stage on which this great 
human drama takes place, an empirical fact, a statistical entry, and no more. The true 
force of the conflict trap is the transcendental power of interest – the engine of all 
human activity (note the metaphorical analogy between a “champion swimmer and 
the “rebel leader”). Interest is thus understood as an integral part of human nature, as 
a great force, which is potentially destructive of order if it is not developed and 
secured. Therefore, when a rebellion occurs, it is because a particularly terrible 
manifestation of this force is allowed to wreak havoc. The notion of interest, derived 
from the science of economy and political science, has tremendous symbolic efficacy 
in the rationalities and practices of human security, and I would argue that neither 
“human security” nor its counterpoint “human insecurity”, such as we know them 
today, would be as they are if it were not for the ultimately metaphysical notion of 
“interest”. Interest is the force that can multiply into “vicious circles” as well as 
“virtuous circles”, that is, into supposedly dangerous or positive population processes. 
The point here is that within the thought-space of the human security rationale, 
interest is held to be a pre-given quality of the human being. In this optic, the 
significance of the rationalities of human security is that they constitute interest as an 
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ethical substance which, precisely because it is assumed to be a natural condition of 
life, can be formed, transformed and improved, making it a viable object of security-
driven development interventions. 
 
The notion of the conflict trap is a mode of objectification which is not in itself an art 
of government. The notion demands, however, that government take cognizance of 
the potentially natural destructive forces of humanity and it swiftly invalidates 
policies that do not take into account the latent natural inclination of human beings to 
pursue “narrow interests”. In addition, it affirms the dense, opaque and necessarily 
autonomous character of global processes of population, but it remains, nevertheless, 
preoccupied with the vulnerability of these same processes, and therefore with the 
need to enframe them in the mechanisms of “human security”. 
The Dark Side of Human Security 
I have argued that in the contemporary human security rationale the role of the state 
has been recast. More than ever before the emphasis is on its capacity to guarantee the 
freedom of each individual in the global social body. When the state “fails”, it de-
links populations from global society. And therefore, within the grid of perceptions of 
“human security”, it is precisely at the critical disjuncture between population, 
territory and state that dangerous subjectivities crop up. Consequently, global peace is 
considered to be threatened by a global anti-society consisting of de-linked 
subjectivities such as “terrorists” (Collier et al. 2003: 42; UN 2004: 20; UNDP 1994: 
2; UNDP 2005: 152, 168), “criminal networks” (Collier et al. 2003: 12, UN 2003: 22, 
31; UN 2004: 49-51; UNDP 2005: 168) and “rebels” (Collier et al. 2003; UN 2003: 
30; UNDP 2005: 166). 
 
The object of the “failed state” is largely analogous to the dangerous subject in the 
human security rationale; the notion of the state in lack is folded back on to 
individuals who are seen as potentially dangerous because the disjunction between 
state and population opens up a space for the savagery of the human interest to roam 
free. We could therefore infer that the human security rationale as creates a space for 
the individualisation of risk.  
 
However, there are no clear boundaries between these modalities of dangerous 
subjectivities, as the terms are highly interchangeable. One of the reasons for this is 
that they all seem to grow out of a single social pathology: underdevelopment. In the 
midst of the evolution of global society, abnormal residues can be identified 
comprised of those individuals and groups who, outpaced and left behind by the 
proper rate of development, endanger by their very existence the orderly functioning 
of the whole. In effect, the dysfunctionality and backwards momentum of the 
underdevelopment-failed state-dangerous subjectivities nexus marks the negative pole 
of the development-state-security nexus. A huge “gap” needs to be filled if the 
distance between these two counterpoints is to be narrowed down. In so far as the 
rebel, the terrorist and the criminal overlap, they are simultaneously insufficient 
subjects of law and insufficient subjects of order; their activities are, in other words, 
both abnormal and illegal. This is why dangerous beings are seen at once as the 
casualties of progress and globalization and as a class apart, their status as human 
beings oscillating somewhere in between being victims and being criminals: 
“Deprivation and unequal treatment may not generate an immediate revolt, but they 
can remain in people’s memory and influence the course of events much later. And 
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while the leaders of conflicts often come from the more prosperous parts of society, 
poverty can provide rich recruiting grounds for the ‘foot soldiers’ of violent 
engagement” (UN 2003: 7). The World Bank argues along similar lines: 
If a country is in economic decline, is dependent on primary commodity exports, and has 
a low per capita income and that income is unequally distributed, it is at high risk of civil 
war. This cocktail is so lethal for several reasons. Low and declining incomes, badly 
distributed, create a pool of impoverished and disaffected young men who can be 
cheaply recruited by ‘entrepreneurs of violence’. (Collier et al. 2003: 4) 
The quote reveals that certain elements are not just victims of poverty, but in fact 
“entrepreneurs of violence”. While all underdeveloped individuals are potentially 
dangerous, some individuals contain a deeper flaw in their personality. This flaw is 
none other than the inclination to pursue illegitimate interests. Understood in this 
sense, the supposed inclination to pursue one’s interests and desires at the expense of 
“common interests” is more akin to an “inherent flaw”, the inability of certain 
individuals to subdue their natural impulses. Human security thus creates, not only 
different modalities of dangerous action (crime, terrorism, rebellion etc.), but also two 
kinds of dangerous individuals: those who can be corrected, and those who cannot 
even when subjected to indefinite correction. There is a sense in which the lack of 
development allows such purely dangerous individuals to extend their operations to 
the whole of society: 
One part of society is producing while another part is destroying. Most of the cost of 
civil war accrues from these destructive activities. The power of the gun displaces civil 
rights. Men with guns, from both rebel and government forces, can steal, rape, and 
murder with impunity. Behind this veil of havoc, the localized collapse of order extends 
impunity to criminal and other antisocial behaviour. (Collier et al. 2003: 12) 
A lack of law and order allows inherently dangerous individuals to operate freely, 
with impunity. Herein lies a difficult paradox for human security, for at the same time 
as it legitimises its interventions in human lives as liberating, it considers the 
autonomy of certain individuals vis-à-vis the state as dangerous. Underdevelopment 
not only victimises people – it allows dangerous human beings with “devious 
objectives” (Newman and Richmond 2006: 102) to set the agenda. This bifurcation of 
the underdeveloped populace has produced a new category of people, so-called 
“peace spoilers” (see, for instance, Newman and Richmond 2006; Stedman 1997 and 
UN 2004: 59-60): “These actors are either within or (usually) outside the ‘peace 
process’, and use violence or other means to disrupt the process in pursuit of their 
aims” (ibid.: 102). This mode of analysis creates an altogether different subject, one 
who cannot be pacified and governed by increasing his freedoms, but only by 
restricting them. Human security therefore creates a subjectivity that entirely negates 
society and is only bent on its destruction: 
The people who join rebel groups are overwhelmingly young uneducated males. For this 
group objectively observed grievances might count for very little. Rather, they may be 
disproportionately drawn from those easily manipulated by propaganda and who find the 
power that comes from the possession of a gun alluring. Social psychologists find that 
around three per cent of the population has psychopathic tendencies and actually enjoys 
violence against others, and this is more than is needed to equip a rebel group with 
recruits. (Collier et al. 2003: 68) 
An “uneducated young male” is a person who, by reason of a causal chain, carries a 
particular high index of danger; he might be a “psychopath”, but he does not need to 
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be. The individualisation of risk that is promulgated by the human security rationale 
thus creates a sphere of illegality and abnormality at the level of the subject which 
must be neutralised in the name of security of all. It is not, I would argue, 
unreasonable to claim that, in so far as it institutes a fundamental rift in the biological 
continuum of the global population species – a rift between those who posses an 
ethics of how to live and those who do not, between those who are secure and those 
who are not – the human security rationale is built around division. 
 
It is crucial to recall, that amid incessant efforts to determine risk, the rationalisations 
of human security are not deterministic, “insecurity” is not considered a fixed racial 
attribute – on the contrary, the very condition of “human security”, as a corollary to 
“human development” is that human beings can be secured and developed. After all 
what would be the reason for the existence of “human security” and “human 
development” be if “human security” and “human underdevelopment” did not exist? 
The promise of evolution has to be held out. This is important because it means that 
those who now posses inferior capability are nevertheless considered to be equipped 
with the innate ability to develop themselves – and thus to become secure – given the 
right conditions and circumstances. It does not seek quell interest and desire, but to 
govern through it, to nurture, empower and care through them. “Interest” along with 
metaphorically connected notions such as “desire”, “allure” and “passion” are the 
ethical substance that “human security” seeks to shape. By creating simultaneously 
insufficiently secure and developed subjects, the human security rationale creates the 
actual matter of intervention. It is an attempt to fashion something out of the raw 
material of the subject’s innate capacities. One could say, therefore, that human 
security is built around the double “seed” of development and security that lies, 
sometimes dormant, within all subjects. This mode of problematisation challenges the 
underdeveloped and insecure subject to take up the responsibility of enhancing his or 
her capacity to act: 
The concepts of human security stresses that people should be able to take care of 
themselves: all people should have the opportunity to meet their most essential needs and 
to earn their own living. This will set them free and help secure that they can make a full 
contribution to development and that of their communities, their countries and the world. 
Human security is a critical ingredient of participatory development. (UNDP 1994: 24) 
With the dangerously deficient capacities of the underdeveloped subjects emerging as 
the concrete object of reform, “human security” has consolidated itself as an overall 
strategy of forming global citizens. In Cruikshank’s words, we might say that human 
security embodies modern “modes of government that work upon the capacities of 
citizens to act on their own behalf” (Cruikshank 1999: 39). Achieving such lofty goals 
quite evidently implies and requires a degree of ethical work on “underdeveloped” 
selves, a rectification of any part of their conduct that might hinder them in becoming 
responsible citizens of the state and the world. Moreover, it presupposes and operates 
through certain modes of subjectification that instruct the underdeveloped to conduct 
themselves in citizenly and secure ways, thereby making them simultaneously 
subjectivities of human development and security. Tackling the problems of human 
security is therefore dependent on mobilising and empowering the “poor”. The HSN 
argues that “[e]mpowerment is important because people develop their potential as 
individuals and as communities. Strengthening peoples’ abilities to act on their own 
behalf is also instrumental to human security” (UN 2003: 11). What types of work 
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upon the self – ascesis – are required to ameliorate the incompleteness that makes the 
underdeveloped dangerous?  
People who are equipped with information, habits of inquiry and reasoned argument are 
better equipped to lend their voice to protect human security” (UN 2003: 140); 
“education and building the institutions needed to deliver democracy is the first line of 
defence against violence” (UNDP 2005: 168); [s]upporting people’s ability to act on 
their own behalf means providing education and information so that they can scrutinize 
social arrangements and take collective action. (UN 2003: 11) 
There is a another difficult problem for the human security rationale, which is 
connected to the problem of reconciling the notion of an ontological state of freedom 
enjoyed by all human beings and the practical need to tame the risks that the exercise 
of freedom by necessity implies. The problem is related to the notion of “community” 
and its assumed constituent parts such as “tradition”, “culture”, “ethnicity”, “race”, 
“religion”, “network” or “nation” – in short, whatever in the eyes of the international 
community gives a group of people their distinctiveness in a global population which 
is considered to be heterogeneous and multicultural. The problem is often identified 
as “radicalism” (UN 2003: 65), “polarization” (Collier et al. 2003: 58) or “extremism” 
(UN 2003: 148). Like the notion of the narrow self-interest of the individual, that of 
radical communalism is understood as an excessive use of cultural freedom that 
upsets a fragile “balance of influential interests” (Collier et al. 2003: 83); radical 
communalism, like the dangerous individual, is seen as subversive. 
 
One modality of communalism that has been the object of particularly intense 
problematisation in the security-development dispositif is “ethnicity”: 
Traditional communities, particularly ethnic groups, can also come under much more 
direct attack from – from each other. About 40% of the world’s states have more than 
five sizable ethnic populations, one or more of which faces discrimination. In several 
nations, ethnic tensions are on the rise, often over limited access to opportunities – 
whether to social services from the state or to jobs from the market…As a result, about 
half the world’s states have recently experienced some interethnic strife. (UNDP 1994: 
32) 
But although there may be a profound anxiety vis-à-vis “ethnicity”, it is not seen as 
dangerous per se. Instead, ethnicity is perceived as dangerous inasmuch as it is easily 
manipulated and can be used to further parochial interests (ibid. 58-9; UN 2003: 32). 
Therefore while “ethnicity” is seen as a fundamental principle of social organization, 
particularly in so-called “traditional communities”, it is not itself a cause of insecurity. 
In the words of the BCT, “All ethnically differentiated societies have a few ethnic 
romantics who dream of creating an ethnically ‘pure’ political entity, but resources 
discoveries have the potential to shift such movements from the margin of 
romanticisms to the core agenda of economic self-interest” (Collier et al. 2003: 60, 
my emphasis). Ultimately, then, the politics of identity of ethnic identity is relegated 
to the realm of the epiphenomenal subsumed to objective economic interest, even if 
ethnicity is recognised as a fundamental modality of social organisation. There is 
nevertheless a structural homology between the notion of “interest” (individual 
energy) and the notion of “community dynamics” (social energy). Both are believed 
to be immanent energies which must be respected and which can be harnessed for the 
purposes of development and security, but which can also degenerate into vicious 
circles. In taking the example of Rwanda, the BCT claims that:  
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Social capital atrophied as the country, communities, and families fell prey to hatred and 
violence. Yet integrative forms of social capital increased within families fighting for 
survival; among individuals attempting to save or rescue Tutsi […]. Strong, exclusionary 
social capital also emerged within Hutu extremism, with extremely negative 
ramifications for those excluded, showing that violence can coexist with, or be the result 
of, strong social capital among its perpetrators […]. High levels of social capital existed 
both vertically and horizontally among Hutu ranks, while bridging social capital that 
linked Hutu with Tutsi was all but eliminated. (Collier et al. 2003: 16) 
Living in a community is considered a basic fact of human life, and, moreover, 
communities are believed to exist as homogenous entities with their own particular 
“social capital”, “traditions”, or whatever term is used  objectify those elements that 
make up a “community”. The presence of this ethnographically styled analysis of the 
community within the “human security” rationale inaugurates the community as a 
governmental field for development and security. In the same manner that it is 
possible to question the government (or lack of government) of states and the self-
government of individuals, it is possible to question the norms and traditions 
governing a community. The surveillance and governance of human security extends 
to all things human: “traditional communities can also perpetuate oppressive 
practices: employing bonded labour and slaves and treating women particularly 
harshly. In Africa, hundreds of thousands of girls suffer from genital mutilation each 
year because of the traditional practices of female circumcision” (UNDP 1994: 31). 
Traditions and cultures, even if they are considered entities which should be allowed 
to prosper and be free, must nevertheless also be normalised. The application of the 
multiculturalist hypothesis of ethnography in the human security rationale makes it 
possible to communalise risk. 
 
In the human security rationale insecurity and underdevelopment, are not seen as 
fixed racial attributes at either the level of the individuals or the community. The 
community, like the individual, is considered to be capable of liberating itself from 
underdevelopment and security with the proper guidance. This underscores how the 
rationalities of human security seek to include and co-opt human life rather than to 
exclude and deny it. It would thus be a mistake to see the technology of human 
security as an “ethnocentric” hegemonic project of global dominance masterminded 
by the development establishment. It is the converse: by embracing the notions of 
communal and individual freedom, development agencies today seek not only to 
govern through those freedoms, but to ensure and defend them. For example the HSN 
argues that, “to achieve peace and stability in today’s interdependent world [it is] 
decisive to develop the capability of individuals and communities to make informed 
choices and to act on their own behalf” (UN 2003: 5). Indeed, educating the future 
generations of the sanctity of cultural freedom is perceived as a fundamental building 
block in the fostering of global citizens:  
The formation of compassionate attitudes and ethical outlooks is central to empowering 
communities and furthering human security […]. In a world replete with divisive 
messages children and adults will not always adopt the mindset of global citizens in an 
interdependent world. To achieve long-term human security, education should promote 
understanding of people’s multiple identities and of the interlinkages within the common 
global pool of learning . (UN 2003: 141) 
In the final analysis “human security” is a techne that is build around a “growing 
recognition of the role of people – of individuals and communities – in ensuring their 
own security” (ibid.: 5).  This vision of recognising individuals and communities as 
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the engines of development and security in global society becomes part of the 
pedagogical project of “human security”. It is considered that, by raising people’s 
awareness of communal and individual interdependence and difference the world will 
ultimately become a safer place. This is considered crucial since desperate poor 
people (especially young men) are believed to be easily manipulated by divisive 
messages (especially ethnic and religious ones) (ibid.: 159; Collier et al. 2003: 68). 
Related to this argument we find the further argument that: 
One reason why rebel leaders promote ethnic grievances so prominently is that they are 
plausible and legitimate smokes-screens for less reputable agendas. The discourse of 
grievances articulated by rebel groups cannot necessarily be trusted. As with all political 
movements, the rebel organisation needs to emphasize grievances, and if necessary it 
will attempt to exaggerate them or to disguise its true interests in terms of more populist 
ones. (Collier et al. 2003: 62)  
Within the rationale of human security the communal dynamics – including 
“ethnicity” – must be developed and cultivated in such a way that they do not 
endanger the security of the greater community, be it the nation or global society. For 
that reason, compassionate attitudes and open-mindedness are considered not only as 
citizenly and as signs of maturity, but also as a bolstering of moral stamina a 
solidification of reason, which renders the potentially dangerous capable of 
withstanding the pressure of divisive messages: thus “care should be given to 
eradicating inflammatory messages” (UN 2003: 141). 
 
The techne of “human security”, however, despite its aversion to direct government – 
and even though it seeks to empower individuals and communities – contains a 
distinctly authoritarian strategy. When strategies of inclusion are considered 
inadequate, stronger measures must be employed. One of the methods suggested of 
dealing with violence entrepreneurs is to “cut the rebel financial jugular” (Collier et 
al. 2003: 142). This strategy entails shutting the rebel groups’ access to the global 
market by stricter controls of the flow of the types of commodities that are typically 
produced by rebel groups, such as diamonds, minerals and illegal drugs. Another way 
of cutting the financial jugular of rebels is to criminalise the political organisations of 
diaspora groups that support rebel groups in their country of origin (ibid.: 144-6, 163).  
 
A UN report entitled A more Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility begins its 
discussion of “Collective security and the use of force” in the following way: “What 
happens if peaceful prevention fails? If none of the preventive measures so far 
described stop the descent into war and chaos? If distant threats do become imminent? 
Or if threats become actual? Or if a non-imminent threat nonetheless becomes very 
real and measures short of the use of military force seem powerless to stop it?” (UN 
2004: 53). 
 
The questions posed above already contain their own answers. In the event that 
peaceful prevention fails, there will be “descent into war and chaos”. The primary 
enemy does not have a name: it is the anonymous and omnipresent forces of “war and 
chaos” that lurks within us all. It is not possible for a neutral governing body to have 
an enemy with a communal identity. Instead, military intervention, in the name of 
collective and human security, must be depoliticised. Somehow coercion must be 
disassociated with communal subjectivities and politics in order for the human 
security rationale to retain its integrity. It does this by explicitly de-racialising the 
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enemy and instituting a universal enemy within: the anti-social and predatory instinct 
of interest: “making peace in civil war requires overcoming daunting security 
dilemmas. Spoilers, factions who see a peace agreement as inimical to their interest, 
power, and ideology, use violence to undermine, or overthrow settlements […]. When 
peacekeeping operations are deployed to implement peace agreements, they must be 
equipped to repel attack from spoilers” (UN 2004: 60, my emphasis). “In Georgia” 
the BCT reminds us, “a few Russian peacekeepers have managed to bottle up 
passions that fuelled secessionist violence in Ossetia and Abkhazia” (Collier et al. 
2003: 164, my emphasis). The human security rationale, therefore, in so far as the use 
of force is being deployed to tame the dangerous interests that drive “spoilers” to 
upset order in global society is also an armed governmentality that legitimises military 
solutions to problems of insecurity. Any peacekeeping force must serve universal 
“global interest” (Collier et al. 2003: 165). Within the techne of “human security”, the 
authoritarian strategy of the use of force can be justified in order to quell the illegal 
and dangerous inner drives of people who have failed to tame their “passions”. 
Securing and Developing the Congo 
The Congo, as we know it today is an entirely modern construction which was created 
during the fierce geo-political competition between the Europe’s great powers to 
carve out as large empires as possible at the end of the nineteenth century. To avoid a 
great war over this vast but as yet scarcely explored territory believed to be an 
untouched and inexhaustible source of nature’s riches in the “heart of Africa”, the 
Belgian King Leopold II was granted the right to exploit its riches during the Berlin 
Conference in 1884-85 on the condition that the Congo River Basin remained an 
international free-trade zone. Thus was born the État Indépendant du Congo (Congo 
Free State) (Lemarchand 1982 [1964]: 30; Merlier 1962: 22-4; Uzoigwe 1985: 29).  
 
In the early colonial imagery, the “Congo” was a space which existed before history 
an unclaimed and timeless space whose very primevalness was a sign of the failure of 
human activity there. The Congo was consistently portrayed through the metaphor of 
“darkness”. The Congolese subjectivity was born as a racial counterpoint to civilised 
European subjectivity. A sustained image of the Congolese subjectivity as backward, 
childish, ape-like, primitive, cannibalistic, (noble) savage, idle and so on ensured that 
it came to embody the woes of Africa (Dunn 2003, especially Chapter 2; Thomas 
1994: 80-1). Colonial classics such as Henry Morton Stanley’s Through the Dark 
Continent (1878, 2 vols.), Congo and the Founding of its Free State (1885) and In 
Darkest Africa (1890), and Joseph Conrad’s The Heart of Darkness (1899), which 
became enormously popular at the time, were all set in the geo-political context that 
we know today as the Congo.37 These classics all enframed the Congo as a dark and 
wild place populated by equally dark and wild people. Enframing the Congo as not 
only dark, but the darkest, ensured that it became subject to all sorts of illumination. 
Not surprisingly, then, the colonial project was justified as Belgium’s “grand oeuvre 
civilicatrice”, that is, as an effort to bring enlightenment and progress to the last 
corner of the globe that had not yet awoken from its pre-historic sleep. According to 
King Leopold II, the imperial project was a mission to “open up to civilization the 
only part of the globe which it has not yet penetrated, to pierce the darkness in which 
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 Stanley undertook the first efforts to colonise the Congo by order of King Leopold II in a series of 
expeditions in the 1880s. 
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entire populations are enveloped, is, I venture to say, a crusade worthy of this age of 
progress” (quoted in Dunn 2003: 21). 
 
Even Joseph Conrad’s novel The Heart of Darkness, a direct attack on the cruelty of 
the agents of the Congo Free State, recognised that the Congo and its peoples were 
savages. The plot centres on the British character Marlow’s journey into the interior 
of the Congo to remove Kurtz, a company official who has “gone native”. Conrad 
employed familiar images of Congoness, most centrally the spatial trope that travel 
into the interior represented backward movement across time and space: “Going up 
that river was like travelling back to the earliest beginnings of the world, when 
vegetation rioted on the earth and the big tress were kings […]. We penetrated deeper 
and deeper into the heart of darkness […]. We were wanderers on a pre-historic earth 
[…]. The pre-historic man was cursing us, praying to us, welcoming us – who could 
tell?” (Conrad 1994 [1899]:  48). 
 
In this novel, the Africans are presented as beasts, cannibals, savages, as childlike 
primates. The interaction with these primitives and the African environment is what 
dragged Kurtz down civilisation’s pedestal. 
 
In circumscribing the Congolese subjectivity as both savage and backward, it became 
possible to undertake the violent subjugation of the Congolese: “[The Congolese is 
one who is] entirely hostile to all idea of work; which only respects the law of force, 
and knows no other argument than terror (President of the Congo’s Supreme Court of 
Justice quoted in Dunn 2003: 42). Similarly Stanley considered Africans to be inferior 
creatures who only understood violence: “Whatever deficiencies, weakness, and 
foibles that [Africans] may develop must be so manipulated that, while they are 
learning the novel lesson of obedience, they may only just suspect that behind all this 
there lies the strong unbending force which will eventually make men of them, wild 
things though they now are” (1878: 71). 
Desecuritising the Congo 
The contemporary imagery of the Congo is still haunted by the mythical figures of the 
savage danger of backwardness, deficiency and the lawless infinity of human nature. 
The years of warfare in the Congo are thought to provide evidence of the terrible 
consequences for “human security” of the disjunction between population, territory 
and state. For instance, the Congo is ranked second to last in Foreign Policy’s “Failed 
States Index”,38 only surpassed by Sudan (Foreign Policy 2005). Furthermore, it is 
estimated that 1.6 million Congolese are living as refugees in their own country and a 
further 460,000 are living as refugees abroad as of 2004 (UNHCR 2004). The Congo 
is a state with rampant health problems. Malaria is endemic, and a vast array of 
outbreaks, from cholera and measles to pertussis and re-emerging pathogens such as 
Marburg, Ebola and plague occur on a regular basis. Acute respiratory infections, 
diarrhoea and measles are also common (WHO 2006), and HIV prevalence is 
estimated at 4 to 5%. A staggering number of an estimated four million Congolese are 
thought to have died either by the hands of various armed groups or by the ripple 
effects of war, making it “the worst humanitarian disaster in the world since World 
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 “The Failed States Index” uses twelve political, economic, military and social indicators of 
instability: Demographic Pressures; Refugees and Displaced Persons; Human Flight; Uneven 
Development; Economy; Delegitimization of State; Public Services; Human Rights, Security 
Apparatus; Factionalized Elites and External Intervention (Foreign Policy 2005). 
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War II” (Coghlan et al.  2004). Crucially, the Congo is ranked number 167, or number 
ten from the bottom, in the Human Development Index as of 2003; the Congo’s life 
expectancy is merely 43,1 years, its literacy rate is 65.3%, its GDP per capita is $697, 
and its combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools is 
28%. These figures place it well below the threshold of “low human development” in 
all categories, except for literacy (UNDP 2005: 222), indicating that the Congolese 
are deficient in all areas of human development, and that the Congo is in a state of 
“development in reverse” (World Bank [Congo] 2004b: 10). 
 
 
The Failed States Index of Foreign Policy (Foreign Policy 2005). The Congo Outlined. 
 
In a case study entitled The Economics of Civil War: The Case of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo researchers Ndikumana and Kisangani, part of Paul Collier’s 
World Bank research team use the Congo to verify the underdevelopment-insecurity 
hypothesis: 
The probability of civil war in DRC is much higher than the population average: It 
ranges from 8 percent during 1975-79 to 77 percent during 1995-99, as compared to an 
average risk of war of 7 percent for all country-periods in the data […] the factors 
included in the [Collier-Hoeffler Model] make the DRC more prone to civil war than the 
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typical country […]. The DRC has lower values for per capita income, income growth 
(except for 1970-74), and peace duration, whereas it has higher values for the share of 
primary commodities in total exports, ethnic fractionalization, population, and 
geographic dispersion of the population, implying a higher risk of civil war. Among the 
factors included in the model, income growth rate, and dependence on primary 
commodities play a central role in causing conflict in the Congo. Low income and low 
expected economic growth reduce employment and profit expectations, which not only 
decrease the opportunity cost of joining a rebellion, but also weaken the government’s 
ability to counteract rebellion. (2005: 80) 
As the quote shows, the determination of the causes that makes the Congo especially 
prone to rebellion follows a familiar line of reasoning: the Congo’s utter lack of 
development has rendered rebellion an atypically viable enterprise. The Congo, 
therefore, by the logic of human security regime, emerges as a serious risk factor for 
“international security”:  
The longer the war keeps rumbling along and the vacuum of governance persists, the 
more opportunities will exist for an increase in transnational threats based in or 
emanating from the Congo. For example, the combination of Congo’s resources and lack 
of regulation could be exploited by money launderers, drug and diamond smugglers, 
arms dealers, sanctions busters, or even terrorists. Deadly diseases already constitute a 
threat, and an inability to contain potential epidemics also should be considered a 
transnational threat, given previous outbreaks of Ebola virus and other virulent diseases. 
(Prendergast and Smock 1999: 8; see also World Bank [Congo] 2002b: 4; World Bank 
[Congo] 2004b: 12) 
Like its colonial predecessor, the discourse of international development casts the 
Congo as a place where humanity’s brooding and menacing natural instincts have 
been permitted to unfold its destructive capacities. For instance, according to the 2004 
HDR for the Congo, the collapse of the formal sector of the Congolese economy has 
allowed it to degenerate into “savage capitalism”: the “activities of ‘savage 
capitalism’ multiplied and developed to the rhythm of the collapse of the state” 
(UNDP [Congo] 2004: 27, my translation), raising fears that “this vast country could 
degenerate into irreversible statelessness” (Prendergast and Smock 1999: 2). In 
similar vein an analysis by the International Crisis Group argued that: 
[A]fter two regional wars, and 34 years of mismanagement, little remains of the 
Congolese state. Outside major towns and away from strategic locations, there is little or 
no government presence. Foreign armies and their mining operations control much of the 
country’s legendary wealth, while rapacious militias and insurgent armies prey upon vast 
swathes of its territory. In sum, the de facto disappearance of the DRC as a nation state is 
well under way. (International Crisis Group 2001a: 2) 
The post-colonial state of the Congo is considered to be thoroughly corrupted (UNDP 
[Congo] 2004: 30; World Bank [Congo] 2004b: 18; World Bank [Congo] 2004c: 2). 
This leads the 2004 HDR to invoke the celebrated notion of the “criminalisation of the 
state in Africa” (Bayart 1989; Bayart et al. 1997): the Congolese state is considered to 
have transformed itself into a criminal predator “where the military and political class 
are systematically implicated in the illicit and non-productive self-enrichment to the 
detriment of general interest” (UNDP [Congo] 2004: 30).  
 
The same report concluded – as if it had taken a page out of the BCT – that “the 
Congolese society’s propensity to violence has economic causes because the efficacy 
of predatory attitudes of internal as well as external actors (especially their capacity to 
undertake [entreprendre] predatory wars) depends on the weakening of social norms 
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against corrupt practices, illicit enrichment, and the squandering of public resources” 
(ibid.: 60). Corruption, for instance, is considered a serious “risk” factor: “A serious 
risk is the possibility of government officials becoming demotivated, prompting them 
to resort to detrimental ‘self-motivation’ practices” (World Bank [Congo] 2002b: 61).  
 
The discourse of corruption of the Congolese state makes the state itself a 
governmental field of intervention in the name of both international and human 
security. If the actions of the state become, indistinguishable from those of the “free 
market”, human security is considered to be seriously compromised: 
The Democratic Republic of Congo’s strides toward peace could prove short-lived if the 
government and donors do not increase efforts to create a transparent and accountable 
government. State institutions such as parliament, courts, the army and the civil service 
remain weak and corrupt […]. These government problems have an immediate impact on 
the humanitarian situation of civilians. (International Crisis Group 2006e: i) 
The moment where self-interest invades the sphere of government is the moment that 
society becomes self-devouring. The extreme “weakness” of state institutions is 
considered a major “risk” (World Bank [Congo] 2004b: 33), primarily because there 
are “human constraints” (World Bank [Congo] 2002b: 60):  
The challenge is to rebuild key institutions, in a country where the twin issues of 
governance and capacity are at once at the core of the development challenges. Historical 
causes of institutional weaknesses – including difficulties of access, the very small 
number of academically trained Congolese at the time of independence, and the long 
period of mismanagement and corruption – have been compounded by the decade of 
instability and conflict (World Bank [Congo] 2004b: 22). 
Another aspect which is considered a threat against security and development is the 
lack of reliable statistical data, without which government becomes almost 
impossible: “The weakness of the statistical base and the data collection system 
implies that there is a danger of being misguided with regard to devising 
implementing, and monitoring and evaluating” (ibid.). Without reliable numerical 
objectification rendering population processes transparent, the Congo automatically 
disappears from the realm of the visible and thus from the realm of the governable, 
once again a cover of “darkness” is thrown over it. Blindness becomes darkness. 
Faced with the risk of the Congo falling into the abyss of darkness it is considered 
imperative to make the Congo governable by employing the science of statistics: 
“there is a need to gradually rebuild the statistical capacity and collect systematic data 
throughout the country, so as to enhance the knowledge base and put in place the 
analytical basis which can underpin future efforts” (ibid.: 23). 
 
“When one has got to make the correct entries, one comes to hate those savages”, 
laments a colonial administrator in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness. This official could 
nowadays no doubt be working for the World Bank or the UNDP; the vocabulary may 
have changed, but the dichotomy between “Congoness” and development has 
persisted. 
Remaking the Congo 
In the discourse of the agencies of international development, it is believed that 
warfare and decades of corruption and mismanagement has left Congolese society in a 
state of quasi-collapse. Congolese society therefore needs to be completely rebuilt 
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(see, for instance, International Crisis Group 2006b; UNDP [Congo] 2004; World 
Bank [Congo] 2004b). In the words of the 2004 HDR for the Congo: 
In the Congo what is needed is to construct a society that is truly new, committed to 
production and the equal distribution of riches, and to living in peace and in security 
while strictly observing the respect of human rights and human dignity. What has to be 
done therefore is to construct “the new” without reconstituting “the old” in any of its 
manifestations. It is also a question of preventing a prolongation of “the provisional”, 
which has permitted an entire people to “resist” total annihilation during all those years 
of progressive weakening and retreat of the State. The old is a rent-seeking economy, 
which has entrenched unequal relations between the state and its citizens, and maintained 
a highly centralized political power which dispensed income derived from a sinecure. 
The provisional is an economy, which is strongly informalised, and, within which, the 
pillars, which carries the growth, is becoming progressively undermined by interests, 
which has supported politically atomised groups, all of which dispensing privileges and 
monopoles. The new is a diversified economy capable of mobilising the enormous 
potential of the country, and political structures functioning in harmony with the 
principles and practices of good governance (vii, my translation). The DRC should recast 
a state founded on the rule of law capable of assuring peace and security throughout its 
national territory. (12, my translation) 
Rebuilding the institutions of the state in accordance with the norms of “good 
governance”; reinstating the “rule of law” and “diversifying the economy capable of 
mobilising the enormous potential of the country” are the remedies proposed to 
combat insecurity and underdevelopment in the Congo. In accordance with the HDR 
2004, the World Bank's 2002 IPRSP is centred around the three main themes: “peace 
and good governance” “macroeconomic stabilization and pro-poor growth” and 
“community dynamics (community-led development programmes” (2002b: 27-48). 
According to Swing,39 the secret that holds the key to the ascent of the Congo to the 
status of a fully evolved nation state – the “end-state” – is “a democratically-elected 
government and a space where rule of law can be the essential framework that will 
finally permit the Congolese people to exploit and develop the vast and rich resources 
of their country” (Swing 2004). 
 
Bound to the bio-political logic of the human security rationale the international 
community’s vision of how to revitalise the Congo centres around the crucial 
problematic of how to reconnect the populations to the institutions: “the extent and 
the complexity of the recent armed conflict in DRC means that there are several voids 
to fill before the ‘peace – security – development’ triangle can be constituted. To 
reconcile the populations between each other and to reconnect the populations with 
the institutions are some of voids to be filled” (UNDP [Congo] 2004: 57). This is a 
question of “harmonising synergies” between communities and the government 
(World Bank [Congo] 2002b: 48). 
 
For the international community, then, the “local community” is a key component of 
national unification; the community is according to the World Bank an original 
feature of the Congolese 2002 IPRSP because of the “important part played by 
grassroots communities in the daily life of the population and above all in activities 
designed to withstand the effects of crisis” (World Bank [Congo] 2002b: 8; see also 
World Bank [Congo] 2004b: 23). Since the local “community” is thus seen as the last 
stand of society and togetherness it becomes imperative to make an “inventory” of 
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 Since 16 May 2003 William Lacy Swing has been acting as the Special Representative of the UN 
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these local dynamics and to reinforce them. This has led to the “preparation of a 
community strategy to combat poverty, the general purpose of which is to bolster 
among grassroots organizations the principles governing human development” (World 
Bank [Congo] 2002b: 19). 
 
The objective of the international community’s engagements in the Congo is to put an 
end to the era of impunity by transforming the very activity of government on all 
levels: “The rehabilitation of economic and social infrastructure and of human capital, 
and bolstering the capacity for good governance at every level (central, middle, and 
grassroots) constitute the priority” (ibid.: 28, my emphasis). Catalysing “human 
capital” is thus a vital ingredient of “filling the void” and bringing “all Congolese 
citizens on the path of robust, just and equitable growth” (ibid.). What is at stake is a 
“revival of the country in a participatory and sustainable manner” (ibid. 7). 
“Harmonising synergies” means making the Congolese citizen and his community 
responsible for reducing the risk of the country falling back into anarchy. 
“Harmonising synergies” is a key-notion. According to the insecurity-
underdevelopment hypothesis, civil war occurs when human interests are not in sync, 
that is to say, that when interests maximises neither utility nor productivity, this 
destabilises the system as a whole. Rather than allowing human beings to follow their 
instincts and pursue narrow self-interest, they should be governed in such a way that 
their social instincts (common interest) are stimulated. Security-driven development 
in the Congo is thus is designed to replace “natural disorder” with “natural order”. 
 
To round this chapter off I would like to stress that in the grid of perception 
promulgated by the human security rationale, population processes constantly evade 
monitoring and government. Criminal networks, corrupt politicians, refugees and 
militias seem to operate gratuitously in a numberless gray disjointed realm between 
civil society and its government: 
The detritus of war remains, including foreign armed groups, lawless local bands and 
organised criminal networks enriching themselves through illegal exploitation of natural 
resources in one direction and the illicit trade in arms in the other […]. And on the 
humanitarian side, we continue to see large numbers of civilian refugees living on both 
sides of unstable border areas […] the problems can only be addressed by a sovereign. 
DRC (Swing 2004) 
It thus becomes, imperative for the international community an imperative to “put an 
end to the culture of impunity among armed groups, to improve the security of people 
and goods, to ensure the respect of property rights and contracts, and therefore to 
create an environment conducive to private sector activity” (World Bank [Congo] 
2004b: 23). The Congo is considered to be at a crucial moment in its history, and 
“determined action is needed in the coming years to consolidate and further expand 
recent progress – or the country could fall into ‘conflict trap’” (World Bank [Congo] 
2004b: 12, my emphasis).  Given the close association between lack of state capacity 
and human deficiency, it is no surprise that dangerous subjectivities seem to 
proliferate in the disjointed and numberless realm known as the Congo: 
It is the continued presence of foreign troops, mixed with armed Congolese elements 
such as the Mai Mai, Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR)40 forces and other 
bandit groups, which causes insecurity for civilians. While there may be stability along 
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the former ‘frontline’, behind it, in eastern DRC, there is no peace (Oxfam 2002); armed 
opposition groups including Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda 
(FDLR)/Interahamwe (Rwandans implicated in the 1994 genocide who subsequently fled 
to eastern DRC), Mai-Mai factions (bands of local DRC citizens originally formed to 
resist Rwandan army occupation), and ethnic or clan-based organizations continue to 
threaten security in certain areas. (Isaacs: 2005) 
For the international community, the Congolese national-building process is 
hampered by these subversive elements, which must be neutralised in order to free the 
Congolese from the conflict trap. Since October 2005, this has created a space for 
MONUC, in collaboration with the FARDC, to seek to neutralise them by force. As 
one UN bulletin explains: 
On 31 October 2005, MONUC’s North Kivu Brigade based in the eastern city of Goma 
launched a robust operation in Virunga National Park aimed to clear it of all armed 
groups and weapons […]. To continue pressure on rebels and to demonstrate its will in 
keeping them out of Virunga National Park, more than 100 troops from the Congo’s 8th 
military region are now deploying in the area. Beyond their illegal occupation, the 
estimated 800 militiamen and their family member present in the park (FDLR and 
traditional Mai Mai combatants) have posed a particular concern for the DRC transitional 
government (MONUC 1 Nov 2005). 
The point here is that, even though the international community has invested a huge 
sums of money and is ethically committed to putting the peace process – which is 
believed to be synonymous with the process of nation-building – back on track and in 
improving the conditions of life in the Congo, it is still employing physical force as a 
means to purify the Congolese body politic of dangerous elements deemed to lack an 
ethics of how to live. 
4. The State of the Spirit of the Nation 
 We want to be civilised Congolese, not ‘Europeans with Black Skin’. 
- Conscience Africaine manifesto, 1956 
It is as if we are in a crab’s hole – when a crab wants to climb up the others pull its leg so 
it cannot continue to ascend. 
- Grégoire “guardian of the Batembo custom”, 15 June 200541 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the Congolese subjectivity, was constructed as a 
negative mirror image of the coloniser. The use of the metaphor of the mirror is no 
coincidence, for while the Congolese were seen as a part of the humanity, they were 
also objectified as culturally and morally inferior, which made it possible, often 
violently, to carry out the subjugation and disciplining of its untamed soul as 
Belgium’s “grande oeuvre civilicatrice”. Paradoxically, the objectification of the 
Congolese as a negative mirror image of the enlightened coloniser would become the 
positive truth through which Congolese national resistance took shape. Objectified as 
primitive and backward, as unable to free itself from the savagery of its natural 
instincts, early national resistance to colonial rule had only one way to go in order to 
secure its place among the “family of nations”: climbing the ladder of civilisation. I 
will argue that the sustained diagnosis and problematisation of the Congolese 
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subjectivity as underdeveloped has inaugurated the experience of being threatened by 
extinction in the Maï-Maï subjectivity. By making a genealogical analysis of the 
problematisations of the Congolese mode of being by both the early forms of 
Congolese national resistance and the Maï-Maï practice of resistance, I will show 
how, in both cases, the formation of national subjectivities entailed the ambivalent 
project of recovering and securing an autochthonous identity while embracing the 
norms of modern civilisation.  
 
But why did the champions of Congolese independence embrace the notion of 
“autochthony” when this same notion had served to exclude the Congolese from the 
sphere of rights-bearing citizens and justified their violent subjugation? By the same 
token, why do the Maï-Maï cast their as “autochthonous”? My pivotal argument here 
is that Congolese resistance, then and now, embraces autochthony because it 
incarnates a pure Congolese identity free from foreign influence, which as such 
facilitates the experience of real freedom. Racial and national discourse is employed 
as a strategy that secures an identity which is purely Congolese, an identity that is 
enframed as Bantu or Congolese. However, the important point here is that although 
this dual discourse seeks to establish the autochthonous mode of being as an 
inviolable eternal spiritual essence, it is still anchored in bio-political rationalities 
because its object of reference, the object which it seeks to securitise and develop, is 
the large-scale phenomenon of the “autochthonous masses”, i.e. the bio-political 
object of the population.  
A Racialised and Ethnified Body Politic 
The gravitational point of the Maï-Maï ethos of liberation is the notion of 
autochthony. Autochthony refers to a kernel of the self which is supposed to be 
immovable and original and it implies belonging to the Congolese “nation”. This fact 
is relevant only if an ancient autochthonous Congolese mode of being is not taken for 
granted. In order to understand better why “autochthony” and its corollary the 
“nation” have become so crucial to the Maï-Maï, it is necessary to render certain 
aspects of colonial rule in the Belgian Congo explicit. 
 
After the takeover by the Belgian government took over the colonial administration 
from King Leopold II in 1908 colonial government in the Congo became infused with 
a new rationality of government, with roots in the British colonial experience known 
as “indirect rule” (Jewsiewicki 1986: 467). Drawing on Mamdani’s groundbreaking 
analysis of colonial forms of government in Africa, we may define “indirect rule” as a 
particular modality of the liberal art of “governing at a distance” adapted to the 
colonial situation (Mamdani 1996). According to Mamdani, the colonial social body 
was polarised into European “citizens” and African “subjects”, a racial bifurcation of 
the social body that led to the creation of a segregated society with two distinctive 
politico-juridical domains, namely the “civil society” of the white citizenry and the 
“tribe” of the autochthonous population. The native population was excluded from the 
sphere of civil society and instead confined to a “traditional” autochthonous sphere as 
a free peasantry. The difference between civil society and the free peasantry, 
however, lay in the mode of rule characteristic of each: whereas civil society was 
governed by a civil power enforcing a civil law claiming to guarantee rights, the free 
peasantry was ruled indirectly through so-called Native Authorities, in the Belgium 
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Congo these became known as chefs coutumiers (customary chiefs) or bami42 (King). 
The key to the establishment of a free peasantry was putting the “land” under Native 
Authority. In most of Africa (including the Belgian Congo), land was defined as a 
customary and communal possession: as a consequence, access to land came to be 
controlled by Native Authorities. In essence this was a liberal security rationale, for it 
was believed that, to the extent that peasant households remained in customary 
possession of land, without the right to alienate it, and that land therefore remained 
outside the scope of the market, the onslaught of market forces would be diminished. 
In the Belgian Congo, this was in part spurred on by the realisation that the processes 
of urbanisation and industrialisation and the concomitant de-tribalisation of the native 
population were endangering the “social equilibrium” of the colony (Jewsiewicki 
1986). In response, the colonial government decided that official recognition should 
be withdrawn from chiefs without local roots and given to chiefs on the basis of 
“tribal” affiliations. In 1926 African courts were recognised as an integral part of the 
colony’s legal hierarchy and were granted extensive executive powers (Jewsiewicki 
1986: 480; Nzongola-Ntalaja 1987: 116-17). The Native Authorities were harnessed 
for their potential for the sovereign exercise of power and became the decentralised 
despotic arm of colonial government. It is important to note that, although the native 
was governed through Native Authorities in the techne of “indirect rule” there was no 
attempt to exclude him from the colonial body politic – on the contrary, this was an 
attempt to ensure his usefulness to the colonial project by enforcing the authority of 
local government (Mamdani 1996: 49). Rather than being its antithesis, sovereignty 
was complementary to the market. 
 
In the Belgian Congo during the 1920s and the first part of the 1930s, this 
intensification of the governmentalisation of the “autochthonous sphere”, and 
especially the institution of the mwami, worked in concert with research into local 
tribal particularities which aimed at establishing “traditional” chefferies (chiefdoms) 
and at identifying the political structure within them. Missionaries, anthropologists 
and colonial agents provided the knowledge base that made the language, histories, 
traditions, rituals and political institutions of the many different “tribes” visible and 
governable (Crombois 1998; Jewsiewicki 1989: 333; Young 1965: 242-6). It is crucial 
to note that the autochthonous culture of the Congo was increasingly being objectified 
as almost purely of the anthropological type called the Bantu, a term coined by the 
German-born philologist Wilhelm Heinrich Immanuel Bleek (1827-1875). Bleek’s 
innovation lay in discovering that a series of African languages from the Union of 
South Africa in the south to British and German East Africa in the east to Senegal in 
the west and to the northern frontier of Belgian Congo in the north possessed a similar 
grammatical structure (Bleek 1862, 1869). Within the grid of perceptions of the 
Belgian colonial administration, however, the Bantu constituted a heterogeneous, yet 
interlinked cultural ensemble of “peoples”, with a similar way of life. In effect the 
Congolese subjectivity was Bantuised. In the words of Van Der Kerken, who was an 
administrator in the Equateur region: 
The Bantu peoples – thus named for the first time by Bleek (1827-1875), the father of 
African philology, by virtue of belonging to the same linguistic family – are the result of 
a combination of various very diverse elements, which, even today, can be found in the 
anthropological type of the individuals […]. In the same way that the anthropological 
type of the Bantu differs from one region to another and even within the same tribe, 
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which in itself is a testimony to the fact that diverse influences have contributed to the 
formation of the people, the cultural characteristics of the Bantus must necessarily be 
different […] it is nevertheless likely that the Bantu peoples, who speaking languages 
that have preserved  their unity and bear strong resemblances can have possessed at one 
time a common fount of civilisation (Van Der Kerken 1920: 38-9, my translation). 
Under Belgian colonial rule, the boundaries of each Bantu tribe came to constitute an 
administrative unit, a chefferie Lemarchand 1982 [1964]: 38-9).43 According to a 
1910 decree, the objective of the administration was “to create, in the entire territory 
of the colony, groups which enjoys a proper life and are endowed with traditional 
means of action, the purpose of which is to ensure the shared interests of their 
members within the framework of the political administration and the administration 
in general” (Devos and Piron in Lemarchand 1982 [1964]: 38, my translation). 
 
The Belgian colonial government thus not only salvaged the authoritarian potential of 
“customary power”, it also sculpted the very tradition and custom of its native 
population in order to render the autochthonous population productive and docile. By 
this dual process, part salvage and part sculpting, the Belgian colonial administration 
crystallized a range of Native Authorities, each armed with a whip and protected by 
the halo of custom. Defined and marked as a member of a tribe, the colonised 
Congolese were encapsulated in customarily governed power relations. The more 
custom was enforced, the more the tribe was recast and conserved as a more or less 
enclosed community – autonomous, yet subject to the colonial authority as it had 
never been before (Jewsiewicki 1989; Makombo 1998: 32-8; Merlier 1962). Encased 
by custom, frozen into so many tribes, each under the fist of its own Native Authority, 
the subject populations were, as it were, compartmentalised in an “ethnic” steel grid 
of Bantu tribes. Young, Jewsiewicki and Bawele have all conducted historical 
analyses of how such tribal subjectivities as the “Bangala” believed to originate in the 
Equateur region (Bawele 1995; Young 1965: 242-6), the “Baluba” of Kasai (Kasaï-
Oriental and Kasaï-Occidental) (Jewsiewicki 1989: 326-39, the “Mongo cultural 
cluster” that spanned several regions in central Congo (Young 1965: 347-50) and the 
“Bakongo” tribe of Bas-Congo (Young 1965: 346-7) were all reinvented and 
reinforced through colonial intervention. Whereas the policy of strict racial division 
separated the autochthonous sphere from the civilised sphere, the process of ethnic 
pluralisation divided the autochthonous Bantu sphere into so many “tribes”. These 
concomitant dividing practices objectified the Congolese subjectivity as not only a 
race apart, but also as a culturally heterogeneous ensemble, a process that no doubt 
strengthened the racial and ethnic self-awareness of those classified as “natives”. In 
sum we can say that the Congolese subjectivity, understood here as a supposedly 
distinct autochthonous personae, was turned against itself and others through the 
objectification of its mentality as not only dangerous and uncivilised and as such 
entirely un-white – that is, as racially inferior –  but crucially also through its ethnic 
pluralisation, or through what we might term as processes of racialisation and 
ethnification. Therefore, when the life of the native became political, in the modern 
Western sense of the word, it took its characteristic dual form of ethnic and racial 
politics. In the years to come, Congolese nationalism would be cast within the triple 
thematic of race, ethnicity and development. It would become a question of ascending 
to nationhood as a conglomerate of Bantu tribes, each endowed with an autonomous 
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set of “customs”, through development while preserving the “customary” African 
Bantu self.  
Liberation through Development 
Congolese nationalism began to take shape during the 1940s amongst a group which 
became known as the évolués (the developed) (Makombo 1998: 42).44 This 
autochthonous sub-population was part of an emerging Congolese elite which worked 
as auxiliaries (as warehouse managers, clerks, nurses, medical assistants, abbots, 
catechists, officers in the Force Publique, (the standing army of the Colony since 
Leopoldian times), agricultural assistants and so on) in the colonial institutional 
framework build around the trinity of state, church and enterprise. Usually recruited 
among the “tribes” that were deemed to be most adept at accustoming themselves to 
the norms of civilisation and open to evangilisation – e.g. the Baluba of Kasaï, the 
Bakongo of Bas-Congo and the Congo River trading peoples such as the Bobangi and 
the Lokele (Young 1965: 256-65, see also Jewsiewicki 1989) these less savage 
natives had received their higher level of civilization through education conducted by 
missionaries. This meant that the ethnic pluralisation of the autochthonous sphere was 
infused with inter-ethnic relations of power, because the less savage natives would 
govern those who were incorporated in the colonial apparatus. 
 
The évolués fully endorsed their role as intermediaries and saw themselves as superior 
to their underdeveloped brethren. In the symbolic order of the era, they were 
positioned higher on the ladder of civilization than the mass of developing natives, yet 
still separated from the colonisers by the insurmountable “colour bar”. This meant 
that the évolués were relied upon to perform the role of the shepherd’s dog. The 
objectification of their relative superiority prompted them to define themselves as the 
“autochthonous elite”, “a few distinguished Congolese”, “auxiliary agents of the 
state”, “the best among us”, “the privileged sons of Belgium”, “the autochthonous 
population privileged by Providence”, “the clairvoyant minds” and as those who were 
“capable of contributing to the control of the territory and to rendering it useful 
[mettre en valeur]” etc. – that is to say, as simultaneously superior to the “developing 
mass” and inferior to their own masters (Kadima-Tshimanga 1982: 43-6, my 
translation; Mudimbe 1980: 133, my translation).  
 
Yet since the évolués were not granted civic citizenship, they began to question their 
exclusion from “civil society”. This lead to a critique of the very foundation of the 
governmental technologies of the bifurcated state: racial segregation. To begin with, 
however, the scope of this early form of modern resistance to colonial subjugation 
was not extended to challenging the superiority of the whites, nor did it question the 
occupation of the Congo by its coloniser. Instead, the évolués demanded that they be 
recognised as a “class” distinct from the “the mass of backwards natives” (Makombo 
1998: 43-4). In effect their exclusion from the ranks of the citizenry and their 
simultaneous detachment from the tribal environment created a profound split within 
the self of the évolués prompting Paul Lomami-Tshibamba – whose incessant 
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criticism of the colonial authorities would assured him a place among the heroes of 
Congolese nationalism – to ask the question in 1945: “Quelle sera notre place dans le 
monde de demain?” (What will be our place in the world of tomorrow?):  
Tossed around between, on the one hand, the customs and the mentality of the natives 
qualified as primitives, and on the other hand, Europeanism, we do not know to which 
Saint we should turn to […] we firmly believe that total assimilation with our 
Benefactors constitutes our social destiny. But alas! As time goes by, victimised by the 
attitudes, gestures etc. of those to whom we thought we were assimilated, our wounded 
and embittered souls are painfully beginning to understand that we are disoriented, or 
more correctly, we have been consciously derailed from the track which necessarily leads 
man towards his social destiny. (Lomami-Tshibamba in Makombo 1998: 44, my 
translation) 
Simultaneously excluded from the domain of civil society by virtue of their status as 
“natives” and detached from the domain of Native Authority the “évolués” and the 
autochthonous urban population had neither ethnic membership nor racial citizenship. 
Neither subject to custom nor exalted as rights-bearing citizens, they languished in a 
politico-juridical limbo. Through the mirror held up by the colonial authorities, the 
developed native saw himself as an immigrant to his own culture, the inferiority of 
which he accepted, as well as the culture he had won. Seeing the momentum of 
civilisation as an inevitable “social destiny”, the “developed” native was disinclined 
to relinquish his spurious hold on civilization. The answer to the question: “What will 
be our place in the world of tomorrow?” therefore had to be to continue on the path of 
development as the trajectory that will eventually lead to the social fulfilment of any 
“man”, regardless of his race (see Makombo 1998: 40-54). Therefore, in so far, as the 
évolué endorsed the fundamental split between a “savage” and a “civilised” mode of 
being, he had internalised the divisive mechanisms of colonial biopower. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, the developed native saw it as a necessity to distance himself 
as much as possible from his “nativity” in order to become integrated into civil 
society “like a white” and to become a “mundele ndombe = European with black 
skin” (Makombo 1998: 84). It was a question of emasculating his racial inferiority by 
improving his self through alignment to the universal moral guidelines of civilization 
incarnated in the behaviour of the whites. 
Liberation through Independence 
Profoundly influenced by their studies and the independence movements that grew in 
intensity all over Africa, the counter-narrative of the évolués became more racially 
self-affirmative during the 1950s:45 
By studying the évolué gained knowledge with the principle of the French Revolution 
(Freedom, Equality and Brotherhood) and discovered one by one the Dutch struggle 
against the Spanish, the American War of Independence, the Belgian fight for 
independence, the Déclaration des Droits de l’homme et du Citoyen [from the French 
constitution], the Right of Peoples to self-rule, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. (Makombo 1998: 192, my translation) 
                                               
45
 According to Makombo the “évolués” were heavily influenced by the French “philosophes” of the 
Enlightenment and such literary monuments as Frantz Fanon’s psycho-analytical Africanist manifesto: 
“Peau noires, Masques Blancs” (1952), Cheikh Anta Diop’s restoration of African mentality: “Nations 
négres et cultures” (1954) and the “Négritude” literary movement of Aimé Césaire and Léopold Sédar 
Senghor. 
   
 68
For the évolués it was no longer a question of assimilating blacks to whites, but of 
climbing the ladder of development as a unified Congolese nation. In the words of 
one Emmanuel Kini, who, as a member of the “Conseil de gouvernement”,46 
addressed himself to the council in the following manner: “I do not understand the 
reasons for which we are being assimilated to the Belgians when in the past we have 
always been told that the Congolese do not possess Belgian nationality. Is there a 
single legal document that consecrates this assimilation in existence?” (Kini 1958 
cited in Makombo 1998: 182, my translation). It was time to free the Congolese from 
the prison of external rule. The “social destiny” of the Congolese could no longer be 
fulfilled under the tutelage of the colons, who did not recognise the autochthonous 
population as citizens. Patrice Lumumba, one of the most celebrated of all African 
heroes of decolonisation, started out as an ardent supporter of Belgian paternalism and 
of a future “Eurafrica” (see in particular Lumumba 1961 [1956]), but by 1958 he had 
become an outspoken advocate of unconditional Congolese independence.  
 
In spite of the volte-face in the attitude of the évolués towards their colonial masters, 
the theme of a backward Congolese autochthonous mode of being in need of 
emancipation through development remained constant. For example, the authors of 
the first political manifesto to demand Congolese “emancipation”, issued by the 
Catholic journal Conscience Africaine in May 1956, thought that it was time 
gradually to hand over the reigns of power to the “Congolese elite”, who, it was 
claimed, were now ready to work with “generosity and disinterest” to develop the 
Congolese. Guided and supervised by the autochthonous elite the Congolese should 
take cognisance of their duties and responsibilities as the citizens of the new nation 
(Conscience Africaine 1956 quoted in Labrique 1957: 252). No longer satisfied with 
playing the role of the shepherd’s dog the évolués now envisioned themselves as 
playing the role of the shepherd. What had started out as a struggle for the recognition 
as members of a civilised white society had turned into fight for the right to 
development as a race (Africans/Bantus), as a nation (Congolese) and as tribes 
(Bakongo, Bangala, Baluba etc.). Returning from the Pan-African conference in 
Accra in December 1958, Lumumba, as the president of the newly formed 
Mouvement National Congolais, addressed a crowd of 10,000 Congolese in the first 
large public political meeting: 
It is time that the Congolese people awaken from its dormant state, that it breaks the 
silence and overcomes intimidation in a peaceful yet resolute manner in order to show 
that it has to be taken into account. […] Based on the experience of other African 
countries that were less developed than ours when they seized the reigns of their country, 
the ascent of the Congo to independence will stabilise the Congolese economy. […] In 
effect, the reinvestment in all the benefits created by national enterprises, the acceleration 
of the program of industrialisation, the awarding by the Congolese state of study grants 
to nationals […] the granting of loans to the Congolese middle classes, the setting up of 
mandatory and free education at all levels, the development of the peasantry and 
cooperatives in the rural milieu, the radical suppression of all kinds of legal 
discrimination, the enthusiasm for work incited by the awarding of decent salaries and 
the rights to human freedoms – all of this proves, ladies and gentlemen, that the Congo’s 
ascent to independence will bring about improved well-being for the inhabitants of this 
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country, a well-being that cannot be fulfilled under the current regime. (Lumumba 1958 
cited in Van Lierde 1963: 17, my translation) 
It is interesting to note that Lumumba’s speech re-employs the theme of the 
Congolese people as caught up in an eternal slumber, a people who have yet to wake 
up and take part in the race to civilisation. The big difference being that for the 
champions of independence the leap forward must be made by the Congolese 
themselves, not under auspices of the colonisers. For the champions of independence, 
the autochthonous African should be lifted out of his state of underdevelopment 
through the application of European expertise. As was written in the Conscience 
Africaine manifesto: “We want to be civilised Congolese not ‘European with Black 
Skin’” (Conscience Africaine 1956 in quoted Labrique 1957: 252). The évolués had 
inherited an analytical grid in which the autochthonous Congolese mode of being was 
objectified as simultaneously underdeveloped and distinctly African, that is, as Bantu. 
Moreover, the autochthonous sphere was divided into a multiplicity of “tribes”. 
Therefore, while racialised civil law had confined the blacks to the sphere of the 
“native”, “indirect rule” had solidified ethnicity by legally, administratively and 
scientifically binding the native to his ethnic subjectivity. 
In Defence of the Nation 
After the Congo won its independence on 30 June 1960, the country was immediately 
plunged into regional and ethnic conflicts that threatened to rip asunder the great 
colonial artefact. Matters were further complicated, as the Congo rapidly became an 
object of geo-political competition in the Cold War, mainly due to its legendary 
wealth, the size of its territory and because of its important geo-strategic position in 
the “heart of Africa”. The latter in particular prompted the Soviet Union on the one 
hand and the West (the United States, Belgium and France) on the other to intervene 
in the Congo to prevent it falling into the other camp In the end the Soviet Union 
backed out of the struggle for the Congo, and a government sympathetic to the West 
was inaugurated.47 By 1964, Lumumbist revolutionary movements had sprung up in 
the provinces of Kwilu (Bandundu), Kivu central (South Kivu), North Katanga 
(Katanga) Maniema and Haut-Congo (Orientale) and Uélé (Orientale) in opposition to 
a government that was largely seen as illegitimate and in the hands of imperialist 
Western powers (Verhaegen 1967: 332-4; Fox et al. 1965: 95-8).48 These 
revolutionary groups – known as the Mulelists49 and the Simbas, 50 respectively – 
were defeated on the battlefield, but were never entirely neutralised and continued 
their activities in the East of the country (Verhaegen 1966; 1969, Vlassenroot 2003). 
These veterans of the struggle to liberate the Congo from the grips of what they saw 
as Western imperialism helped form the national resistance against foreign occupation 
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in the Kivus in the 1990s, and the present day Maï-Maï see these revolutionaries as 
their direct predecessors.  
 
While the practice of resistance of the Maï-Maï and that of the revolutionaries of the 
1960s are informed by similar rationalities, there is at least one major difference: 
while both struggles revolve(d) around the notion of “autochthony”, whereas the latter 
was articulated primarily in opposition to the “white man” the former is articulated 
primarily in opposition to the “Tutsi”. Yet, in so far as these racial opponents embody 
the figure of the “foreigner”, they have interchangeable functions in the discourse of 
Congolese nationalism. What I mean is that the Maï-Maï grid of visibility is organised 
around a racial grammar: employing the notion of autochthony is a way to positively 
affirm that one belongs to a particular race with a particular way of life or culture. As 
such race is a crucial “measure of man”: that is to say, that for the Maï-Maï one’s 
cultural attributes (i.e. one’s moral predispositions, qualities, patterns of behaviour, 
traditions, strengths and weaknesses and so on) to a large extent determines one’s 
mode of being.  
The Invention of the Foreigner 
Maï-Maï:  Do you know that it is God who is our Father? Many among 
you have lost your family; you have lost your father, your 
mother or the whole family. The entire family is dead, but 
you are still praying to our God. And all of that is because 
of the Tutsi; do you not agree that our enemy is the Tutsi? 
Recruits:   Yes! 
Maï-Maï: Unite your hearts and God will help you with everything. 
We are going to give you some information […] he who is 
ready to give himself to the cause should stay because I see 
that we are suffering a lot and that it is because of the Tutsi 
that all of this is happening today. If we are to die, it is 
better to die here fighting, and he who is interested in our 
work is going to stay, right? 
Recruits:   Yes! 
Maï-Maï:   Who can deny that the Tutsi are our enemies? 
Recruits:   Nobody! 
 
The above is an excerpt of an exchange between a new batch of recruits and a 
representative of the Maï-Maï during the days of the maquis.51 The exchange 
highlights that the dominate symbol of the enemy is a racial category: the Tutsi. It 
falls outside the scope of this dissertation to delve into the history of the formation of 
the Tutsi identity, whether on the level of the object or of the subject, but it is 
necessary to note how the Tutsi emerged as a foreigner because the figure of the 
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“Tutsi” informs the Maï-Maï resistance and enframes the Congolese mode of being by 
way of contrast. 
 
The analytical framework that came to differentiate the Tutsi from the autochthonous 
Congolese, as well as the autochthonous Hutu of Rwanda and Burundi is generally 
known as the “Hamitic hypothesis”.52 The modern-day Hamitic hypothesis is built 
around Judaic and Christian myths of biblical and medieval vintage. In essence, these 
recounts the story of how Noah’s son Ham was cursed to be black because of his 
contempt for his father, and it was believed that the Negroes were the degenerate and 
shamed descendents of Ham (Sanders 1969: 521-2). However, by the nineteenth 
century, the myth that the Negro was the accursed descendant of Ham had been 
turned upside down. The catalyst for this change was the discovery that, even 
amongst the Egyptians – the people of that grand civilization which had nurtured and 
inspired Greece and Rome – there seemed to be people of African stock with “a broad 
and flat nose, very short, a large flattened mouth […] thick lips, etc” (Denon, cited in 
Sanders 1969: 525). How could one explain that the race of Negroes, the slaves of the 
Europeans and the objects of their contempt seemed to be the ancestors of European 
civilisation? The answer was simple: the descendants of Ham – the Hamites 
(including the Egyptians) – were actually Caucasians under black skin. Rather than 
being Negroes, the ancient Egyptians were considered Hamitic, not Negroid. At least, 
that is the how Comte de Gobineau, a respectable nineteenth-century reactionary who 
later came to be considered the father of European racism and whose writings were 
much favoured by the German National-Socialist theoreticians, explained it all. In 
Gobineau’s version, which was generally accepted, the sons of Noah were the 
predecessors of the three main races of humanity: the Europeans were begotten from 
Japhet, the Semites from Shem, and the Hamites from Ham. In this version it was 
claimed that it was actually only Canaan, not Ham or his other sons, Cush the 
Ethiopian, Mizrahim the Egyptian, and Put the Persian who had been cursed to being 
black. The Hamites were said to be the founders of the great civilizations of Egypt 
and Phoenicia, a move that made room for the interpretation of the Hamites as 
external dispensers of civilisation in “Negro Africa”, in the words of Mamdani: 
To make room for a revised notion of Hamites as Caucasian, the hierarchy of race was 
stretched further. The top of the Caucasian ladder continued to be occupied by the 
Teutonic Anglo-Saxons. But its bottom rung, previously occupied by the Slavs, was now 
stretched to include the African Hamites. Just as Egyptians were devalued in the 
hierarchy of Caucasians – put at it its low rung as Hamites, whites with Black skin – they 
were rejoined to African and acclaimed as the historical summit of the African pyramid. 
They constituted, as it were, the front line of the Hamites marching though the length and 
breadth of the continent, spreading civilization. (Mamdani 2002: 84) 
By the end of the nineteen century the racial classification “Hamites” no longer 
corresponded to a difference in colour but it came to include a wide range of peoples, 
from fair-skinned, blond and blue-eyed Berbers to black Ethiopians. Moreover, the 
Hamites were said to share a single language (which was believed to be retained by 
some, i.e. Ethiopians and Berbers, and lost by others, as was said to be the case with 
the Egyptians, the Tutsi, the Bahuma or the Masai). In addition, the Hamites were also 
said to share a single culture: unlike the Negroes who were regarded as 
agriculturalists, the Hamites were said to be pastoralists. As a result, European social 
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science classified the Hamitic Tutsi as a race apart from the Negroes; a sub-race 
which had migrated south from somewhere in Ethiopia and upon arrival in the Great 
Lakes Region of Africa had started sowing the seeds of civilization (Lemarchand 
1999; Mamdani 2002). Does this entail that the Tutsi are just a European mirage? No, 
not even remotely. First of all, historians have long since established that the Tutsi 
were a firmly established social category long before the age of European conquest 
and colonialism. “Tutsi”, however, was not a racial category, but rather a label for 
anyone in power, as opposed to the subordinate “Hutu”. Yet the Tutsi subjectivity was 
sufficiently porous to absorb successful Hutu through ennoblement, while conversely 
a Tutsi could become a Hutu by losing his status as a nobleman (Maquet 1961; 
Newbury C. 1989; Newbury D. 1987; Rennie 1972). Moreover, it was in the colonial 
state of Rwanda (and to a lesser extent Burundi) that the racial difference between the 
Hamitic/Tutsi foreigner and the autochthonous Bantu/Hutu was institutionalised, and 
it was through the bio-political colonial state that the theory of the Tutsi as “a 
civilizing race” was converted into a reality. According to Father Léon Classe, for 
example, “The Tutsi are great men, with fine and regular traits, with something of the 
Aryan and Semitic type”. Similarly, for Father Menard, “the Tutsi is a European 
under Black skin”. The predisposition of the church was fully backed two years later 
by Louis Frank, the Belgian Minister of colonies, in his first ever visit to Rwanda: “It 
is not our intention, under the pretext of equality, to touch the bases of political 
institution. We find the ‘Watuzi,’ who are established for a long time, intelligent and 
capable; we respect this situation”. (all sources cited in Gatwa 1998: 109-10) 
 
Through the distinction between alien and autochthonous, the Tutsi came to be 
defined as a race – the Hamitic race – different from the Hutu, who were constructed 
as autochthonous Bantu. Therefore, unlike in neighbouring Belgian Congo, the 
autochthonous sphere was both racialised and ethnified, rather than only ethnified, 
constructing the colonized along an autochthonous majority (Hutu) and an alien 
minority (Tutsi) axis. The Tutsi occupied the contradictory ground of a race subjected 
to white supremacy while holding the mantle of “customary power”, which in the 
Congo was reserved for the autochthonous bami. The colonial state in Rwanda thus 
produced polar racial identities, and not plural ethnic identities among the colonised. 
The contradictory position of the Tutsi was signified by their privileged status in the 
customary sphere and their nearly rightless status in the hierarchy of race in the civic 
sphere. In many ways the Tutsi occupied a similar position to that of the évolués in 
the Congo, the notable difference being that the Tutsi were objectified as racially 
distinct from the autochthonous masses, unlike the évolués. While the latter were 
semi-developed natives, the Tutsi were superior aliens. Yet, in the governmental 
technologies of the Belgian colonial regime, both Tutsi and évolués functioned as 
auxiliaries to the central state and thus as the agents of civilization, progress and 
development.  
 
A quick glance at the frequency with which mass slaughters of racial adversaries have 
occurred in the Great Lakes region should be sufficient to highlight the explosive 
potential of the Hamite-Bantu division. The relationship between the Hamite and the 
Bantu is marked by a terrible truism: victory for one spells defeat for the other, for 
every struggle bears the hallmark of a life-and-death tussle. “One needs to 
remember”, Mamdani writes, referring to the 1994 genocide, “that the Tutsi were 
killed as Hamites, not as Tutsi” (Mamdani 2002: 231). What Mamdani is hinting at 
here is that, even if the Tutsi and the Hutu did exist before the colonial period, it was 
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not until these were frozen into racial categories that the large-scale murder of an 
entire sub-population became possible. It was this racialised logic of conflict that 
spilled over the border into the Congo in 1994, completely changing the stakes in the 
local conflict between the autochthonous and the Rwandan populations. 
From Local War to Regional War  
The formation of the local militias that eventually became the Maï-Maï started in the 
early 1990s, a period of great uncertainty and growing tension between what were 
seen as the “autochthonous” population and the two “non-autochthonous” population 
groups, the “Banyarwanda”53 and the “Banyamulenge”,54 both considered to be of 
Rwandan origin. Yielding under the pressure of its former Western backers, the 
Mobutist regime inaugurated a process of democratisation in 1991 through what was 
called the Conférence nationale souveraine. Rather than inaugurate a new democracy, 
however, the process of democratisation sparked simmering ethnic conflicts in the 
country, and nowhere more so than in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, 
as several “ethnic groups” saw this as an opportunity to claim their democratic right to 
greater autonomy, influence and socio-economic development.55 Furthermore, it 
marked an important step in the constitution of a self-conscious political majority 
constituted by the tribes or ethnicities considered to be autochthonous in the Kivus.  
 
As noted in the introduction communal violence erupted in North Kivu in Masisi in 
1993 between the Hutu Banyarwanda and the Bahunde, but soon the neighbouring 
tribes of the Batembo and Banyanga also became involved. According to my sources, 
this was the moment that the autochthonous ethnicities under the leadership of the 
Native Authorities and Simba/Mulelist, revolutionaries started organising armed 
groups to defend what they saw as their ancestral rights to the land, which were being 
challenged by the Banyarwanda. The autochthonous front against the non-
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different groups: the small farmers (Hutu) born in Masisi who are second- or third-generation 
immigrants from families transplanted from Rwanda during the colonial era; the small farmers from 
Rwanda who have inhabited the small canton of Bwisha for centuries (Bwisha was historically attached 
to the ancient kingdoms that had their seats in present-day Rwanda); clandestine immigrants (mainly 
Hutu) who arrived from Rwanda in the search for land before and after 1960; and finally Tutsi who 
arrived in several waves from 1959 onwards. Before the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the majority of the 
Banyarwanda were Kinyarwanda-speaking peasants implanted by the Belgian colonial authorities 
throughout eastern Congo, but principally in North Kivu in the triangle between Goma, Walikale and 
Rutshuru. Thus, the term covers both Hutu and Tutsi (these two categories remained largely non-
antagonistic in the Kivus until April 1994) 
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autochthonous was far from united, however, for these groups were constituted as a 
defence, as it were, not only against Banyarwanda groups, but also against armed 
groups of other Congolese ethnicities and the forces of the Mobutist state, especially 
after his army sided with the Banyarwanda in the 1993 war.56 The fact that the militias 
did not bear the homonym “Maï-Maï” in this period is an indicator that the militias 
were initially organised mainly along tribal lines (the groups associated with the 
Banande were called Kasindiens and Ngilima; the Bahunde group was called the 
Batiri; the Banyanga/Batembo group was called the Katuku). 
 
The implantation of a million-plus refugees and in between 50,000 and 65.000 ex-
FAR soldiers and Interahamwe/Impuzamugambi paramilitaries from Rwanda in 1994 
abruptly changed life in the Kivus on both sides of the autochthonous/non-
autochthonous divide. Almost immediately the Kivutian conflict – which was already 
entering a deadly security rationale wherein the neutralisation of one’s “ethnic” 
enemy had become the guarantee survival of one’s own community – was infused the 
racialised conflict of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda. The ex-FAR and 
Interahamwe/Impuzamugambi rearmed and reorganised themselves in the refugee 
camps set up along the border between the Kivus and Rwanda, from where they 
continued their war against the RPF/RPA and prepared to re-conquer Rwanda and to 
deal the final blow to their Tutsi enemies. This not only definitively ended the 
strained Hutu-Tutsi alliance within the Banyarwanda, but also instantiated the theme 
of a racial war between the Bantus and the Hamites in eastern Congo. The war thus 
took on a new dimension, and communities began to arm themselves in order to 
secure their survival as the killings intensified. It was at this point that life in the 
Kivus became decidedly militarised and the contours of emerging armed 
governmentalities could be discerned among the autochthonous communities. That is 
to say, militarised government of the local population in order to ensure their 
corporation and support by the different armed groups, whether Congolese or 
Rwandan, became more widespread. As part of this process, according to my sources, 
a certain military ethos found its way into local life, which, once settled, spread like a 
wildfire, sometimes almost all the young men (but also some women) of entire 
villages joining the Maï-Maï movement. Being a jeshi (soldier), came to signify 
someone who was ready to sacrifice his life for a higher cause. 
 
General Padiri’s Maï-Maï group consists mostly of people from his own tribe the 
Batembo, but scores of people from other autochthonous tribes were incorporated into 
the movement as it grew in size and influence. The group had its base around the 
territory of Bunyakiri on the southern side of the border between North and South 
Kivu, which is known as Butembo, “the land of the Tembo”.57 Since 1993, the 
Batembo have been involved in the Banyanga Katuku movement from North Kivu, 
but as the conflict intensified the movement became more and more “temboised”, so 
that by 1996, when the AFDL rebellion broke out, the Katuku movement was 
predominantly a Batembo movement. In order to understand why the Katuku 
movement had become “temboised” it is necessary to make explicit the relative 
position of the Batembo in the maze of ethnic power relations that is the Kivus. 
                                               
56
 Interview, Daniel, Bukavu, 14.06.05, Maï-Maï, demobilised Major; Interview, François, Bukavu, 
21.03.05, Maï-Maï, former Territorial Administrator; Interview, Didier, Bukavu, 01.06.05, Maï-Maï, 
former Assistant Territorial Administrator; Interview, Gaston, Bukavu, 16.05.05, Maï-Maï, Intelligence 
Agent. 
57
 This name is not to be confused with the town of Butembo in North Kivu. 
   
 75
Although objectified as an autochthonous Bantu tribe by colonial and post-colonial 
ethnography, the Batembo did not possess their own sovereign Native Authority 
during the Colonial era.58 Instead the Batembo were scattered across the chefferies of 
their autochthonous neighbours the Banyanga, Bahunde, Bahavu, Bashi and Barega, 
where they were subject to the sovereign authority of their Bami. This subjugation of 
the Batembo to its neighbours has created an immense sense of loss, humiliation and 
marginalisation amongst them. As Didier told me:  
In Bunyakiri before the war we were dependent upon the Bahavu, so we do not have 
chiefdom or a customary legislation which is recognised in Kinshasa – and these Bahavu 
– all they did was to dominate us. They had their hands on the market of Bunyakiri, that 
is, all the taxes were used in their favour, they could do that because of our non-
recognition from Kinshasa […]that is to say that if you are recognised by Kinshasa then 
you can develop because there is going to be a fund which is destined for your 
chiefdom.59 
In September 1960, taking advantage of the window of opportunity provided by 
independence, a certain Kayumba Antoine addressed a letter to the provincial 
assembly in Bukavu on behalf of the Mutembo tribe, wherein he proposed the 
creation of a Batembo chefferie. Through the intervention of Kayumba Antoine and 
his associates the Batembo were granted a chefferie on the 14 November 1961 
(Bulletin Provinciale du Kivu 1961: 33-4), only for it to be removed again in 1967 
during an administrative reform. New initiatives were taken in 1974, and again in 
1991 (incited by the window of opportunity provided by the Conférence Nationale 
Souveraine instigated by Mobutu’s regime), but both of these attempts were rejected. 
It is significant that in none of these submissions do the authors problematise the 
relationship between the Batembo and the non-autochthonous population, indicating 
that for the Batembo, before the war in Masisi, the problem was not the Rwandan 
immigrant population, but rather the non-recognition of their rights to enjoy ethnic 
freedom unlike the case of Banyanga and the Bahunde who have been in conflict with 
the Banyarwanda since the colonial period (Bucyalimwe Mararo: 1991; 1997). Was it 
this feeling of ethnic marginalization that compelled the young Batembo to join the 
Katuku in large numbers, rather than anti-foreigner feelings? Perhaps, though, it is 
certain that the Batembo saw their involvement in the Maï-Maï movement as an 
opportunity to emancipate the tribe from marginalization on the local and national 
levels. In the words of one Mutembo Maï-Maï:  
There are certain tribes which have been excluded from the administration of the 
country; modern civilization has arrived a little late at their place for several reasons. The 
Batembo is one of those people who have endured this late arrival of civilisation. They 
have not been able to participate in the government of the country; however, they have 
defended themselves in order to be able to participate in the administration of the 
country. That is why certain tribes from the forest which have not been included in the 
administration have profited from certain circumstances in order find their identity…to 
reposition themselves. The Batembo are amongst these tribes. They were marginalized 
and in order to escape this marginalization it was necessary to take up arms.60  
In 1996 the FAZ and the ex-FAR/Interahamwe in retreat from the advancing AFDL 
passed through Bunyakiri and rallied the population against what was understood to 
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be a foreign invasion commanded by the Tutsi in Rwanda, thus making it easy for the 
Katuku to obtain arms and ammunitions: “when the Rwandan Hutu came here, they 
came with their arms and a simple exchange between arms and food could take 
place”.61 In the Maï-Maï narrative, this alliance was broken up because the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe and the FAZ pillaged and maltreated the civilian population 
leading to confrontations. Meanwhile, the Katuku were also fighting the AFDL at the 
entrance of the Kahuzi-Biega National Park, thus blocking the only passable route 
northwards to the strategically important city of Kisangani. In December 1996, 
however, an accord was reached between the Katuku and the AFDL forces. The 
Katuku only accepted the AFDL as an ally when they became convinced that it was a 
genuine Congolese revolution aiming to overturn Mobutu’s regime, a regime that had 
persistently had denied the Batembo of an autonomous chefferie: “Because we were 
still kids [des petits]62 we didn’t yet understand politics, and profiting from the faith 
we put into him as a nationalist, Kabila [Laurent-Désiré Kabila] was able to negotiate 
with us”.63 The alliance between the Katuku and Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s government 
was frail, however, and hostilities between the two parties were common. In the 
narrative of Padiri’s groups this was due to the fact that the new government had 
allowed “foreigners” to take charge of the country. From the point of view of the Maï-
Maï, it was becoming increasingly obvious that the AFDL was being commandeered 
by the governments of Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, which had drawn up a strategy 
of making the rebellion appear to be “autochthonous” by making the Banyamulenge 
the spearhead of the movement.64 
  
In an interview with a delegation of journalists from Kinshasa in 1998 Padiri, had the 
following statement destined to Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s government:  
The government promotes stupidities; that is why you are saying: ‘Oh look, the Maï-Maï 
are warmongers, they are fighting a tribal war, a segregationist war etc…’ I say the 
following as a Congolese citizen: if we are here we are in our country and we cannot 
accept that our country is taken abroad [inaudible], destroy country. We cannot accept 
that, and all of this is because you – you the people of the government – you do not want 
to respect our country and its borders and therefore there are infiltrations going on 
without you doing anything; these infiltrators do whatever they want and the government 
makes no interventions […]. If I have taken the path of war, it is not for my personal 
interest; it is not that I am opposing the government, but I am opposing the people who 
destroy our country. For that reason, if the President takes no actions against these acts, 
then, frankly, I am obliged and determined to oppose him.65 
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The conflict between the Maï-Maï and Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s government ended 
when the RCD rebellion, supported by Kabila’s former patrons, Rwanda and Uganda, 
broke out in August 1998. The local militias in the Kivus,66 the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, 
the FDD and the FNL all came in on the side of the Kabilist geo-political block in 
order to counter the imperialist project of creating a Tutsi-Hima67 empire in central 
Africa:  
We turned against Mobutu because of his dictatorship; after that Kabila became our 
cause of concern because he had brought the Rwandans, but when Kabila demanded that 
the Rwandans should go back to Rwanda, the second war was unleashed. It was at this 
moment that we rallied on the side of Kabila’s government in order to fight the enemy 
and liberate our country.68 
 As the scope of the war expanded the ethos of the movement was subject to a subtle, 
yet decisive alteration. From being a local conflict between immigrants and 
autochthonous tribes it became a war between nations and races: “with the Katuku 
and Batiri it was still a local war, but since we met up in 98 we started thinking on a 
national level, we started seeing it as a national problem; we thought that we should 
defend the Congolese territory. Since then we have integrated all the tribes into the 
movement: Barega; Banyanga; Bahunde; Bashi, Kasaïans; Bakongo etc. and so it 
became a national movement”.69 As for the conflict between “autochthones” and the 
“non-autochthones”, this had not ended, but had rather become integrated into a far 
more extensive and complex field of power relations. The resistance was still justified 
as a defence of the right to keep their ancestral land by the autochthonous tribes, but 
the enemy was now much more formidable, and the Maï-Maï had to adapt:  
In 93 our objective was that we should counter the immigrants and their thoughts of 
taking the land of the autochthonous tribes by force, but from 98 onwards the movement 
became a politico-military movement with both political and military objectives, and we 
started the military school then too. On the organisational level, before Masisi was the 
only battleground, and we did not need a grand organisational structure and we recruited 
those who thought they were capable without giving them any education, either 
ideological or military. We relied only on the dawa and we used traditional arms like 
spears and arrows, but in 98 we started sensitising in earnest and all the recruits had to go 
through a military education and an ideological education.70 
During the 1998-2003 war Padiri’s organisation gradually developed into the most 
influential of the Maï-Maï groups. According to my informants, within the 
organisation the number of combatants in Padiri’s resistance group reached 
approximately 16,000 combatants when it was at its zenith in 2002, but a UN 
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assessment estimated Padiri’s combined force to be at approximately 6,000 that same 
year (UNSC S/2002/341).71 Other significant Maï-Maï groups are those of Colonel 
Dunia, in Baraka, Akilimani in Masisi/Walikali/Lubutu, Kakule Sikulivasaka in 
Muhangi/Bunyatenge, General Damiano in Walikale, Nyakabaka in the Ruzizi Plains 
and the “Hautes Plateaus”, and Mugabo Hasani in Masisi, to name but a few of the 
many relatively autonomous Maï-Maï groups operational in the Kivus. Of these other 
Maï-Maï groups, it is probably the one associated with Colonel Dunia which is the 
most influential. His group was estimated at 4,000–5,000 combatants in the 2002 UN 
assessment and at 8,000–12,000 combatants in a 2004 assessment (ibid.; MONUC 
2004: 14).  
 
The modulation in the ethos of resistance of the Maï-Maï had a sweeping effect on the 
mode of organising the resistance. From being a local militia group, it became a 
national movement with partial control over a large swathe of territories in eastern 
Congo. In South Kivu, the Maï-Maï were in partial control of Bunyakiri, Shabunda, 
Mwenga, Walungu, Kabare and Kalehe; in North Kivu of Walikali and Masisi; and 
finally, in Maniema of Punia, Pangi, Kailo, Kasongo and Lubutu. This would, of 
course, be subject to change as the front moved back and forth, but as a general rule 
the Maï-Maï controlled large portions of the hinterland, whereas the RCD controlled 
cities, roads and certain sites of mineral exploitation, such as Kamituga in Mwenga. 
This meant that Padiri’s Maï-Maï group became the de facto governing body in a 
large part of eastern Congo and the movement scrambled to establish a modicum of 
government for the population living in the territories under its control. Based on my 
interviews with the Maï-Maï, the utter collapse of formal government structures in the 
rural areas of the east in the wake of the AFDL rebellion required the Maï-Maï 
themselves to take over the role of the local state, a move that opened up a much 
vaster, much more discontinuous and less closed space than the chefferie that most of 
the Batembo Maï-Maï were used to navigate in. Padiri’s Maï-Maï quickly found 
themselves caught up in “ethnic” conflicts with their neighbours resisting the 
domination of the Batembo and as a consequence Padiri’s Maï-Maï were often 
embroiled in skirmishes with rival Maï-Maï fractions. 
 
Following the signing of the Final Act of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in April 2003, 
the Maï-Maï entered into a transitional government with the ex-Government, the 
MLC, RCD-Goma, RCD-ML, the RCD-N, the unarmed opposition and 
representatives of civil society.72 Moreover, Padiri’s Maï-Maï group decided to join 
the new Congolese army the FARDC, thus officially disbanding the military branch 
of the organization. Later, in 2003, Maï-Maï General Padiri was appointed a Major 
General in the FARDC and Commander of the ninth military region of Orientale in 
north-east Congo. At least six political parties claiming to represent the Maï-Maï 
surfaced following the inauguration of the Transitional Period in 2003, and as a result 
political representation has been severely contested.73 However, the only political 
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party, which is recognized by the Maï-Maï military leadership is the “Mouvement 
Mai-Mai” created in July 2003 (Collège des Fondateurs 13 April 2004; Mouvement 
Maï-Maï Directoire National 26 June 2004). Despite the fact that the Maï-Maï no 
longer exist as an autonomous military movement, many of its soldiers having either 
been demobilised or reintegrated into the FARDC, several more or less unaltered 
Maï-Maï units existed in the Kivutian hinterland during my stay. During my 
fieldwork the Maï-Maï still considered themselves to be in a state of war, even though 
the forces of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda had withdrawn, and they continued to 
plead allegiance to the “Maï-Maï cause”. There was very little faith in the transitional 
government and they deeply mistrusted the institution of the presidency, which at the 
time was divided into one president, Joseph Kabila, and four vice-ministers: Jean-
Pierre Bemba, of the MLC; Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi of the ex-Government; 
Arthur Z’ahidi Ngoma of the RCD-ML; and Azarias Ruberwa of the RCD-Goma. 
This institutional set-up, known as “1+4”, was in the eyes of the Maï-Maï highly 
flawed and facilitated infiltrations from the camps of their enemies. The vast majority 
of the Maï-Maï were therefore under the impression that they were being neglected 
and marginalized at all levels of government.  
The Battle between Racial Selves and Racial Others 
Listening to and reading the narratives of the Maï-Maï is to enter into a polarised 
world of brothers and enemies, like entering an epic drama where the righteous fight 
the fallen in a war that has been going on since the first contact between the white 
man and the native Congolese population. It is a battle where the “primary objective 
is to liberate the country”.74 
 
However, it would be incorrect to assume, on the basis of the fundamental division 
between the autochthones and the foreigners, that the Maï-Maï reduce the Congolese 
conflict to one with merely two dimensions. In fact, the Maï-Maï see the Congolese 
conflict as multilayered, one that might have been initiated by the foreigner, but 
which is far from being a simple battle between foreigners and autochthones. Broadly 
speaking, the Maï-Maï war of liberation is fought against two kinds of enemies: the 
enemy within and the external enemy. The enemy within appears in two 
manifestations: 1) the corrupted Congolese, i.e. the Congolese who have fought on the 
side of the Hamites and the West in the RCD and the MLC, but also the “ruling 
class”, which is considered to have neglected its sacred duty of ensuring the security 
and development of the “autochthonous masses”; and 2) the dangerous seed of 
corruption, which, lurking within all Congolese, though planted by the foreigner, 
threatens to unravel the Congo’s national unity. As for the external enemy, it is a 
conglomerate of foreign actors constituted by such different actors as the UN, the 
United States, Belgium and other smaller Western countries, South Africa and the 
Nilotic75 countries, but as noted, the most prominent symbol of danger is the Tutsi. 
  
In accordance with the bifurcation in the imagery of the enemy the war of liberation 
has two main battles. The first battle is for the survival of the Congolese population, 
which is considered to be threatened by extinction by the external enemy. The second 
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battle is fought over the spirit the souls and of the Congolese citizenry, which is 
considered to be threatened by “mental alienation”: 
The total liberation conceived by the Maï-Maï is concerned with liberating the Congolese 
from enslavement, mental alienation of all kinds and foreign occupation. (Mouvement 
Maï-Maï March 2002, my translation, emphasis). 
The term [resistance] contains two meanings, that is to say: resistance to the occupation 
and resistance to all Congolese would works for the occupation.76  
Yet, even though the war is being fought on two different fronts, its source remains 
the same: the foreigner: “We are called Maï-Maï because we have fought to liberate 
our country, we have rejected the corruption of the enemy”.77 
 
For the Maï-Maï, the war between the autochthonous populations and both external 
and internal enemies is a war that has been going on for centuries, since the arrival of 
the “white man”. In the Maï-Maï rendition of the history of this war, the objective of 
the “imperialists” has always been to “enslave” and “exploit” the autochthonous 
population (Mouvement Maï-Maï 2002 March 2002): 
The resistance against the aggressor is not of recent date. Already in 1481 the King 
NZINGA PANJU opposed the Portuguese (imperialist) occupation. The prophetess 
CHIMPA VITA resisted against the imposition of Portuguese power in the Kingdom of 
Kongo: she was burned alive. And still in our memories, there is: SIMON KIMBANGU 
who was arrested in 1921 and died in exile in 1951; the KITAWALA in 1942; P. E. 
LUMUMBA assassinated the 17/01/1961 and recently Mzee Laurent Désiré KABILA 
[sic.] assassinated the 16/01/2001 for having brandished and aroused the spirit of 
nationalism; the profound love of the country (PATRIOTISME). (Mouvement Maï-Maï 
27 September 2004, my translation, emphasis)  
There are two aspects of the Maï-Maï articulation of the history of the country that we 
need to keep in mind. First, the war is considered a war of aggression; that is, it has 
been unjustifiably imposed on the Congolese populations by foreigners. Secondly, 
this war of aggression imposed by foreigners has, through the ages, been met with 
resistance by autochthones imbued with the spirit of nationalism. As was the case for 
their ancestors, it is through the “spirit of nationalism” that the Maï-Maï carry out 
their resistance: “Our resistance […] is a heritage of the spirit and/or the state of 
patriotic nationalism” (Mouvement Maï-Maï 2005 16 January, my translation). The 
fact that the Maï-Maï enframe their resistance as the activation of the “spirit of 
nationalism” reveals what I consider to be the defining aspect of the ethos of Maï-Maï 
resistance and liberation, namely that the Maï-Maï see themselves not as a movement 
contending for power, but as agents of a universal, natural and divine spirit, that is, 
the nation. By articulating the current Maï-Maï resistance as merely the latest episode 
of an eternal war of liberation being fought to defend the integrity and sovereignty of 
the nation, the Maï-Maï legitimate the naturally endowed right of the autochthonous 
population to autonomy and self-determination. Further, by formulating the concept 
of the nation as a transcendental spirit that flows unchanged through history, the Maï-
Maï are producing a historical discourse which institutes the autochthonous subject as 
the sovereign object of its own history, rather than the product of the white man’s 
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efforts to civilize him. In the words of Dieudonné, “we have need of seeing the 
Congolese dignity restored”.78 
 
In conformity with their historical analysis the Maï-Maï are convinced that the wars 
that have been fought on Congolese territory since the 1990s are the result of the 
ambition of certain Western powers to realize the dream of creating a grand Tutsi-
Hima empire in central Africa: “The cause of all our oppression here in Central Africa 
is the attempt to create a Tutsi-Hima empire; if there are Tutsi here it is because they 
want to create a Tutsi empire, but the population resist and in resisting we suffer”.79 
 
The creation of a Tutsi-Hima empire is thought to imply the preservation of Hamitic 
rule in Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, as well its conquest of the Eastern Congolese 
provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Orientale. This imperialist project is 
considered to be orchestrated by the United States and Great Britain acting in 
collusion with “Belgium, Germany, Norway, Holland and Sweden, all the Nilotic 
countries (Somalia, Senegal, Nigeria, Eritrea…) and the UN” to “exploit the Congo’s 
abundant natural resources, to conquer more land and finally to recruit manpower for 
the factories” (Mouvement Maï-Maï March 2002). If the West is considered to be the 
puppeteer, “South Africa, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda” are the puppets.80 But why 
not ensure the continued exploitation of the Congo through the agency of the 
Congolese themselves? Because the West thinks that the autochthonous population is 
made up of savages incapable of harnessing the vast potential of the country and 
therefore seeks to exploit the Congo through the agency of foreigners: 
We ask of the Westerners not to support these people [the Rwandans, Ugandans and 
Burundians] in order to bring war to the Congo, because these people are deceitful. We 
don’t need these strangers to install peace here, nor to give us lessons in democracy […]. 
Is it necessary to use the Rwandans to exploit something here? If the West has interests 
in the Congo they may come but collaborate with the Congolese.81 
For the Maï-Maï, this war which has been imposed on the Congo by foreigners with 
imperialistic attitudes, is not merely a war between armies, but rather a war fought 
between nations and races. What is at stake is not only political or economic interests, 
but, rather, the survival of the Congolese nation and ultimately the Bantu race, with 
everything this implies in terms of the effects of knowledge and power i.e. culture, 
traditions, spirituality, the biological existence of the population, economic 
independence etc. This experience of being involuntarily thrust into an international 
war against an enemy supported by the might of the West has created a profound 
sense of being threatened by extinction. Here is how Tristan answered when I asked 
him, “what pushed you to join the Maï-Maï movement?”: “What pushed me to join 
was that we were told that the Tutsi are going to exterminate all the men and rule with 
the women in order to make the Congolese progeny disappear. I felt that as a threat – 
that’s the reason why I joined up”.82  
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As indicated by Tristan’s words, the Maï-Maï feared that the autochthonous 
Congolese population was threatened by extinction. According to Didier about “32 
instructions” had been given by the Tutsi-regimes of Rwanda and Uganda to ensure 
the annexation of the eastern Congo into the Tutsi-Hima Empire. These 32 
instructions revolve around two main themes: the weakening of the life-force of the 
autochthonous population, and as a result its capacity to resist occupation and the 
exploitation of its resources. To give a few examples: “Fourth instruction: massacre 
the Congolese youth by poison and forced labour”; “Fifth instruction: exterminate the 
customary and local authorities in order to weaken the customary power and 
traditional healing”; “Eighth instruction: pillage the resources of the Congo; the 
minerals and agricultural and industrial products”; “Thirteenth instruction: weaken the 
demography in the Kivus by killing the male children […]”; “Fifteenth instruction: 
grant the young Tutsi university studies so that they can later occupy all the public 
services of the country”; “Seventeenth instruction: kill all the Congolese who seem to 
be capable of mobilising the population against the Tutsi-Hima”; “Eighteenth 
instruction: weaken the demography of the Nande, Nyanga, Hunde, Tembo, Havu, 
Shi, Fulero, Rega and Bembe”; “Twenty-fifth instruction: weaken the health sector in 
order to weaken the vitality of the Congolese population”.83 I am not in a position to 
verify whether any such programme really existed or not, but it is certain that the 
RCD-G along with its ally the APR engaged in harsh repression and conducted 
massacres whereever they encountered resistance from the Maï-Maï (Morvan 2005: 
48-9). It is, however, equally true that the Maï-Maï used this alleged programme to 
mobilise the population in the resistance to foreign occupation. In any case, regardless 
of whether or not such a strategy of conquering the Kivus and subduing its population 
existed the Maï-Maï were convinced that this was the case and acted accordingly. 
They therefore became involved in a racial war that promised either total victory or 
total annihilation. It is against this backdrop of a fear of annihilation that the Maï-Maï 
practice of resistance must be understood. 
 
It is not, however, for the Maï-Maï, only the future of the Congolese progeny which is 
at stake, here, for the war of aggression in the Congo is considered to be just one 
battlefield in an international war begin waged against all the Bantus of central 
Africa: “We have finally realized that the war that the Tutsi are engaged in is not a 
war against this or that country, but rather a prolonged war by the Nilotics against the 
Bantus of Central Africa”.84  
 
But what makes the Tutsi so dangerous in the eyes of the Maï-Maï? Not surprisingly 
it is their cultural predispositions, their cultural mode of being. The Hamitic way of 
life is regarded as the opposite of the Bantu way of life: “the Bantu are sedentary, 
agriculturalist, peaceful and solidary whereas the Tutsi are a nomadic people; they are 
pastoralists, tourists, deceitful […] they are liars, corruptors and scheming, which is to 
say that they spread division. It is a reality because within our ideology we have 
studied, and we only say what is real and logical”, and further, “Who are the Tutsi? 
They are adventurers, they have a porous social structure and are therefore unstable; 
they have a dishonest personality, they are hateful and they easily change; they suffer 
from a complex of superiority”.85 It is noticeable that for every cultural characteristic 
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attributed to the Tutsi there is a Bantu counter-characteristic, highlighting the negative 
reciprocity that is believed to exist between the Hamites and the Bantus. In point of 
fact. the Tutsi are considered so dangerous that one must “avoid all contact with the 
Tutsi”(Mouvement Maï-Maï March 2002) because either you oppose them, in which 
case they will eliminate you, or you accept their presence in which case you will 
become an enemy of the Maï-Maï and the Congolese people. Either way, entering into 
contact with the Tutsi is a great risk to take.  When I asked André what he thought of 
the Tutsi he simply said: “We don’t have the same blood”.86 Not only was the racial 
division between non-autochthonous Tutsi and autochthonous Bantu, conceived by 
European scholarship centuries ago and institutionalized by colonial governmentality 
in the Great Lakes Region, reproduced by the Maï-Maï it has been recast as a 
permanent racial war being fought over the hegemony of Central Africa, in which 
there is no alternative than to fight the Tutsi to the end:  
[I]t is necessary that the Hutu return to power in Rwanda as long as the Tutsi is in power 
in Rwanda there is not going to be a sustainable peace here in South Kivu. […] the 
problem is that it is the Tutsi who are in power, he is predisposed to let the autochthones 
suffer. […] It is necessary to destroy the nucleus of the Tutsi army which is in Uganda. 
That is the proposition for an effective peace in the Great Lakes Region.87 
In sum, we may note that the Maï-Maï war of liberation is a bio-political practice of 
security which seeks to care and protect the population by defending it from 
dangerous foreign elements threatening its very existence. “If the war breaks out 
again people are going to be massacred. Rwanda acts as if it is a major power […] 
there is going to be miracles because we cannot tolerate it, we have never gone to 
Rwanda. We are capable of committing genocide, genocide of the Tutsi, we can even 
kill the children”.88  
The Battle over the Congolese Spirit and the Souls of the 
Congolese 
As already noted, the war of liberation carried out by the Maï-Maï implies two 
different battles: the battle over the souls and spirit of the Congolese, and the battle 
for the survival of the Congolese progeny. Having already covered the latter, I now 
turn to the former. 
 
The universal and sacred pillar around which the Maï-Maï resistance is erected – as a 
corollary to the notion of autochthony is the nation, which is considered to be a supra-
historical spiritual ensemble as old as the world itself. For the Maï-Maï the nation is 
manifestly not an abstract idea, but rather the totality of the spirits, humans, plants, 
animals, ancestors, bodies of water etc., i.e. all of God’s creations which reside on the 
Congolese territory. When I asked Xavier what the relationship was between the Maï-
Maï and the country, he answered in the following manner: “We fight for the integrity 
of our country; we fight so that no one transgresses its limits and seizes it; not even 
one metre. The preoccupation of the Maï-Maï is that the Congo stays the way God has 
created it […] we cannot cede our country to the enemy so that he can exploit it, so 
that we can share it; that never!”.89 The territory of the Congo, therefore, is seen as a 
divine creation reserved for the Congolese tribes, making armed resistance not just a 
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defence of a territory, but also the extension of Providence.90 In other words, the Maï-
Maï see it as their sacred duty to secure the perpetuation of the nation’s sacred 
spiritual unity. 
 
The theme of an internal war between traitors and loyalists to the national cause 
emerged literally in every conversation I had with the Maï-Maï, for whom the war had 
not ended simply with the withdrawal of foreign troops, but instead was continuing  
by other means:  
We don’t know whether the current government is from the RCD or Lumumbist; we 
regret that the current government do not recognise us […] we think that what the 
government is doing is colonization […] all we see is that the RCD which was fighting 
us in the forest is still fighting us today […] the war is still going on.91 
But why do the Maï-Maï think that there is still a war going on when the occupying 
armies have withdrawn? For two reasons; firstly, the war between the Bantus and 
Tutsis is an eternal war, and even though the Tutsi armies might have withdrawn to 
their respective countries, they are still represented in the country, not only in the 
form of the Banyamulenge and the Banyarwanda communities, but equally in the 
institutions of power they are thought to have infiltrated: “the Maï-Maï are in a 
defensive position. We know that the war is coming and we are already planning the 
defence. We can accept the peace process, but we know that the Banyamulenge are 
not satisfied”.92 Secondly, centuries of foreign dominance and exploitation have left 
the autochthonous self alienated from its ancient Bantu ethos. As a consequence the 
autochthonous population has become weak, insecure, manipulable and un-civic: 
With the arrival of the white man here in Black Africa the big and solid civilisations and 
progenies became decadent and even weak. From that moment on social disorganisation 
reigned, there was the slave trade of the blacks, there was exploration and exploitation, 
pillage of the riches of the country, evangelisation, mental alienation, caused by the 
preoccupation of the whites to exploit our continent. It was the beginning of the 
aggression suffered by the black man at the hands of the white man.93 
I would suggest that, rather than seeing the racially self-affirmative and racially 
exclusive discourse of autochthony employed by the Maï-Maï as “extremist” or 
“radical”, we need to think of it in terms of a crisis of the autochthonous subject – that 
is, in terms of an intense experience of insecurity connected to the experience of being 
threatened by extermination as a nation. The theme of an internal war inaugurates the 
autochthonous self, individually and collectively, as a field of intervention; it 
institutes the Congolese self as a battlefield. The crisis of the autochthonous subject is 
also a crisis of subjectivation for, in as much as centuries of foreign domination and 
exploitation have hollowed out the substance of the autochthonous mode of being, the 
autochthonous subject has lost its moral foundation and thus finds itself without 
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purpose and an authentic ethics. This disjunction between the ontological core of the 
autochthonous being and the ethics of the subject, instituted through the burrowing 
activities of the foreigner, is generally referred to through use of the terms “failure”, 
“weakness”, and, most tellingly, “lack of nationalism”. As in the discourse of 
international development, it is the post-colonial Mobutist state which is made 
responsible for the near total dismemberment of Congolese society, because it has 
abandoned its prescribed role of protecting the population: 
After the First Republic and since the advent of the Second in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, the rulers of the country have not been concerned with their primary tasks; 
notably the tasks of securing the populations and their possessions and to assure national 
sovereignty – which, since the 1990s, has created an indescribable chaotic situation in 
our country. (Nationalistes Résistantes Maï-Maï Haut-commandement 25 May 2003, my 
translation)  
In fact, this way of problematising the current state of Congolese society is not the 
only structural homology between the discourse of the international community and 
the discourse of the Maï-Maï for, just as in the former, it is believed that the lack of 
unity between state and population facilitates the pursuit of unethical actions by 
dangerous elements: 
The aggression is favoured by the psychological characteristics inherited from 32 years 
of Mobutism; so for 32 years we have been badly educated. If only he had governed with 
a patriotic spirit, we could not have been so weak so as to let ourselves be violated by all 
kinds of exterior influence. But, since for 32 years we have had a president who does not 
merit the title, we are ignorant; we have no power to defend ourselves when we are faced 
with aggression. If we have been subjected to aggression it is because psychologically 
we have inherited the culture of corruptibility.94 
It is the incapacity of certain Congolese to withstand the onslaught of acculturation, 
through contact with the foreigner, which has rendered them “corrupt”:  
If there are Congolese who reacts and thinks like the Tutsi, it is because they have lived 
together for a long time. […] After that there is something from them that stays inside of 
them. Because the Tutsi are so cunning, they can change the mentality of the original 
population. For example: the Congolese who have worked with them have a little bit the 
Tutsi mentality.95 
The logic of the Maï-Maï resistance has thus come full circle: the Congolese have for 
centuries been alienated from their ancient Bantu ethos; this has stimulated them to 
pursue personal interests and power, which in turn has pushed them to join forces 
with the enemy and to de-solidarise themselves from their Congolese brethren. It is no 
surprise, then, that the “objectives” of the autochthones that are “allied to the Tutsi” 
are considered to be “personal interests” and “power” (Mouvement Maï-Maï March 
2002) Non-compliance with the universal ideal of the unified action state necessarily 
makes one an ally of the enemy: 
[T]he Congolese [spirit has] for too long been invaded by negative values of all kinds, 
which has resulted in armed aggression which he has proved incapable of countering. 
The armed aggression conducted by our neighbours to the East is the product of several 
forms of aggression which we have suffered from for centuries: spiritual aggression, 
political aggression economic aggression, social aggression, cultural aggression […] the 
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combination of which constitutes what we could call the ‘Congolese affliction’. […] The 
Congolese are a people without a history because they are without a spirit, because their 
spirit is invaded by negative values. (Mouvement des Maï-Maï Congolais pour la 
Révolution à l’Africaine 2004)  
For the Maï-Maï, the Congolese spirit is considered to be insufficiently developed, 
thus rendering it insecure and vulnerable because the Congolese have been “incapable 
of countering aggression”: “When our neighbouring countries to the East planned the 
war, they studied the Congolese ‘me’. They discovered that it was easy to spit in the 
face of the Congolese if only one brings him easy money, women, alcoholic drinks or 
music. They did it and they marched from the east of the country to the west without 
having to fight” (Ibid). The autochthonous soul has thus long since been corrupted by 
different forms of “aggression”. It is these aggressions that are considered to be at the 
root of what I have called the crisis of the autochthonous subject and the concomitant 
crisis of subjectivation.  
 
Apart from the pro-Tutsi rebel movements, the RCD and the MLC, it is mainly the 
“ruling class” and the military personnel of the regular army who is considered to be 
corrupt. Moreover, since the signing of the peace accords, it appears to the Maï-Maï 
that the ex-Government, the RCD and the MLC have become almost 
indistinguishable. This is because they seem interested only in holding on to power, 
rather than taking care of the “autochthonous masses”. Even their own political 
representatives are suspected of having been corrupted, and there were those within 
the movement who thought that it movement should not be made into political parties, 
because politics, by definition, was seen as a pursuit of power, which, according to the 
ethos of resistance, is unethical:  
The Maï-Maï movement is today the feeblest movement because it is divided into several 
groups and these groups cannot unite. […] It is a road to power, so they see that everyone 
who has fought in the resistance of the Maï-Maï should occupy a responsible post 
somewhere. […] It is as if it is a question of making small groups so that everyone can 
become a leader. […] Instead of working for the nation instead of orienting the 
population to what they should do […] they commit themselves to the search for power, 
for positions and money, a lot like the Congolese politicians.96 
From his perspective, the politicisation of the Maï-Maï was a populist attempt to cash 
in the popularity of the Maï-Maï at the ballot box. Indeed several of the Maï-Maï with 
whom I spoke were frustrated that the very people who had been chosen by the 
movement to represent them at the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and in the transitional 
government seemed to have forgotten the “base”, had forgotten that they had been 
given a mandate to serve the interests of the autochthonous masses, and not their own 
interests. There was incomprehension with respect to why the different 
representatives could not come together in one single party whereby they could show 
that they were above the fray. Being a Maï-Maï, one was expected to be able to lay 
aside personal ambitions in order to serve a higher cause. From the point of view of 
the rank-and-file Maï-Maï, both civil and military, this was a momentous break of the 
Maï-Maï code, and there was concern that the movement’s political representatives 
had given in to the temptation of power: “Anselme, the minister […] I don’t know if 
he is also corrupted; he doesn’t remember the suffering that we endured together in 
the forest”.97  
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Now, in so far as the “ruling class”, whether from the rebel groups or not, is the 
symbol of the fallen native par excellence, the internal war is also a class-struggle for 
a democratisation of power. It is no coincidence that the Maï-Maï resistance is cast as 
a popular revolution carried out by the mass of autochthonous peasants: “the politico-
military movement, the Mai-Mai, is the sum of the organized reactions conducted by 
the autochthonous Congolese peasants” (Mouvement Maï-Maï March 2002). The 
objective of the Maï-Maï is not to destroy the governmental apparatus, but to claim it 
in the name of the nation and have it serve its original purpose of protecting and 
directing the people, rather than exploiting it: “This revolution is devoted to becoming 
a process through which the Congolese is rendered responsible […] and to teach the 
Congolese and the Africans that public interests should be the only objective of the 
Prince and his subjects (dixit cardinal Richelieu, 1964). Lastly, it is a necessary will, a 
superiority of the spirit and the knowledge of the measures to be taken in the interest 
of the State.98 
  
Moreover, the class struggle is connected with tribalism and regionalism because the 
holders of power in Kinshasa are considered to be mainly people from the tribes in the 
west of the country. 
The army of Mobutu lacked the spirit of patriotism and the spirit of nationalism; it is a 
problem of tribalism, and during the war they would flee the fighting, so we can infer 
that they didn’t have nationalism inside them. The Mongwande tribe from Equateur held 
all the command posts and all the posts in the security services in South Kivu. It is thus 
these people from Equateur who have sold the Kivu, and it is the same thing that Bemba 
and the Commander of the 10th military region is doing now.99 
As it was, during my stay, there was a very serious conflict between the Maï-Maï and 
the leadership of the 10th Military Region that resulted in several armed 
confrontations. This conflict was interpreted in terms of a conflict between 
“Swahilophones” and “Lingalophones” within the army. This terminology is used, not 
only to differentiate the Swahili-speaking part of the army from the Lingala-speaking 
part, but also to differentiate easterners (i.e. those from Katanga, Maniema, the Kivus 
and Orientale) and westerners (i.e. those from Kinshasa and its environs, and 
especially the people from Equateur). “When the army reunified, we, the Maï-Maï, we 
came here with pride from our respective camps in the forest, like combatants who 
have fought for our country. Unfortunately the RCD, MLC, even the ex-government, 
make us suffer. What’s worse is that there is tribalism in the army; if you don’t speak 
Lingala or French you are marginalised; they take us for simple civilians”.100 For the 
Maï-Maï this conflict is in reality an offensive set off by an alliance between the 
“ruling class” and the “foreigners” against the Maï-Maï because the they had blocked 
the mutual interest in sharing the spoils of expropriation (to the detriment of the 
masses) of the foreigners and the ruling class.  
 
On 9 September 2004 the Maï-Maï addressed a memorandum to President Joseph 
Kabila. In the memorandum the authors of the document – all former Maï-Maï civil 
servants, who had been stripped of their positions of authority following the 
inauguration of the transitional period – accuse the politicians of the transition not 
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only of “marginalizing the Maï-Maï” from the administration of the country and in the 
army, but of destabilizing the country by giving responsibility to the “enemies of the 
peace” in “matters of the State” (Entité Mai-Mai/EST 27 September 2004). Following 
this criticism, the memorandum proposes the “definitive exclusion of the staff, 
customary as well as public, which has had an ideological education in Rwanda, 
Uganda or Burundi. This is in order to avoid internal conflict, since, “having lost the 
war; this staff have been ideologically prepared to set off internal troubles, which is a 
new strategy of the aggressor to reach his objective of partitioning the Congo” (Ibid).  
The Becoming of Modernity 
The crisis of the subjectivation of the autochthonous subject is tied to the experience 
of being threatened by extinction, physically, culturally, mentally etc. But the crisis of 
the autochthonous subject is also connected to the experience of being 
underdeveloped. By objectifying the autochthonous self as endangered and insecure 
qua underdeveloped, the Maï-Maï resistance inscribes itself in the two centuries-old 
discourse which objectifies the Congolese mode of being as perpetually condemned to 
occupying the lower rungs of human civilization. Yet, the Maï-Maï rationalise the 
current state of underdevelopment of the autochthonous subject differently from either 
the colonial discourse or the discourse of international development. For, whereas 
these consider the underdeveloped state of the Congolese mode of being to be a 
consequence of the incapacity of certain elements in Congolese society to master their 
natural drives, the former, in continuity with the thematic of the war of the races, see 
the current state of underdevelopment as a consequence of the strategy to squeeze the 
life out of the Congolese people in order to facilitate the creation of the Tutsi-Hima 
empire:  
[A]n enlightened son of the country, General Padiri BULENDA, imbued with a sense of 
responsibility, constituted in the East of the country a new resistance labelled: 
MOUVEMENT MAÏ-MAÏ, to which other patriotic daughters and sons of the country 
voluntarily adhered, and together they fought a battle with determination, self-confidence 
and creativity in order to liberate the Congolese people from all the evils that slows down 
its development. (Résistantes Maï-Maï Haut-commandement 25 May 2003) 
If the autochthonous self is underdeveloped, it is because the enemies of the people 
have always sought to block the advancement of the Congolese population, especially 
the “tribes of the forest” such as the Batembo, Banyanga, Barega and Bahunde, of 
eastern Congo. For the Maï-Maï, the fact that no international aid has come their way 
is ample proof that the UN, Western NGOs, firms and governments, are legitimizing 
the imposition of the Tutsi-Hima Empire in eastern Congo. Consequently the Maï-
Maï would pose questions of the type: Why did the UNCHR leave all the Hutu 
refugees a few metres from the border with Rwanda, when international law stipulates 
that refugees must not be closer than 250 km from international border? The answer 
was: to authorize an invasion of the Congo. And why have Vodacom and Celtel101 not 
put up antennas in Bunyakiri? 
We think that it is because of our resistance that one does not wish for us to progress. We 
ask ourselves the question that why all the other towns have coverage, either by Celtel or 
Vodacom, but not Bunyakiri? Maybe because, if we allow the people of Bunyakiri to 
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develop, they will continue to resist until they become a threat to us. We think it is for 
this reason that development is stopped in our home.102 
As was the case with the champions of independence the Maï-Maï see the 
development of the nation as an inevitable social destiny that although it might have 
been halted, nevertheless, continues to work towards it own fulfilment, regardless of 
the efforts of the enemies of the peace to “Balkanise” the country:  
[H]aving discovered a diabolical plan for the balkanisation of our country and the 
destabilization of the entire sub-region we have succeeded in thwarting the Rwando-
Ugando-Burundo-Eritrean coalition supported by the imperialists and their aggression to 
which the DR Congo is the victim. It is therefore our right as daughters and sons of DR 
Congo to continue to defend our country, but we are also under obligation to embark on 
strategies which will lead us to the total liberation of our nation under siege. (Résistantes 
Maï-Maï Haut-commandement 25 May 2003)   
By universalising and sacralising the forward momentum of the development of the 
nation state, the Maï-Maï are able to cast “development” as an autochthonous strategy 
for nation-building. In the Maï-Maï discourse the forward movement of 
“development” corresponds to the momentum of divine providence. However, as was 
the case with the évolués, it is believed that the West, and indeed all the enemies of 
the autochthonous subject, is more developed than the autochthonous subject. Herein 
lies the great paradox of using evolutionary racial discourse as a practice of resistance, 
for it presents the Maï-Maï with the difficult problem of simultaneously seeking to 
secure, purify and unify the original autochthonous mode of being and to embrace the 
norms of civilization, which the Maï-Maï recognize are of European origin. How do 
the Maï-Maï reconcile the conviction that it is the white man, who after all instigated 
the alienation of the autochthonous mode of being which led to its regression, with the 
conviction, no less naturalized, that presently it is the white man and the races which 
have been more influenced by him, such as the Hamites, who are at the pinnacle of 
development – the position which the Maï-Maï see as the necessary future position of 
the autochthonous subject? The solution is to split the autochthonous subject into 
three domains, two inner domains: the spirit and the soul; and a physical domain: the 
body: “The Maï-Maï believe in the three dimensions of man: spirit, soul and body”.103 
The “spirit” is considered to be the more or less irreducible divine substance of the 
autochthonous subject. This “spirit” is none other than the “nationalist spirit” that is 
situated at the beginning and the end of history, the spirit that travels through history 
untouched, and that automatically “pushes” the autochthonous populations to resist 
when the nation is subjected to aggression by foreigners. The “nationalist spirit” or 
“patriotic spirit” is thus considered a sort of impulsion from depths of the 
autochthonous being: “In the beginning it was difficult – we used only spears, arrows, 
and sharpened bamboo sticks. But we were determined we were pushed by the 
patriotic spirit. With our traditional arms we succeeded in killing the enemy and 
recovered their weapons. That is how little by little we were able to acquire modern 
weapons”.104  
 
The “soul”, on the other hand, is the malleable and manipulable aspect of the inner 
domain. In a sense both aspects of the inner domain are universal, at least in so far as 
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all human beings are considered to possess them; but whereas the “soul” is unique to 
each human being, everyone is imbued with the spirit of God. This division of the 
inner domain between “spirit” and “soul” brings to life a universal authentic 
Congolese spirit, which will not be alienated by the modernization/development of the 
soul, a process which by necessity implies the whitening of “native”. In this optic the 
relevance of the notion of the “spirit of the nation” is that it constitutes a Congolese 
ethical substance which remains resistant to outside influence even though its soul and 
body is partly cultivated through modern technologies. 
 
For the Maï-Maï, there is nothing inherently contradictory in embracing modernity 
while safeguarding and cultivating traditional values: 
We are trying to modernize [the Dawa]; little by little we are doing away with the 
conditions which are too restrictive, which encloses us within ourselves. In order to 
embrace modernity, we devote ourselves to whatever makes us feel free.105 It is not a 
satanic cult, as certain people from the Catholic Church tend to think, that no! It is rather 
natural and human. We have our culture which is faced with the one imported by the 
Europeans and it is a dilemma. In the same way as the Christians, we pray and fast; and 
we take recourse to all the practices in order to vanquish the enemy.106  
For the Maï-Maï, therefore, it is perfectly possible to modernize the autochthonous 
subject without renouncing traditional values so long as a given modern technique is 
congruent with the overall telos of liberating the autochthonous subject: 
[The relics that we wear] are our traditional values. In the beginning we were almost 
naked, we didn’t’ wear any clothes […] I am still carrying [my relics] with me, but you 
can’t see them because they are underneath the uniform. It is a question of clothing; it 
does not have any influence on modernism. We are trying to adapt our system towards 
the conditions of the modern world, but in the very beginning some wore them to show 
that they were happy and proud.107 Before we were not allowed to wear whatever nor to 
eat whatever but today with the modernity of our relics we can wear clothes and even 
wear shoes.108 The dawa is an ancestral force which we used and which we continue to 
use. It is our traditional values. Each people has its own tradition – even ‘the whites’ can 
learn a new tradition, but they are not going to estrange themselves from their own. […] 
We risk to disappearing if we abandon our custom.109 
This will to reconcile tradition with modernity is also discernable through the 
symbolic of the body. For instance, in the interview with the journalists from 
Kinshasa, recorded on video, Padiri is sitting in a chair, in his left hand he is holding a 
long knife, and in his right hand a pistol. Moreover, he is wearing what seem to be a 
brand new Adidas track suit and a hat of red and black feathers. Later on we see 
Padiri, addressing the journalists, wearing an assortment of relics, an AK 47 and a hat 
made of leopard fur (Video Maï-Maï undated).110 This seemingly odd mixture of 
“modern” and “traditional” garments and weapons is anything but coincidental. As 
Bahati explains: “It is to show that he is both a traditionalist and a modernist, because 
we don’t refuse modernity: the war that we have conducted should not estrange us 
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from modernism and the truth. Carrying the knife and wearing the hat of feathers is to 
show that he endorses the culture; the knife is comparable with the gun”.111  
 
 
The picture shows Padiri with a hat of Leopard fur during the maquis. Picture given to the aut 
 
The meeting with the journalists took place in July 1998, but the Maï-Maï that I met 
wore their relics underneath their uniforms. Why is this? Because they felt the need to 
align themselves with the rest of the Congolese army “today we are wearing modern 
clothes because we are united, it is necessary that the army wears the same uniform.112 
The army doesn’t have any tribes. It is the one and the same throughout the national 
territory”.113 In addition, while the Maï-Maï would defend their right to resist using 
“traditional” means, they were also keenly aware of the fact that being naked and 
wearing relics, such as different parts of an animal, carried with it the stigma of being 
“sorcerers”. And this is not entirely unfounded. The Catholic Church, for instance, 
sees the dawa as an unethical manipulation of “satanic” forces. I did not have much 
time to explore this conflict, but a quote from an interview with a Catholic priest 
about the position of the Catholic Church vis-à-vis the Maï-Maï exemplified this 
attitude:114 
Author:  How can we qualify the dawa? 
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Answer:  The dawa, their fetishes you know that I personally I have never seen a Maï-
Maï who has taken his medicine, what do they do? They take the medicine 
before they attack, thinking that they become immune against bullets, but I 
think these are mystical realities. Mystical not in the positive sense of the 
word, for we as Christians, we think immediately about the Holy Spirit when 
we think of the mystical, but mystical in the negative sense of the word – you 
know, you can use Satanic forces in order to be able to, or want to do well 
[…] the Daemons, you can work with them in order to liberate the Congo, and 
it is for that reason that they have not succeeded 100 percent in their 
resistance.115 
The attitude of the priest reflects those I encountered among quite a few Bukavians 
who were not directly involved with the movement. One woman warned me before 
going to Bunyakiri that I should be careful, for in Bunyakiri “black magic reigns”. 
Only too aware of the association between their dawa and “sorcery”, the Maï-Maï 
would routinely assure me, as if to avoid the stigma of being a “savage”, that it had 
nothing to do with “Satanic forces”, but was rather a divine, natural, culture-
traditional practice inherited from their Congolese ancestors:  
It is not sorcery, but plants in purely natural state that we use, it is for God, and nobody 
should say that it is satanic,116 no-one should think that it is ‘fetishes’. It is our values, we 
cannot alienate ourselves from our custom.117 The resistance of the Maï-Maï was not a 
savage organisation, it was resistance to aggression, and it was an organisation of young 
people who had understood the necessity to of defend their country. Those who think that 
the dawa are ‘fetishes’, they are wrong – it is the power of God given to us.118 
In effect, the objectivation of the dawa as “diabolical” amongst parts of the population 
in Bukavu is an indication of the moral distance instituted between the assumed 
“modern” and “developed” urban life and the assumed “backward”, “traditional” and 
“savage” life of the Kivutian hinterland. For instance, when I asked an employee in a 
transit centre for former kadogos why the Maï-Maï were mostly recruited from among 
the tribes in the rural areas, he answered: “you know out there in the ‘bush’, 
civilization has not arrived yet. They are used to killing the beasts of the forest with 
their proper hands, taking a life for them is not difficult it is part of their culture”. 
That this evolutionary bifurcation between the rural milieu and the urban milieu was a 
palpable social conflict can also be discerned from the events that transpired during an 
interview in Bukavu with Bahati who used to be a Maï-Maï doctor. During the course 
of the interview an interested local person intervened and asked the doctor whether 
the formulas of the Maï-Maï could be modernized by giving them to a modern 
laboratory in the West. The doctor answered as follows: 
No! You should not be thinking in those terms – each nation has its proper culture. 
However, we could write it down and organize a laboratory, but have you, the 
Congolese, invested yourself in this endeavour? The Congolese do not want to invest in 
it; all they say is that it is something for the Maï-Maï, that they are dirty, and that they 
are villagers and savages. […] All the Congolese think about is money or being named 
deputy in the name of the Maï-Maï.119  
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The curios spectator persisted by saying that he had asked the question because 
“certain people say it’s diabolical”. The response was passionate:  
Listen mister! If you say it’s diabolical, that’s because you don’t know God. Listen! He 
who has manufactured the gun and the bomb has given it a lot of thought, they have 
organized themselves in order to create that […] are you going to tell me that that is from 
God? Is it the angels who have made all of that? Is it not men? They have used the 
materials that were already there. The Maï-Maï have also used the materials, but when 
they used them was in a purely natural state.120 
Apart from the fact that this exchange puts in perspective the tension between the 
Maï-Maï and parts of the urban population, it also stresses that the Maï-Maï consider 
their spiritual practices to be “purely natural”: 
The Batembo tribe is primitive and the Maï-Maï is a child of the Batembo culture. Nature 
is primitive, and we have not yet lost anything from nature. When we go towards 
modernism things will change. That is not to say that we against modernism, but nature 
too has its place; custom and whatever is primitive should not be abandoned.121  
It is pertinent that the Maï-Maï understand autochthonous culture as being to nature 
than modernity. It is, however, hardly surprising, since for the Maï-Maï the natural 
state is God’s original design. In framing the Maï-Maï as being in a purely natural 
state, they also by default become closer to God, and hence spiritually superior to 
modernity. 
 
The fact that the “traditional” mode of being is cast as a mode of being which is 
opposite to a “modern” mode of being shows how effective the dividing practices of 
colonial rule have been in the formation of subjectivities. This underscores a vital 
point, namely that neither tradition, nor modernity can be said to exist prior to the 
power relation that has been established between them; “tradition” and “modernity” 
enframe each other by way of contrast. “Tradition”, such as it appears to the Maï-Maï, 
would not exist if “modernity” was not there as a counterpoint clearly demarcating its 
own reality. This leads me to suggest that if the will to reconcile “modernity” and 
“tradition” is experienced as a dilemma or as the mixing of two different modes of 
being, this could very well be because colonial technologies of government divided 
the “autochthonous” sphere from the “civic” sphere along the lines of “tradition” and 
“modernity”. I would argue that, if the Maï-Maï feel torn between their traditional 
way of life and the need to move forward, to progress and to develop, in short to 
embrace modernity, in their effort to secure the Congolese mode of being, it is likely 
because they have internalised the dividing practices inaugurated by the governmental 
technologies of colonial rule.  
 
As was the case with east-west regional division, the urban-rural and developed-
underdeveloped division is highly tribalised. The city of Bukavu is situated in 
“Bushi”, which is the “land of the Shi”; as such it is considered a Bashi stronghold. It 
was not uncommon for the Batembo Maï-Maï with whom I spoke to refer to the Bashi 
Maï-Maï branch of the Maï-Maï movement, which for most of the war was allied to 
Padiri’s group, known as the “Mudundu 40”, as “false Maï-Maï”, because the Bashi 
were considered to have become too modernized and out of touch with the 
“autochthonous traditions”: “During the period of colonization the white man arrived 
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at Butembo; our tribe beat him, they didn’t easily accept becoming colonized and 
during this period there were youths that said no to colonization, but here [in Bukavu] 
the Bashi bowed down in front of the coloniser.122 We cannot, therefore, take for 
granted the official discourse of the Maï-Maï stipulating that they are a movement 
which has surpassed the tribal divisions that have has divided the Congolese body 
politic since independence. In spite of the nationalisation of the ethos of resistance it 
would seems that the concomitant ethnic pluralisation and politicization instituted 
through colonial rule has not loosened its grip completely but continues to produce 
tribalised conflict in the Kivutian social space:  
We are one of the cultures which has not had a chance to blossom. […] We are frustrated 
that we have been banished; we haven’t had a chance to be heard. Even if there are 
people of goodwill who have wished to help us, when they arrived in Bukavu, the Bashi 
told them that the Batembo are a tribe of savages and that it is very dangerous to go to 
[Butembo], and so no one went there out of fear of going. Until this day we are 
considered as people of the forest. […] It is as if we are in a crab’s hole – when a crab 
wants to climb up, the others pull its leg so it cannot continue to ascend.123 The Shi want 
all the aid to be destined only for them.124 
The activities of international and national NGOs are also interpreted through this 
grid, as can be discerned through the following quotes: 
The Maï-Maï are neither tribalists nor racists, and we are for all those who assist the 
population in developing itself. […] To say that the Maï-Maï are an obstacle to the 
development of the population is false. It is an argument advanced by the NGOs based in 
the city in order to make sure that the aid stays in the city. It is, however, the rural milieu 
which has most need of development.125 The humanitarian aid was only destined for the 
city where our enemies and their allies the RCD were: nothing was given to the 
territories controlled by the Maï-Maï.126 
The great predicament for the Batembo is that they have been allowed to develop 
neither as a culture nor economically, socially or politically, thus leaving the 
community teetering on the edge of modernity as well as tradition, being neither fully 
autochthonous nor fully developed, and this has rendered it utterly insecure, that is, 
without either “ethnic” or “civic” rights. The Batembo, however, are regarded not just 
as lacking in the domain of rights, but to be deficient in the realm of civic virtues, 
which are considered to be required to prosper and survive in the world today. 
Interestingly, the way Maï-Maï problematise the precarious position of the Batembo 
tribe is a microcosmic mirror image of their problematisation of the trans-ethnic, i.e. 
national, Congolese subjectivity. As for the Maï-Maï themselves, it would be 
incorrect to conclude, on the basis of this observation, that they see themselves as 
languishing in between “modernity” and “tradition” because, contrary to the 
“autochthonous masses”, the Maï-Maï do not see themselves as alienated, but instead 
as truly and complete autochthonous subjects who are trying to embrace modernity 
and working towards the total emancipation of the Congolese subject through 
development and autochthonisation: “We are going to accost the enemy with our 
traditional means and after we have fought the enemy we are going to recuperate his 
modern technology because we are sure of ourselves, we have confidence in 
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ourselves”.127  In short they see themselves as those who are capable of picking up the 
shepherd’s crook and guiding the “herd” to the “promised land”, not because they see 
themselves as more developed, but because they see themselves as spiritually 
superior, that is, as being imbued with the divine principle of “nationalism”: “The 
Maï-Maï revolution […] is a necessary will, a superiority of the spirit (Mouvement 
des Maï-Maï Congolais pour la Révolution à l’Africaine 2004). “God has revealed 
[the dawa] to us because the life that we lived was a feeble one, first of all we were 
underdeveloped, badly equipped in terms of war material, and less educated in 
modern warfare, whereas Rwanda was supported by certain superpowers”.128 The last 
quote stresses that, from the perspective of the Maï-Maï, God has granted them the 
knowledge of the way nature can be harnessed for protection precisely because the 
Maï-Maï have committed themselves to defending the divine order of nature, which is 
also God’s order. Part of that order is the preservation of the sanctity of the borders of 
nations. The primitive ways of the Maï-Maï are the way of God and Nature. 
 
To sum up my analysis of the problematisations of the Congolese subjectivity by the 
Maï-Maï we could say that it is a vision that places the conclusion at the beginning – 
It begins and ends with the “nation”. It is simultaneously a nostalgic search for origins 
and a developmental futurism, bringing together the “land of the ancestors” and the 
“promised land”. The vision of the Maï-Maï is that the souls of Congolese can be 
modelled into a unified and purified body politic through the use of modern 
technology while safeguarding the spiritual superiority and unity of the autochthonous 
subject. To this end, it is necessary to purify the spirit of the nation from the stain of 
the foreigner, which is thought to be at the origin of the crisis of the autochthonous 
subject and its concomitant crisis of subjectivation. The enemy is crystallised into two 
broad categories: the “internal enemy” and the “external enemy”. The internal enemy 
manifests itself in two forms: First, it does so as cultural hybrids – such as the RCD, 
MLC, “ruling class”, and even certain branches of the Maï-Maï (“Mudundu 40”) – 
which have been contaminated, and thus alienated through exposure to the 
“foreigner”, through which these subversive elements become the vanguard of revolt 
against the autochthones, endowed with the natural and divine right to rule. Secondly, 
the internal enemy is that seed of corruption that has been implanted by the foreigner 
and that lies inside the soul of all Congolese, where it threatens to break the invisible 
spiritual bond between the autochthones. 
 
The external enemy is a conglomerate of different actors, which have in common their 
seeking to exploit, re-colonise and enslave the Congolese by installing a Tutsi-Hima 
empire in eastern Congo. The discourse of an external war, however, does not run on 
a parallel track to the discourse of internal war – it is part of it, for “mental alienation” 
represents displacement of the autochthonous Congolese subject through contact with 
the foreigner. The two themes work in concert with each other within a unitary and 
subject-less bio-political strategy of nation-building.  
 
According to the Maï-Maï, despite the immense complexity and the many different 
interests at stake in the Congolese conflict, the crisis of the autochthonous subject can 
still be traced back to two phenomena: the presence of the foreigner and the lack of 
nationalism of the autochthonous subject. Behind the political stage, whether local, 
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regional, national or international, the mechanics of the war of the races is working 
relentlessly towards the final confrontation. At the end of the war, the autochthonous 
subject will be either totally obliterated or totally liberated. 
  
By formulating their resistance as a battle to restore unify and purify the nation the 
Maï-Maï manifests itself as an oppositional history which inscribes itself on the very 
tableau it seeks to oppose. The adoption of a racial and nationalist discourse, however, 
is not an invention of the Maï-Maï themselves, nor an ideological product, nor a 
mechanistic reaction to their marginalised position, but could be considered as a 
discursive tactic, a technology, in motion in the security-development dispositif. In 
other words, self-racialisation is a form of resistance, which is inscribed in bio-
political regimes of practices. In fact, the unitary discourses of civilization and race, 
which enframed the Congolese mode of being as a mass of backwards natives is 
annexed and taken into the fold of their own critique and reinvested in their own 
struggle with everything this implies in terms of effects of knowledge and power. This 
incites the Maï-Maï to undertake the vast project of guiding the autochthonous subject 
out of its crisis of subjectivation. The Maï-Maï have seized on the dual 
problematisation of the sovereignty of the people and the teleologico-salutary project 
of development, which has incited them to take up arms against foreigners and 
nationals in the name of the nation and of Providence. Who among the colonizers 
could have imagined that the objectification of the native as primitive and backward 
would become the watermark of a truly native revolution more than a century later? 
Moreover, can we be so sure that the “community development programmes” 
launched by the agencies of the international community in its effort to rebuild the 
Congolese nation state will not enter into the stakes of ethnic conflict? 
 
In light of the analysis of this chapter, I suggest that the self-objectifying communal 
notion of the spirit of the nation constitutes a sine qua non for the Maï-Maï practice of 
resistance. The obviously metaphysical notion of the “spirit of the nation” has 
remarkable symbolic efficacy in the practice of resistance of the Maï-Maï, like the 
notion of interest has in the practice of human security. 
5. Army of the People, Army of God 
The course of the people is the course of God. 
-  Soumialot, Colonel, 2 May 2005129 
Everything that we did was inspired by the life of the population […] for us the objective 
is peace and the wellbeing of the population. […] Democracy is at the base of all good 
governance. 
- Valentin, Major, Juridical Advisor, 3 May 2005130 
The soldier is a great personality who should be respected because he defends his 
country and protects the population. In relation to the civilian, the soldier is superior 
because he ensures his security. 
- Désiré, demobilised kadogo, 22 April 2005131 
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In the previous chapter, I showed how the Maï-Maï problematise the state of the 
Congolese subjectivity as underdeveloped and by consequence insecure. It is a mode 
of problematisation, which, as we have seen, they Maï-Maï share with the 
international community. In the present chapter I will show how this mode of 
problematisation has provoked the Maï-Maï to take up the challenge of countering the 
unravelling of the Congolese nation state and the crisis of the autochthonous citizenry. 
I will argue that the crisis of subjectivation presents the Maï-Maï with the difficult 
challenge of making the autochthonous self an ethical subject of his actions anew by 
finding devotion to his culture after what they see as a centuries-long concomitant 
process of alienation and desecuritisation. For the Maï-Maï, this could enable the 
autochthonous subject to submit to rules and give a purpose to his existence while 
simultaneously opening up to modernity. Furthermore, I will show how spiritual 
practices, which undoubtedly have deep local roots, are employed as techniques to 
secure and regenerate the autochthonous self. However, I will also argue that these 
local practices are inserted into a bio-political scheme of government which combines 
notions of welfare and security for the population and the individual. My central 
argument in this chapter is that the desecuritisation of the Congolese subjectivity has 
created space for the emergence of armed governmentalities and the formation of 
militarised subjectivities. 
Mobilising the Masses 
As a consequence of the modulation in the ethos of resistance of Padiri’s resistance 
movement – going from being a movement with the conscious goal of countering the 
expropriation of the autochthones at the hands of the Banyarwanda to a movement 
with the objective of liberating the Congolese nation in its totality from foreign 
influence, in whatever form – the Maï-Maï movement by self-definition became a 
nationalist “politico-military movement”. They were determined to make sure that the 
implosion of the formal institutional framework of the state in the Kivus did not carry 
with it a descend into chaos and lawlessness. Padiri’s Maï-Maï organisation therefore 
took upon itself the task “filling in” for the central state and re-establishing the 
“authority of the state” (Entité Mai-Mai/EST 27 September 2004), and the movement 
became de facto the sovereign authority in the territory it controlled, where it 
instituted a highly militarised authoritarian regime, which was legitimised by the fact 
that the country was at war. 
 
In order to be able to govern this vast territory spanning several provinces, Padiri’s 
Maï-Maï organisation made efforts to re-vitalize modern institutions such as the 
police, the army, the civil administration, education, and the judicial system. The Maï-
Maï also reinvigorated the principle of indirect rule by installing customary 
authorities at the lower levels of territorial administration, i.e. the collectivité or 
chefferie, the groupement and the localité (FAC/OPS-EST June 8 2002b). In order to 
facilitate the government of the population living in the territories of their control the 
Maï-Maï relied on the expertise of former local civil servants and university 
graduates. 
 
As for the military organisation General Padiri’s Maï-Maï group recruited significant 
numbers of soldiers from the regular Congolese army, which had been routed twice: 
by the AFDL in 1996-7, and by the combined force of the APR and RCD in 1998. In 
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addition, Padiri’s Maï-Maï group worked closely with Rwandan, and to lesser extent 
Burundian, Hutu insurgents as they faced a common enemy in the Tutsi. This led to a 
gradual professionalisation of the military branch of the Maï-Maï movement, since the 
Maï-Maï received military training from the officers of the ex-FAR (former Rwandan 
President Habayrimana’s presidential guard), the Congolese army and Tanzania in a 
military academy created in Maï-Maï-occupied territory.132 Indeed, according to my 
sources the Maï-Maï military organisation became a replica of the Congolese regular 
armed forces, with divisions, brigades, battalions, companies, platoons, and sections. 
In addition, there was the Service de Renseignement (Intelligence Service), which 
was an intelligence unit attached to the headquarters. The movement also had a 
military tribunal, Le tribunal OPS/EST charged with validating official documents 
and of punishing failures of military discipline. Only one aspect set the Maï-Maï 
military organisation apart from the standard modern army structure, the so-called 
Bureau 6, which was charged with responsibility for overseeing matters involving the 
dawa. According to my sources there were more than 100 “doctors” associated with 
Bureau 6.133 When used as a military technology, the dawa, as we shall see, is an 
ensemble of complex spiritual techniques of purification and unification which are 
employed to protect the combatant and his group from physical and spiritual harm, to 
increase his bodily capacities and finally, to ensure his self-discipline. 
 
At the summit of the Padiri’s politico-military organisation was the “Etat-major 
politico-militaire” (Politico-Military Head-Quarters or EMP), situated at first in 
Mangaa in the localité of Kalima in the territory of Bunyakiri, and later in Nzovu in 
the territory of Shabunda. The EMP was supported by the Coordination des Affaires 
Intérieures (Coordination of Internal Affairs or CAFI); an organ tasked with the 
coordination of the civil administration including the relations with the customary 
authorities. The Maï-Maï sought to stimulate the population into participating in the 
liberation of the nation by creating so-called Comités de Soutien (Support 
Committees or CS), which from April 2000 became the Comités de Sécurité Civile 
(Civil Security Committees or CSC). These groups consisted of civilians who were 
organised at the level of each village, and in principle “all Congolese, convinced by 
the validity of the cause should be members if they were capable”. The Comités des 
Mamans Sociales (Social Mothers Committees or CMS) was another branch in the 
Maï-Maï civil society network. It consisted of women who were used mainly to gather 
intelligence of the enemy.134 The tasks of the committees were many, but in general 
they were charged with the responsibility for “sensitising” the civilian population of 
the legitimacy of the Maï-Maï’s cause, to support and participate in its military 
organisation, and to “watch over the security of the population throughout the 
territory occupied by the Maï-Maï” (FAC Division Spéciale May-May Province du 
Sud-Kivu 27 November 1999). The movement’s apparatus of public institutions was 
financed through the taxation of the population and the activities of artisan mining an 
activity which became more lucrative with the rise in the price of coltan in the 1990s. 
According to Morvan, mining activities in the areas controlled by the Maï-Maï 
became highly militarised. Whereas earlier it was the bami who coordinated the 
mining activities, from 1999 onwards it was the Maï-Maï who took over the control 
and supervision of the commerce and exploitation of mineral resources. The merchant 
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and miners paid taxes to the Maï-Maï and the Maï-Maï offered them protection in 
return (Morvan 2005: 59-64).135 
  
General Padiri himself acted as the supreme authority of the Maï-Maï state within the 
state. It was widely recognised that he was not merely a general acting as a proxy-
authority for the state, which had been forcibly decommissioned in the Kivus, but 
rather a leader who had been chosen by God to lead his people to the Promised Land; 
hence the name “Général de Dieu” (General of God).136 At first sight this focalisation 
on the sovereignty of the leader, might suggest that the armed governmentality of the 
Maï-Maï is a throwback to pre-modern forms of rule in which the sovereign enjoys 
unlimited rights over his subjects. But on closer scrutiny this is far from being the 
case. Sovereignty is not understood as the right to kill or let live: instead Padiri137 is 
considered to be sovereign because he is imbued with the spirit of nationalism. “He 
had nationalism inside of him so he deserved to become the leader”138. If Padiri is 
today the leader it is because it is “the course of the people and the course of the 
people is the course of God”.139 It is not Padiri himself who is the sovereign but the 
nation. Padiri has been chosen by God because of his ethical superiority as manifested 
in his commitment to the universal principle of the nation. Padiri is a symbol of the 
uncontaminated native, “an enlightened son of the country” (Nationalistes Résistantes 
Maï-Maï Haut-commandement 25 May 2003). There is an unmistakable symbolic 
parallel between Padiri and the Judeo-Christian figure of the shepherd-ruler who 
watches over his flock (the Congolese). However, it is God, and only God, who is the 
true shepherd; Padiri is merely the medium of his intentions. It is God who has given, 
or promised, his flock a land (the Congo). Padiri, as God’s emissary, gathers the 
dispersed individuals and leads them to the Promised Land. In the armed 
governmentalities of the Maï-Maï, the objective of power is not to perpetuate the rule 
of the sovereign, but rather to ensure that the people’s destiny is fulfilled: 
In 1998 Padiri Bulenda emerged as the leader of the Maï-Maï. He hadn’t followed any 
military education […] he was called General of God because he was granted this grade 
without even knowing the capital of our country, but today he is a major general because 
of the combat he has waged for the country – it’s one of God’s miracles. He is also called 
General of God because he succeeded, at one time, in taking Bukavu without blood being 
spilled. […] So he is chosen by God to do things that will amaze humanity.140 Padiri is 
not from the royal family, but he is a hero. […] If someone is capable of defending our 
cause, capable of overcoming great obstacles that we ourselves are not capable of 
overcoming, we consider him our King. He is not, but we consider him as such and we 
can crown him with leopard fur.141 
In the discourse of the Maï-Maï, Padiri is the benevolent shepherd of the people who 
must steer the people out of harm’s way; he must protect the sacred life of the 
autochthones, even in the midst of war, and so he cannot expose them to death. 
Nevertheless, the Maï-Maï techniques of government are less concerned with the “art 
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of leading the herd” than with enforcing and observing those natural and divine laws 
that provide security and facilitates development and, beyond this, leaves the 
autochthonous population free. Padiri is not a mwami, but he is recognised as a 
symbol of the spirit of nationalism, “chosen” precisely because he fights for natural 
and divine laws. The difference between the sovereignty of the ruler and the 
sovereignty of the nation is crucial, for it highlights the fact that it is the universality 
of the nation and the correlative democratisation of sovereignty, that are the 
touchstones of the Maï-Maï technologies of resistance. 
 
Addressed to the life of the autochthonous masses, the political technologies of 
resistance are concerned with the “security of the citizens and their possessions” and 
devoted to “promote the well-being of the population” (Mouvement des Maï-Maï 
Congolais pour la Révolution à l’Africaine 2004): 
Everything that we did was inspired by the life of the population […] for us the objective 
is peace and the well-being of the population. […] Democracy is at the base of all good 
governance,142 [the Maï-Maï] administrators incarnate a truly nationalist ideology 
founded on: the respect for the institutions of the State, the will of the People and of God 
and the well-being of the people. (Mouvement Maï-Maï 16 January 2005) The most 
important role of the administrative personnel is, and will always be, that of guaranteeing 
the security of the population and its possessions, the supervision, orientation, education, 
as well as the formation of the population, and not the contrary. (FAC/OPS-EST 8 June 
2002a)  
Faced with the prospect of the obliteration of the “Congolese progeny”, the Maï-Maï 
sought to find adequate responses to the invasion of their country. In general terms the 
response of the Maï-Maï can be defined as the inauguration of a comprehensive 
programme intended to counter the foreign aggressor by engaging the totality of the 
autochthonous masses in the struggle to achieve ultimate freedom and to mend the 
schism inaugurated between the universal “spirit of nationalism” and the alienated 
wayward “souls” of the autochthonous citizenry. “Objectives” [of the Maï-Maï 
revolution]: Install a unitary democratic state of right; make the Congolese participate 
in the collective destiny through the equitable distribution of the national revenue; 
revolutionise the Congolese on the moral, spiritual and cultural levels”. (Nationalistes 
Résistantes Maï-Maï Haut-commandement 25 May 2003)  
 
A war which threatens the existence of the entire autochthonous population requires 
that “everybody at his or her level should defend without distinction of age or 
sex”,143Because “the contribution of each Congolese nationalist citizen is 
indispensable” (Nationalistes Résistantes Maï-Maï Haut-commandement 25 May 
2003) As indicated by the preceding quotes, the theme of total war instilled a sense of 
urgency, which compelled the Maï-Maï to embark on the project of mobilising the 
global mass of autochthones in their territory. “Our force was the population itself”,144 
Bahati said, indicating that the practices of resistance of the Maï-Maï are inscribed in 
a bio-political regime of practices with build-in strategies of harnessing the capacities 
of the totality of the population: 
Considering the demands of the current political environment preaching democracy, and 
intent on driving out the enemy in order to guarantee the national sovereignty of DR 
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Congo the Maï-Maï resistance fighter is obliged to organise a political education of the 
masses. (Nationalistes Résistantes Maï-Maï Haut-commandement 25 May 2003) 
The autochthonous masses are thus invited to take part in the concomitant process of 
edifying the Congolese nation state and the salvation of the autochthonous soul. In 
enframing the Maï-Maï resistance movement as a movement of the masses that works 
towards the fulfilment of the destiny of the Congolese nation by revolutionising the 
Congolese subjectivity, the practice of resistance again reveals its close affiliation 
with teleological views of history. 
 
The civilian personnel were responsible for the overall well-being, supervision and 
mobilisation of their fellow citizens.145 In a little more detail the “mission” of the civil 
administrators was defined as: 
creating and energising the Support Committees; organising the services of the state in 
accordance with the laws of the country including the recruitment of youths in the Maï-
Maï army of resistance; informing and guiding one’s friends and detect and track down 
enemies;146 being of service to the population, i.e. assuring the protection of the 
population and their possessions; ensuring a tight collaboration between population and 
soldiers; promoting development initiatives in one’s unit; working for the maintenance of 
national territorial integrity; sensitising, educating, training and supervising the 
population within a vision of self-development. (FAC/OPS-EST 8 June 2002b, my 
translation) 
In order to carry out these tasks, the administrators were required not only to undergo 
an “ideological seminar” conducted by the Maï-Maï military authorities; they also 
needed to be of a certain ethical constitution. To be fit for service in the Maï-Maï 
administration, one needed to “be imbued with Congolese nationalism and patriotism, 
that is to say, being ready to sacrifice oneself for one’s people; manifest credibility to 
everyone; be an effective collaborator of FAC; be available and persevering in order 
to be of service to the Nation; be of good morality; have respect for life and human 
rights; and respect transparency in the management of public affairs” (Ibid., my 
translation). 
 
In order to facilitate the participation of the totality of the population in the process of 
emancipation from foreign domination, the Maï-Maï organised seminars at places of 
public gathering such as the church and the market, where they disseminated the 
“Maï-Maï ideology” (Document, Nationalistes Résistantes Maï-Maï Haut-
commandement 25 May 2003). But how was the civilian autochthonous population 
expected to participate in securing and developing of its own existence? In two ways, 
each corresponding closely, to the two battlefronts in the war, that is, the wars against 
the “external enemy” and the “internal enemy”. With respect to the war effort against 
the external enemy, the population was expected to “fulfil all its civic duties”, that is, 
to “pay taxes; securitise itself; offer its children to the army; offer its labour to the 
army; offer the army different supplies”. (Nationalistes Résistantes Maï-Maï Haut-
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commandement 25 May 2003).  With respect to the internal war, it was to proceed by 
inaugurating an ethical “revolution” of the self and exorcising the spirit of the 
foreigner, so that the Congolese mode of being could finally attain ethical closure.  
 
The Maï-Maï ethos of resistance thus legitimised itself as a project for the total 
freedom of the autochthonous population, yet it relied heavily on disciplinary and 
sovereign techniques of government. The authoritarian character of the Maï-Maï state 
within the state is captured in this order that was issued as part of a larger strategy to 
reenergise and reorganise the Maï-Maï administration, which in the summer of 2002, 
was considered to be severely deficient and demoralised by the Maï-Maï authorities:  
Art. 3:  The reciprocal collaboration between the superior and sub-alternate civil 
servants should permit everybody to participate in the decisions taken. 
However, position of the boss [chef] is sovereign, as per the principle ‘the 
boss has the last word’. (FAC/OPS-EST 8 June 2002) 
Another example is the following décision taken by the EMP in response to a series of 
grievances brought to their attention by the population of the groupement of Nindja: 
All the population must leave their refuge and go back to their villages those who are 
uncooperative in this decision will be punished according to the law. 
1. The Congolese compatriots of these localitiés are obliged to help with the transport of 
military objects; notably: 
Weapons 
Ammunition 
Wounded combatants […] 
4. He who has ears must listen. (FAC/OP-EST 8 April 2002) 
Recruitment into the Maï-Maï military often happened by force. Forced recruitment 
included boys as young as ten years old, this being justified by the fact that the 
country was under attack by a superior force and that everybody was obliged to 
contribute to its salvation:  
It is only normal [that we used forced recruitment] because the enemy had a huge war 
machine and at a certain point we realised that it would be better to take the people by 
force [...] and after we had given them the ideological education they too realised that it 
was necessary to stay in the movement. […] Forcing someone into the army is relative 
because one can always do it when the country is threatened by grave danger; everybody 
should fight for his territory and his country as a whole.147  
Venance told me the story of how he was recruited by the Maï-Maï: “The day that we 
went to the army there were fifteen of us in the church, and all of a sudden we saw the 
soldiers, who came to take us by force. Our parents didn’t want us to go. They did 
everything they could in order to free those of us who had been captured, they paid 
ransoms, they brought goats and cows to the soldiers, but it wasn’t possible”.148 It 
must be said, though, that even though the demobilised kadogos I interviewed were 
not without grievances against the Maï-Maï movement, they were all very proud to 
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have fought for the liberation of their country and it shows how effective the ethos of 
liberation and resistance has been in the formation of subjectivities in the Kivus. 
 
Even if the role of the military in the Maï-Maï apparatus of government was to 
“ensure security and protect the civilians”,149 the security of the nation as a whole was 
the primary concern, which meant that the Maï-Maï used physical force to make sure 
the civilian population did what was expected of them. 
  
All of the efforts of the Maï-Maï authorities to mobilise the masses, however, would 
have been in vain had they been unable to harness the support of the Native 
Authorities. Assuring the corporation of the bami in their territories of control was a 
necessity because to this day these chefs coutumiers remain a source of great pride 
and wield considerable authority over of the local populations. Moreover, since the 
Maï-Maï frame their political project as a defence of the “autochthonous” mode of 
being, protecting and harnessing what is perhaps the most prominent symbol of 
tradition in the Kivus seems almost like a foregone conclusion:  
We didn’t have any support from neither the government nor foreign countries, nor 
multinational corporations. We were therefore obliged to rely on the support of the 
population. In order to ensure the support of the population, it was necessary to be on 
good terms with their governors. That is why, wherever the movement made headway, 
we approached the bami. […] The mwami plays a major role because he has the 
authority:  if he himself opposes us, then everybody is going to refuse to corporate 
because the people pay heed to the word of the mwami. We owed him respect – no 
soldier could give him cause for worry because he is invested with his powers: they knew 
that Padiri respected the bami; every time Padiri organised ceremonies, he invited the 
bami and emphasised their power because it was they who mobilized the population to 
supply the soldiers with provisions and to integrate the youths into the movement. [...] I 
remember in Kitole in 99 that Padiri gave the Mwami of Bunyakiri a military uniform 
and explained to the soldiers: ‘If you see the Mwami in a military uniform, that means 
that he is a combatant like us, and he has the same authority as the military authority’.150  
The cooperation between the Maï-Maï and the bami is not unlike the colonial doctrine 
of “indirect rule”, for, like the colonial rulers, the Maï-Maï sought to harness the 
authoritative power of the bami in order to ensure the contribution of the mass of 
autochthones to the objective of securing the Congolese body politic and to bind them 
indirectly to the central authority of the state. But there is another similarity between 
indirect rule and the Maï-Maï mode of government: both of these strategies of 
government are tied to the logic of preserving the autochthonous mode of being. This 
aspect buttresses the identity of the Maï-Maï practice of resistance as one aimed at 
restoring and reconnecting the autochthonous subject to his authentic “national 
spirit”.151 Moreover, it is interesting to note that giving the mwami a military uniform 
automatically confers authority upon him. This highlights both the extent to which 
power relations were militarised, and the exaltation of the military mode of being. 
  
The Maï-Maï project of nation-building is simultaneously highly inclusive and 
discriminatory. At the same time as it seeks to expel and combat the enemy in all his 
manifestations, it also seeks to salvage and convert those lost “souls” that have been 
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corrupted by the enemy so that they may become aligned with the cause of national 
liberation. As a truly autochthonous movement devoted to the liberation and salvation 
of all the Congolese people, it was necessary that those fallen Congolese who had 
been corrupted and manipulated by the Tutsi, but who had “become conscious of the 
nationalist cause”,152 could be included into the movement. This is why the internal 
revolution is fought preferably without having to commit fratricide. Padiri expressed 
this clearly in a message conveyed to the population living in the territory of Nindja: 
Now is the time to note the crimes that our Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian enemies 
and occupiers commanded by people like Kagame, Museveni, Buyoya and in complicity 
with certain Congolese, oblivious of the acts that the enemy commits against the 
Congolese people in the interior of their own country. […] Our army is aware that our 
brothers who are hungry for material goods have been manipulated by the enemy for 
their objective is to divide in order to rule; it is a trap set up by the enemy, and our army 
has forgiven all those who have been taken hostage and caught up in the destructive 
game of the enemy. […] It is my wish that everybody goes back to their daily business 
and works for our country in collaboration with our army, the FAC. (FAC/OPS-EST 7 
August 2001) 
This inclusionary aspect of the practice of resistance illustrates the strategic 
imperative of ensuring the contribution of the totality of the population to the cause of 
total liberation. 
Revolutionising the Native 
The ethical programme inaugurated “to revolutionise the Congolese on the moral, 
spiritual and cultural level” in order to halt the crisis of subjectivation is intimately 
tied to the great modern millenarian dream of the united and purified nation. As such, 
this grand vision functions as a vital template of happiness for the Maï-Maï ethos of 
liberation. It is, I would argue, nonetheless also responsible for disseminating 
anxieties and feelings of insufficiency, humiliation, loss, impoverishment, indignity 
etc., which fuel the experience of being utterly dispossessed and mired in the darkness 
of perpetual slumber, for it is only through the self-objectifying practice of 
comparison with the other, more developed nations of the world that the Congolese 
people emerge as the “wretched of the earth”, to paraphrase Frantz Fanon. To halt the 
endless freefall from the ladder of development and to deliver salvation to the 
Congolese people, the Maï-Maï see it as their sacred duty to cultivate truly patriotic 
subjectivities capable of withstanding the onslaught of foreign influence.  
 
The techniques of self-revolution are derived from the recognition that the 
autochthonous subject lacks nationalism and is underdeveloped: “It is because [the 
Congolese] are underdeveloped that our youth is not sufficiently educated in terms of 
patriotic education; if the youth had been sufficiently educated they would all have 
been Maï-Maï today […] it is a lack of ideology and civic education and 
patriotism”.153  To exemplify these techniques of self-revolution, I will refer to a 
report made by the administrator of Nindja and addressed to General Padiri entitled 
“Report on the seminar of development in Nindja” (FAC/OPS-EST Province du Sud-
Kivu Territoire de Kabare 15 June 2001). In the letter the administrator of Nindja 
reports that “all the strata of population of NINDJA”, i.e. the “elements of 
FAC/Headquarters of the KABARE-NINDJA axis [the military], agents of the State 
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of the Territory of KABARE and the Chefferie of NINDJA, the economic actors, the 
authorities of the religious cults, the overseers of the associations of development and 
the peasants” were brought together to discuss “the problems of the life of the entirety 
of the population as observed by the different categories of people; problems which 
halt the development of NINDJA”. The seminar began with a definition of 
development given by the “Chief Commander of the Headquarters”, who emphasised 
the importance of “community development”. For the military commander of Kabare 
“community development” could be defined as the “accumulation of the forces of the 
population and the State for the elevation of the level of the life of the population”. 
The problems that “halt the development” at Nindja, as seen by the above-mentioned 
actors, constitute a veritable litany of absences, failures, insufficiencies and lacks in 
citizenly behaviour that creates insecurities. The problems are ethical problems and 
can be divided into two broad categories: the lack of an ethics of citizenly behaviour 
encountered on an everyday basis, and the lacks of the souls of the citizens, which is 
considered to be the source of the former. Here are some examples of everyday 
insecurities:  
the non-application of the law on the judicial level by the military and local authorities; 
lack of respect for the instructions given by the EMP and by the military and civilian 
authorities of NINDJA; the plundering of the fields and the cattle renders it impossible to 
carry out economic activities; the presence of a large number of foreign armed groups in 
NINDJA; why will the FAC not securitise the forest of MUGABA like they did with the 
forest of CHIVANGA?; the arbitrary arrests and harassments of all kinds of the 
merchants by the FAC; lack of respect towards the State, even by the population, which 
is why the services of the State have been paralysed; lack of support (materially and 
morally) by the authorities at all levels; the agents of the state […] impose exorbitant 
fines on a population which is poor and deprived of everything; the absence of roads; the 
isolation of NINDJA from the rest of the world. (Ibid.)  
As for the ethical lacks of the souls, not surprisingly this is in one way or another 
connected to the theme of the lack of the spirit of nationalism. Here are some 
examples of the lacks of the souls: Insufficient ideological education in terms 
nationalism and the law on behalf of the population as well as the soldiers; the 
absence of sensitisation of the population in terms the education of development; 
ignorance as a large and non-combated evil in NINDJA; lack of fraternal love in the 
population; the population expecting that development will come from the outside; 
lack of work-ethic etc. Having first delineated the problems that halt the development 
in Nindja, the participants of the seminar proposed a list of remedies to alleviate the 
situation of generalised insecurity. Here are some of the solutions proposed: 
Organisation of an attack against the non-identified armed groups that disseminates 
insecurity in Nindja. After this cleansing operation patrols should be organised  in the 
forest of MUGUBA; in order to halt the harassment of the civilian population by the 
military, the Civil Security Commitees should play their designated role of reporting all 
kinds of deviations taking place in the village; it is important to contain the soldiers in a 
single place rather than leaving  them scattered around where they can commit exactions; 
in order to maintain public order a police force must be created by enrolling youths into 
the police and the army; the law must by applied by the administrators and engaged in 
the pursuit of the recalcitrants; organization of popular meetings where the masses of 
NINDJA will be given an ideological education, and by the same token all the authorities 
military as well as civilian should be given one (politicising the army in order to make it 
an army of the people); local authorities must organise seminars by bringing together the 
parents and the teachers for the development of the education. (Ibid.)  
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We see that while the remedies proposed to halt the crisis of the autochthonous 
subject entail sovereign techniques of power such as law enforcement and military 
force, these are seen as complementary tools to the normalising techniques of 
government exert a more positive influence over the life of the autochthonous 
population, such as “ideological education” intended to “awaken the nationalist spirit” 
of the autochthonous subject (Mouvement des Maï-Maï Congolais pour la Révolution 
à l’Africaine 2004). 
 
But how should the autochthonous subject be transformed from a floundering 
alienated existence into a truly patriotic citizen? The first step in this battle over the 
souls of the Congolese is to resist the corrosive impact of the foreigner on the 
Congolese spirit: 
The Maï-Maï against political aggression is not just he who picks up the gun, not just a 
civilian either, but he who fights against all the anti-values.  
The anti-values are the following: Tribalism, abuse of power, nepotism, the personality 
cult, fearfulness, dreadfulness, selfishness, rape, prostitution, stealing, extortion, 
corruption, cupidity, fraud, clientilism, impunity, embezzlement, mismanagement, 
demagogy, lying, deception, subterfuge, intrigue, flattery, blind submission, dependency, 
favoritism, idleness, cowardice, slothfulness, indecision, easy money, sorcery, killing, 
etc….(Ibid.) 
To avoid alienation and the subsequent spread of anti-values, the Congolese must be 
reconnected with his autochthonous mode of being: “[The Maï-Maï are] committed to 
bring the Africans on the path of regeneration, which is the course which will lead to 
the original state. It is a spiritual renaissance which should be edified around the 
purity of heart and voluntary humanism. Furthermore, the Africans are obliged to 
develop their physical, psychic and spiritual constitution” (Ibid.). 
 
To this end all the agents of the Maï-Maï movement were given the responsibility of 
“awakening of the nationalist conscience of the Congolese” (Ibid). The autochthonous 
subject must shed the superficial shell of anti-values imposed upon him by the 
foreigner by devoting his self to a return to the “original state”, as exemplified by a 
verse from the Book of Revelation in the New Testament referred to in one of texts 
used to educate the Congolese: “Remember therefore from where you have fallen; 
repent, and do the works you did at first. If not, I will come to you and remove your 
lampstand from its place, unless you repent” (Mouvement Maï-Maï February 2004). 
The autochthonous subject must thus seek to find devotion to his authentic culture 
from which he has fallen. This requires knowledge of the Congolese mode of being 
and the Congolese citizen must therefore inaugurate “an excavation of the inner crests 
of the Congolese ‘me’ in order to imbue it with positive values” (Mouvement des 
Maï-Maï Congolais pour la Révolution à l’Africaine 2004).  
 
“Self-confidence”, that is, confidence in the autochthonous mode of being through 
knowledge of the self must be instilled in the Congolese so that he may become 
capable of “resisting all forms of injustice” (Mouvement Maï-Maï March 2002). 
Through a revolution of the Congolese self it is believed that the Congolese can 
regain their “total freedom” (Ibid.). To revolutionise the Congolese “is to make them 
capable of countering all forms of aggression. These aggressions take root in our 
spirits so that is where positive values, sacro-human and divine values must be 
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cultivated, which have been replaced by anti-values” (Mouvement des Maï-Maï 
Congolais pour la Révolution à l’Africaine 2004). 
 
It is noticeable that many of the “anti-values” listed above have been used to 
characterize Congolese society by the international community, namely “nepotism”, 
“tribalism”, “abuse of power”, “fraud”, “clientilism”, “demagogy”, “impunity”, 
“mismanagement” and “embezzlement”. There are indeed striking similarities in the 
manner the two different projects enframe unethical self-conduct. Here is how a 
report from 2002 by the EMP describes the state of Maï-Maï administration: “the 
spirit of corruption, tribalism, injustice, discrimination and division, of collusion with 
the enemy […] which haunts certain among our administrative personnel, civilian and 
customary, is contrary to our ideology” (FAC/OPS-EST 8 June 2002a). 
 
One mode of self-conduct which both projects seem to be preoccupied with rooting 
out is excessive self-indulgence, in particular “interest” and “corruption”. Another 
example is the condemnation of tribalism or ethnicity: “The Maï-Maï have banished 
tribalism and that is how we were able integrate people from all corners of the 
country”154 But why is tribalism invoked as one of the most aberrant “anti-values” by 
the Maï-Maï when the Maï-Maï resistance is so firmly attached to the notion of 
autochthony? After all, is the tribe not the domain of the native? Maybe so; but 
tribalism runs counter to the bio-political dream of harnessing the total capacity of the 
population and weakens the vitality of the Congolese nation – a fatal error when one 
is seeking to “mobilise and organise the autochthonous population in order to avoid 
the dispersion of forces to be used against the foreign aggressor” (Mouvement des 
Maï-Maï Congolais pour la Révolution à l’Africaine 2004) and to put the Congolese 
nation back on the track of development. Thus, for the Maï-Maï it is important to 
reconnect with tradition, while simultaneously disposing of tribalism, at least in its 
degenerate form of partisan tribalism, which is considered to detract from national 
unity. 
 
The reason for the remarkable similarities between the international community and 
the Maï-Maï, I would argue, is that both the practices of resistance of the Maï-Maï 
and the practices of international development are part of a security-development 
dispositif wherein certain elements in Congolese society emerge as dangerous qua 
lack of an ethics of how to live. This does not imply that everyone is thinking in the 
same way, but it implies that the Maï-Maï ethos of liberation and the ethos of human 
security share a general mode of problematisation; which, is of course, how to erect a 
Congolese nation state by training and transforming of the Congolese population – a 
problem, to which there are, of course, an inexhaustible number of solutions possible, 
including the very different examples provided by the two cases discussed in this 
dissertation. However, even though both the international community and the Maï-
Maï legitimise their interventions in the lives of others with reference to the freedom, 
well-fare and security of the population they are both, in their efforts to unite and 
purify the Congolese social body, producing unethical modalities of self-conduct. 
  
Self-renunciation is a crucial technique of resistance in as much as the autochthonous 
subject must be ready to sacrifice his or her life for the salvation of the community 
and the perpetuation of the universal principle of the nation, as exemplified by a verse 
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that the Maï-Maï used to sing during the war: “Even if I am killed, another will be 
born as long as the Tutsi does not occupy the country”.155 Similarly, for François, he 
who is not ready to die for his country is not a responsible person: “One can only die 
for one’s land: a man who cannot die for his land is not a responsible man. […] I told 
myself I have no more force I have a son who is capable of taking up arms, and I told 
him you can be of use in the army”.156 For the Maï-Maï death, is relative in the sense 
that the sacrifice of one’s earthly life in the name of a higher cause ensures the 
salvation not only of one’s own afterlife, but also of the collective life of the nation. 
Self-renunciation, whether in the form of the suppression of “tribalism” or of 
“selfishness”, is therefore a crucial technique with which to achieve the spiritual 
wholeness of the nation and to ensure that the autochthonous population reaches the 
shores of the Promised Land. “Our ideology” Baptiste said, “is to realign everybody 
to the same code of conduct”.157 It is not stretching the facts to say that the armed 
governmentality of the Maï-Maï places heavy emphasis on the ethical principle of 
obedience to a higher cause, so much so that every citizen may be exposed to death, 
as long as this leads to the final deliberation of the Congolese people. The millenarian 
vision of the fully developed and hence secure nation state is not only accepted by the 
Maï-Maï it is welcomed as the indisputable end-point of history. In order to reach this 
culmination of history, which was also its innocent beginning – this utopian terrestrial 
paradise i which total harmony reigns – it is necessary to “revolutionise” the 
autochthonous mode of being in such a way that the actions of the Congolese do not 
prevent the knot between the beginning and the end of history from being tied. 
The Making of a Maï-Maï Combatant 
The rest of this chapter will be devoted to disclosing the techniques of self-
government, through which the Maï-Maï combatant is formed. I will be focusing 
mainly on the spiritual techniques of self-formation – ascesis – of the dawa, but also 
on other forms of self-subjectification. The critical argument advanced here is that the 
techniques of the dawa and other processes of subjectivation are informed by the 
themes of national unity and purity. 
 
Being a Maï-Maï is defined in the following way:  
The Mai-Mai is a spirit of mind, a mentality which manifests itself through a refusal of 
all forms of aggression, exploitation, expropriation, servitude…with respect for divine 
principles. He who exteriorises this spirit of mind is called a MAI-MAI. 
It is the sentiment that the child manifests when someone wants to take away his candy 
or his toy. It is the refusal that the peasants in the east of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo spontaneously manifested when they reacted against the aggressors. (Mouvement 
des Maï-Maï Congolais pour la Révolution à l’Africaine 2004)  
Being a Maï-Maï is enframed simultaneously as taking cognizance of divine law, as 
an outlet of a natural inner drive, or a spirit and finally, as someone who seeks to align 
himself to these principles. Another example: “A true Maï-Maï is someone who is 
animated by the spirit of nationalism and who receives the ideology and the protective 
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force. He should fight in order to ensure victory and even if you shoot at him he 
remains invulnerable – that is a true Maï-Maï”.158 
 
Taking cognizance of and accepting the spirit of nationalism establishes a positive 
relationship with the Maï-Maï-self creating an unbreakable connection between his 
self and his nation; by becoming a Maï-Maï, you mode of being is aligned with the 
Congolese mode of being, i.e. the spirit of the nation. The relation between the spirit 
of the nation and the spirit of the Maï-Maï is one of complete sympathy hence the 
widely used expression amongst the Maï-Maï that they fought for “love of the 
country”: “If we have received the revelation from God to fight for our country, it is 
because we love this country: we cannot subject ourselves to someone who doesn’t 
love our country.159 We the Maï-Maï, we are the sons of this country – we love our 
country”.160 Armed resistance is justified on the authority of divine will and is 
enframed as a defence of immanent divine principles (primarily the nation): “The 
border is sacred. We [Rwanda and Congo] are separated by the Ruzizi river: we 
couldn’t go there to attack the Rwanda with this dawa – it wouldn’t work there; we 
can only defend”.161 By framing the Maï-Maï fight as “defensive”, the Maï-Maï are 
able to identify their struggle clearly as “just”. This is in sharp contrast with to their 
enemies, who are enframed as “aggressors”, making their war “unjust”. Liberating the 
Congo for the Maï-Maï is a matter of restoring the sacred order of things. The Maï-
Maï fighter thus becomes by default an instrument in the hands of God:  
The response to all those who criticize or underestimate the work of salvation carried out 
by the MCRA/Maï-Maï in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Africa can be 
found in Acts 5: 38-39: “So in the present case I tell you, keep away from these men and 
let them alone, for if this plan or this undertaking is of man, it will fail; (39) but if it is of 
God, you will not be able to overthrow them. You might even be found opposing God!”. 
(Mouvement des Maï-Maï Congolais pour la Révolution à l’Africaine 2004)  
I suggest that the Maï-Maï ethos of liberation inaugurates nationalism as a form of 
spirituality. I justify this observation upon the fact that nationalism is conceived as a 
spiritual mode of being, that the Maï-Maï must seek to attain; he must align his soul 
and his body to the spirit of nationalism, he must narrow the gap between this spirit 
and his soul. But nationalism not only emerges as divine law, it also clearly 
demarcates the autochthonous self from the foreign other, making it possible for the 
Maï-Maï to obtain a full and positive relationship with his self through the nation. 
This is not possible through Christian spirituality, for instance, because Christianity is 
associated with European culture. The following is a much shortened and selective 
version of Richard’s experience of the spirituality of the Maï-Maï movement and its 
relation to Christianity: 
When I was a student, I often went to the furthest reaches of the countryside to 
evangelise with the Xaverian fathers. That’s when I met the Maï-Maï in 1994-95 on the 
border between North and South Kivu. But, as it was, it was they who evangelised me I 
realized that they were much more spiritual than I, who had come to evangelise them. 
Christianity is connected to European culture. They came with their practices and their 
ideology. We as Africans we have our own way of believing, adoring, praying; we 
believe in the ancestors; we believe in the truth of the dreams. The Maï-Maï movement is 
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not really a Christian movement but rather a non-clerical spiritual movement with purely 
African beliefs, which is wider than European spiritual culture. However, we do believe 
in God, because there is only one God.162 
Richard’s definition of the Maï-Maï movement as a “non-clerical spiritual movement 
with purely African beliefs” demonstrates that, while the core of the Maï-Maï is 
definitely seen as spiritual, it is not Christian but rather African. It is important to 
understand that the Maï-Maï do not question the existence of God: what are 
problematised are the “practices and ideology” of Christianity, which are associated 
with European culture. If the Maï-Maï were to imitate all the Christian ways of 
believing he would become estranged from his African spirit, in which case he could 
not claim to be autochthonous nor resistant. By objectifying the interior of the Maï-
Maï as African, and as spiritual, the Maï-Maï has set a dyadic marker of identity, 
which allows the autochthonous subject to emerge as distinguishable from other 
cultural modes of being while nevertheless remaining faithful to divine principles. 
The spiritualisation of the nation makes it possible to envision spirituality as a truly 
autochthonous mode of resistance. This implies that one aspect of the dawa is that it is 
a crucial marker of identity for the Maï-Maï and as such part of their techniques of 
self-africanisation, Bantuisation, autochthonisation and authentication. But even 
though the dawa is articulated as a purely African form of spirituality its use is 
sometimes nevertheless authorised through biblical myths: “We can justify the use of 
traditional medicine; it is written in Exodus 15:26 […] Exodus justifies the use of 
biblically why we use the herbs”.163 
 
The dawa is articulated by the Maï-Maï as an ensemble of traditional practices 
developed for the good of mankind, which has been used to such varied activities as 
hunting, healing, warfare, purification, fishing, counteracting witchcraft etc. – in short 
all the “traditional activities” of autochthonous life.164 
 
Whether the Maï-Maï recognises himself as a Christian or not, he believes in the 
principles of divine immanence and sovereignty: “We believe that God Almighty 
directs man […] our conviction is founded in an orientation which is superior to 
human life”.165 Said Richard: “The first thing to know is that it is God who directs the 
Maï-Maï”.166 This conviction imbues their actions with purpose, finitude and 
legitimacy being the principle which informs the spiritual techniques of the dawa.  
 
The dawa, however, is not only a technique of self-Africanisation, that is to say, a 
practice of cultural freedom: it is also an ensemble of spiritual techniques, utilised in 
the inculcation of an ésprit militaire and ésprit de combat, that is to say, in the 
formation of militarised subjectivities. 
 
In effect, the ethical regimen of the dawa, was a most important cog in the machinery 
of disciplinary techniques of the Maï-Maï military organization. In the words of 
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Joséphine: “When we were at the front, our dawa prohibited us from stealing, 
committing acts of violence and disturbing the civilian population. […] Everything 
turns around the dawa, and if you breach the prohibitions that ensures the good 
functioning of our dawa, well, then we could not tolerate it and you are whipped or 
thrown in prison”.167 
 
In order to understand the techne of the dawa, certain elements of the rationality 
informing it must be made clear. According to the Maï-Maï, the Congolese social 
body is not restricted to human beings; instead it extends to the totality of God’s 
beings, including, plants, animals, ancestors, bodies of water etc, in effect it is 
understood as a “biological system”.168 It is seen, we recall, as a spiritual ensemble. 
The ethical imperative of national unity derived from the belief in a pre-given divine 
and natural harmony obliges and encourages Maï-Maï combatants to structure their 
actions so that they do not rupture the sacred bonds between the combatant and the 
other creatures of the nation, thus desecuritising the Congolese subjectivity further. 
“Here we believe that the plants have an entity […] the herbs are creatures, and we as 
human beings we are also creatures and we should complement each other”.169 “The 
Maï-Maï, like the Katuku, knows that man is dependent upon having good relations 
with his environment and upon having good relations with the invisible beings, 
including the plants that live in total harmony”.170 Non-alignment with this sacred 
order is considered a dangerous infraction against the divine and natural principle of 
national unity and purity.  
 
Each Maï-Maï is therefore under an obligation to accept these truths and to accept a 
strict code of conduct, which will ensure his alignment with this principle through 
techniques of “self-mastery”.171 In order to be granted protection from the forces of 
nature, the Maï-Maï must master his body and his soul. By aligning his body and his 
soul to nature the Maï-Maï combatant is granted its protective forces. 
 
Effectively this means that being a Maï-Maï requires one to follow an ethical regimen, 
the telos of which is to ensure that the Maï-Maï conducts himself in such a way that 
the bond between his spirit and the rest of the spirits of the nation is not ruptured: 
The system is clear: this plant can work against that system so long as you use it 
respecting the laws. If you respect the conditions that plant becomes your friend: “me, I 
protect you, and since you protect me I become your friend”. For example, when we 
have a revelation that corn can work against this or that situation then we cannot continue 
cutting it down; it becomes our loved plant.172 Man protects nature and nature protects 
man and the same protection is used when you are invaded. We protect each other 
against any exterior force; it is as if nature has a will of its own.173 
It is necessary to understand that, for the Maï-Maï, the causal mechanism which 
protects the Maï-Maï combatant is spiritual interaction:  
                                               
167
 Interview, Sophie, Kisangani, 01.05.05. Mai-Maï, Lieutenant. 
168
 Interview, Bahati and Didier, op. cit. 
169
 Interview, Bahati, 19.04.05. op. cit. 
170
 Interview, Gaston, op. cit. 
171
 Interview, Richard, op. cit. 
172
 Interview, Bahati, 19.04.05. op. cit. 
173
 Interview, Grégoire and Bertrand, op. cit. 
   
 112 
It is the spiritual dimension of man that works with the dawa and not his physical 
dimension. You have, for example, a revelation stipulating that a certain plant has a 
certain effect, and when you wake up you go and look for this plant it is entirely 
spiritual; the dawa enters the body and then it works like a spirit.174 It is a sort of 
mechanics.175 
The spirits of animals, plants and ancestors are imbued with the ability not only to 
protect the combatant, but also to augment his bodily capacities. For instance, the 
attributes of animals are thought to be transferable to human beings through spiritual 
interaction, if one wears these relics containing the spirit of a given animals. The 
eagle, the lion, the owl, and the gorilla are animals whose forces can be harnessed to 
enhance the capacities of the Maï-Maï. “The eagle is a bird that we know is very 
strong, and if we have the bone of such an eagle it can give us the effect of its strength 
and its triumph because the eagle is the greatest bird there is”.176 “The lion is a strong 
animal; it runs very fast too, and we use the relic of the lion to become stronger and 
faster; it is an ancient practice.”177 “When we killed a lion, all the Maï-Maï wanted a 
relic from its because the lion has all kinds of spirits”.178 “The owl can even see at 
night in total darkness. Therefore, when the kadogo wears the relic of an owl, he can 
see his adversary in total darkness”.179 “The gorilla is the animal with the strongest 
hands and arms because it can rip apart anything with its hands. When we killed a 
gorilla, everybody in the village wanted its nerves to make the dawa […] and when a 
kadogo wears it he acquires the strength of the gorilla”.180 The spirits of certain plants 
are also endowed with the capacity to enhance the capacity of the combatant’s body: 
“There are trees that can resist all the seasons, and there are others which lose their 
leaves during the dry season. The leaves of trees that can resist all kinds of weather 
were worn by the kadogos so that they could resist any situation and any 
circumstance”.181  
 
Two Maï-Maï. The one on right is wearing relics around his arms, legs and forehead. Picture given to 
author. 
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The Maï-Maï revere their ancestors as saints and rely heavily on their interventions in 
their practice of resistance. It believed that it is through the spiritual interaction 
between the spirit of the combatant and the spirit of the deceased ancestor that the 
Maï-Maï obtained the formulas used in the dawa. This spiritual interaction occurs 
when one is dreaming. The reason for this is the belief that when one is sleeping it is 
only one’s spirit which is active and it is the moment when the spirits of the ancestors 
can communicate directly with the living person, the moment when “revelations” take 
place: “We believe that someone who is no longer alive can still help out, so our 
people believe in life after death.182 The dawa “is a revelation which comes to us in 
dreams it is our ancestors who show us what we should do”.183  For the Maï-Maï the 
spirits of their dead ancestors act as guardians and as defenders of the Maï-Maï and 
the Congolese people. They intervene in the lives of the still living in numerous ways 
and are considered to be intermediaries between God and man:  “We sincerely believe 
that the dawa that we use against those who commit aggression against our country is 
nothing but a gift given to us by the creator”.184 It is, thus, through the agency of their 
ancestors that the Maï-Maï “doctors” receive the knowledge from God regarding 
which natural beings can be used to produce the dawa with various effects on the 
body and soul of the combatant. 
 
Now, all new recruits who entered into the movement were required to undergo an 
initiation ritual, which was designed to purify the recruits and harmonise the group as 
part of the detribalisation of the movement because “everybody came from different 
cultures”:185 
You are brought to the river, where you are washed, with the dawa, made by the 
kadogos. It is necessary that no one is in that river within five kilometres; then you dry 
yourself on a rock near the river, and finally, everybody goes to the doctor. When you are 
with the doctor, you swear oaths, you are tattooed and you receive medicines that are 
smeared on the nose, the eyes, the knees, the feet and the neck.186  
As the quote shows one of the elements of the ritual of initiation is immersion in 
water, which also is the name of the movement (“Maï” means water in Swahili), and 
is imbued with the capacity to purify the combatant, which is why ablution is part of 
the initiation ritual. Water is used in this capacity on an everyday basis by the Maï-
Maï as well, for every time a Maï-Maï combatant felt that he had been contaminated, 
or if he had violated the code of conduct, he was sprinkled with blessed water in order 
to restore his purity:  
When a combatant becomes impure, he knows he is already ready to die, he feels guilty 
and he withdraws, he can’t fight. So there could be many combatants leaving in the midst 
of the battle. When he withdraws, he does to find purity again; when he comes back, then 
he must be punished in order for him not to commit the same fault again. We whip him 
and give him other forms of punishment decided by the group; we tell him that these 
medicaments are sacred and expensive, and if God has revealed this to us, it means that 
we cannot permit ourselves to transgress the law. Then he is ready to be washed and the 
kadogo sprinkles him with water and he becomes pure again.187 
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The quoted words also allude to the fact that it was the kadogos who handled and 
carried the maï. This is because young boys were considered to be pure, and by virtue 
of their purity could carry the holy water without contaminating it. This was the main 
rationale behind the recruitment of the youngest boys. For the same reason, it was the 
kadogos who assisted the doctors in making the medicines of the dawa, a task with 
great prestige: “everybody wanted to be guarding the relics”.188  
 
A group of kadogos.  The one on the left carrying Maï around his neck in plastic container. Picture 
given to the author. 
 
When a boy reached the age of twelve, he could no longer be the assistant of the 
doctor because he would begin to have enough knowledge of the imperfect world of 
the adults (he would start having thoughts about women, money, power and so on), 
thus making him impure, at which point he would become an ordinary soldier. 
 
When the combatant was tattooed, the doctor inserted a mixture of burned-off pieces 
of plants and “powders”189 in the cut. It is believed that the spirits of the burned-off 
plants interact with the spirit of the combatant when it is inserted into his body, and it 
is the effect of this interaction in conjunction with the purification, through the 
sprinkling of maï over the body, which is considered to render the combatant immune 
from enemy fire. As for the oath that was taken, it would have gone something like 
this: “Here, where I am now I am not going to die by the hands of the Tutsi; I shall 
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not accept that even one centimetre of the Congolese land is taken abroad, and I shall 
not accept that the Congo becomes occupied by the Tutsi”.190 
 
The quoted words show that the nationalisation of the Maï-Maï combatant was highly 
ritualised. This can also be illustrated by a ceremony practiced by Bahati’s group: 
“We point to the ground of the country in which he was born, and we ask him to bend 
down and swear that he will die for this land, and then he swallows some earth”.191 
The ritual contains two aspects: 1) an oath of loyalty and 2) an act of unification. 
While the oath contractually binds the combatant to the Maï-Maï cause the 
swallowing of earth seals this bond. By swallowing some earth, the spirit of the 
country merges with the spirit of the combatant, creating a union between individual 
and nation – the precise objective of the Maï-Maï’s resistance. 
 
The ethical regimen of the dawa which is called les conditions, was a set of 
injunctions and prohibitions designed to ensure that the Maï-Maï combatant was 
aligned with the cause of national liberation. These conditions became less in number 
over time as they became too restrictive and because they revealed the identity of a 
Maï-Maï to their enemies:  
When we started using the dawa there were a lot of conditions. It happened that no one 
could shake hands anymore, we couldn’t wash; we lived with a lot of entreaty, then it 
was revealed that we could wear clothes, wash ourselves and even salute the enemy. This 
is what permitted us to walk among the guys from the RCD […] they couldn’t know who 
was who because there were no signs to distinguish us.192 At some point there were too 
many conditions, so many in fact that it became impossible to stay invulnerable. Then a 
new generation of dawa was born which nullified some of the conditions.193 
Deviations from this ethical regimen would break the alliance between the combatant 
and the other spirits, which in turn would break the protection that these spirits 
provide in their reaction to the spirit of the combatant. Unethical actions therefore will 
sever the natural harmony between the Maï-Maï and his environment, and as 
consequence he will no longer be invulnerable to enemy fire. 
 
There is no space in this dissertation to list all the conditions and their relations to the 
Maï-Maï nationalist ethos and rationality of government that I learned about, but I 
will illustrate these techniques of self-mastery through some examples.  
 
The Maï-Maï were not allowed to eat anything because “we believe that eating 
another being can add something to your being”;194 for instance, they could not eat 
ducks because they are slow; pigs because they are dirty; or manioc leaves because 
they are used by sorcerers, and because it negates the effects of other plants used in 
the dawa. Moreover, the Maï-Maï were not allowed to eat when the rain was falling 
because it is believed that all the good things and bad things that have been said 
remain in the air. When the rain falls it gathers everything in the air and so when you 
allow all the maledictions to enter your body, your spirit and soul are inevitably 
contaminated and thus made vulnerable. The Maï-Maï were allowed to eat neither the 
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head nor entrails of an animal, because it is believed that if you were to be hit by a 
bullet, it would hit you in the part of your body which corresponds to the body part of 
the animal you have eaten. Similarly, it was forbidden to break the bones of an animal 
while eating it, because if you do a bullet would hit you in the bone. If, on the other 
hand, you eat the muscles of animals you will only be hit in a muscle, a wound which 
is considered much less dangerous.195 
 
There were a number of conditions which should be observed on the field of battle. 
For instance, in the beginning the Maï-Maï fought naked in order to become one with 
nature: “Fighting naked is a way to show that I am clean, that I have nothing on me; I 
am here as God created me”.196 Another rule was that the Maï-Maï were forbidden to 
turn their back on the enemy because in fleeing the enemy you would have betrayed 
the cause of national liberation, an act which would immediately negate the combined 
effects of the techniques of purification. Moreover, one should not jump over the dead 
body of an enemy because it was believed that, while his body might be killed, his 
spirit was still alive, in which case you would automatically become polluted and find 
yourself in a state of impurity.197 When the Maï-Maï recovered the arms of a 
vanquished enemy, these would also have to be purified with Maï in order to expulse 
the spirit of the enemy. 
 
 
The doctor is purifying a gun. Picture given to the author. 
 
The Maï-Maï were only allowed to receive anything from civilians on condition that 
the civilian placed it on the ground first. In certain cases it seems that it was even 
necessary to purify it with maï before it was picked up by the combatant in order to 
“untie the spirit of the giver from the object”,198 so that the spirit of whoever had 
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touched the object could not be passed on to the Maï-Maï. Money especially was 
considered an impure object, not only because it has passed through the hands of 
many people, but also because it is associated with selfishness and personal profit 
which, we recall, was one of the anti-values of the Maï-Maï moral code, making it, by 
default, an impure object: “If you become to attached to money you will have sold out 
your conscience”,199 That is why, ideally “the money that we obtained had to be kept 
in a pool”.200 The money most be used to serve the “common interest”, not “personal 
interests”. 
 
A pivotal moral injunction was the prohibition against having sexual intercourse with 
women when the Maï-Maï were at the front. This was because women are considered 
potentially dangerous. In the Maï-Maï ethos, between the masculine and the feminine 
mode of being are considered to be polar opposites separated by an insurmountable 
moral space, in which the male very obviously occupies the moral high ground. The 
moral division instituted between the masculine and feminine mode of being in the 
Maï-Maï ethos is so fundamental that if a woman so much as touches certain species 
of herbs and trees used in the dawa, she must be killed.201 This is because women are 
considered impure when menstruating. By touching the dawa, a woman may negate 
the protection which has been so meticulously build up. In addition, women are 
considered to be weak, malleable, corruptible and cunning, making them prone to 
treachery and in most cases unfit for military service,202  a “creature of no value”.203 
When the new recruits arrived in the maquis, we said, ”you would like to become a Maï-
Maï, a rebel, a revolutionary,” but in order to become a true Maï-Maï it is necessary to 
abstain from certain things: […] women because they can make you become excited and 
vulnerable and persuade you to give away all the secrets, as was the case with Samson 
and Delilah […] women are scheming […] you can be with her and share secrets with 
her, and the next day she will betray you. She has only feeble resistance, is fragile and 
therefore manipulable; she pursues her own interests.204 
The Maï-Maï nevertheless did have female combatants in their ranks, but women 
were only considered fit for military service if they were of a proper ethical 
constitution, as revealed during the training. Joséphine was one of these women 
fighters; she had started out as a kadogo with the AFDL, but had been recovered by 
the Maï-Maï, by whom she was eventually granted the rank of lieutenant. According 
to her she became a Maï-Maï officer because she possessed the spirit of nationalism: 
“I had a goal and had to follow it; my goal was to do everything I could to help the 
Congo arrive at its destiny”.205 
 
Nonetheless, the above account clearly suggests that the militarized Maï-Maï self is a 
masculine subjectivity. A good example of this is that one of the conditions of the 
dawa is that the Maï-Maï is obliged to walk on the right-hand side of the road because 
“We know that the right hand represents the man, strength and power”.206 Joséphine 
told me that: 
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[W]hen you are at the front you cannot make love to a man. You should all consider 
yourself as a man – if we did not, the dawa would be negated. […] As a commander I 
considered myself like a father, because I had to nourish and protect my guard. […] In 
the military service neither sex nor age should count, and I tried to act in such a way that 
I was not considered as a woman.207  
The quoted words are remarkable on several counts. First, they shows that, in order to 
be considered a Maï-Maï, a woman enrolled in the army of the movement should act 
as a man and subdue her natural weaknesses as a woman by imitating the ethically 
superior behaviour of men. Secondly, it is pertinent that Joséphine thought that in the 
military service “neither sex nor age matters”. This emphasizes that, in the effort to 
save the Congolese nation state, everybody – man, woman and child – should be 
ready to contribute. Since all Congolese are threatened by extinction, all other 
concerns should be set aside. To the extent that Joséphine’s comment reflects the 
concern with harnessing the totality of the capacities of the Congolese population in 
order to secure the continued existence of that same population it is a bio-political 
security rationale. In spite of the objectification of women as potentially dangerous, 
their assumed natural capacities to weaken the strength of the men, combined with 
their naturally cunning personality, could be harnessed in the cause of national 
liberation. For this reason women, were used extensively as spies and intelligence 
officers.208 
  
Whenever a comrade fell in battle the Maï-Maï were obliged to make every effort 
possible to recover his dead body, since the spirit of a fallen comrade was considered 
to still be alive. Moreover, by retrieving the body of their fallen comrade the Maï-Maï 
also prevented that the enemy from making a product out of his body using it against 
themselves.  
 
For the Maï-Maï, their military organization was not just an ensemble of individuals 
but also a spiritual unity which was supposed to move in unison: as Gaston said “We 
are one in spirit”. A number of daily rituals were performed to ensure that the 
discipline and harmony of the group: “Sessions were organised in the morning and at 
night in order to settle any disputes among us and to solicit the protection of the 
invisible forces from the enemy. We ate together and made a pact by swearing: “If I 
betray you I hope I may die”. A spirit of combat [ésprit de combat] was 
developed”.209 
 
Being a military organization Padiri’s Maï-Maï group was very hierarchical, and 
whoever occupied a higher rank in the military hierarchy could demand the total 
obedience of his or her subjects:  
We lived with the commanders, but we didn’t have the same privileges. At the front we 
were always in the firing line, while the commanders were there to give orders only. We 
were there as objects of all the orders given by the commanders. […] It was military 
service: we could not refuse an order that a commander had given us. Even if you didn’t 
like it you were obliged to execute it. […] At the front our commanders could say “kill 
that person” and you did it.210 
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I was told that, occasionally, kadogos would refuse to carry out orders, and sometimes 
even revolt, but this seems to have happened mostly when the commanders failed to 
respect the code of conduct of the dawa (it was especially difficult for them to stay 
away from women211), or when the conditions became unbearable for the kadogos 
(hunger seems to have been a major problem212). The fact that the kadogos would 
revolt against their commanders because they allowed themselves to transgress the 
code of conduct of the dawa underscores the symbolic efficacy of the theme of 
spiritual contamination and shows how effective the dawa was as a disciplinary 
military technique employed to render the combatant loyal, docile and effective. 
 
This leads me to a crucial point: the dawa, although informed by deep-rooted local 
practices and rationalities, is inscribed in a bio-political rationality of government. 
There are a number of reasons for why I suggest this. First of all, the dawa revolves 
around the theme of national unity and purity. Unless one assumes that a Congolese 
ontology – whether articulated as a set of customs or traditions, as a particular culture, 
as a race, as a certain kind of spirituality, as primitive, as backward, as 
underdeveloped, as superstitious etc. – can be discerned through the spiritual practices 
of the dawa, it appears to me more fruitful to see the particular way in which the dawa 
was applied in the practice of resistance as a technology of national liberation rather 
than a magico-religious cultural tradition tied to a particular Congolese way of life. 
The spiritual technologies and techniques of the dawa are harnessed by the Maï-Maï 
in their military organisation in order to protect, liberate and secure the Congolese 
population their way of life. It is simultaneously a unifying technique of self-
nationalisation and a purifying disciplinary technology of power applied on the one 
hand in order to extort the full potential of the combatants’ bodies, and on the other to 
protect the combatants themselves from spiritual and physical damage. With this in 
mind, I think it reasonable to conclude that the ensemble of local techniques of 
hunting, healing, purifying etc., known as the dawa, as engaged by the Maï-Maï, were 
governmentalised, that is to say, that they were used in the context of mobilising, 
training and disciplining an entire modern army for the purpose of defending the 
sovereignty of the Congolese nation state. If this seems to be a contradiction in terms, 
this might very well be because the established analytical grid through which we are 
accustomed to perceiving such practices has long since established that “African 
traditions” are impregnated with “magico-religious” rationalities and beliefs. What 
my study seems to suggest, however, is that a given techne can be harnessed to any 
purpose. Thus detribalizing the native through techniques informed, whether 
consciously or not, in part by local rationalities and embedded local regimes of 
practice, and in part by modern rationalities and practices of nation-building is not 
only possible but a reality in the case of the Maï-Maï practice of resistance. To put 
this into perspective, it is worth mentioning that Maï-Maï “doctors” from the different 
tribes (both within and outside Padiri’s group) organized seminars in order to gather 
their experiences and develop better formulas, indicating that regimes of practice or 
dispositif are never intact but constantly in motion as processes of objectivation and 
subjectivation are reformed and transformed. 
  
Claiming that the dawa was governmentalised is not the same as claiming that the 
assumption that the innate natural capacities of a given plant used in the dawa or that 
                                               
211
 Interview Petro, op. cit.  
212
 Interview, Mudereka, op. cit. 
   
 120 
the conviction that wearing a given body part of, say, a lion makes you stronger and 
faster, were invented by modern science. Rather, it is to say, that the innate natural 
qualities (spirits) of these beings are utilized by the Maï-Maï in their effort to vitalise 
and secure the Congolese populace as a species. 
 
The figure of the soldier was highly valued by the Maï-Maï. Being a soldier instilled a 
sense of pride in the Maï-Maï because, by virtue of having agreed to sacrifice his life 
if necessary for the greater good, the solider is thought to incarnate the spirit of 
nationalism. In Désiré’s words: 
The soldier is a great personality who should be respected because he defends his 
country and protects the population. In relation to the civilian, the soldier is superior 
because he ensures his security.213 
Self-militarisation was thus a crucial technique of resistance, a process of self-
subjectification which took many forms. This can be discerned through the symbolic 
of the body of the combatant. The weapon of the combatant accentuates the qualities 
of the resistant body and becomes an extension of his remodelled self because of its 
continual presence and ostentation almost appearing like a prosthesis on the body of 
the combatant. Through it, the Maï-Maï combatant strikes a defiant and powerful 
attitude signalling to the world that he is capable of defying intrusion and imposing 
himself and in conjunction with a uniform, which connects him to the state, he 
becomes an authorised master of life and death: 
We received supplies from the government, guns, uniforms etc. On these uniforms 
“FAC” was written. They were green [...] it was the first time we received supplies from 
the government [...] The day we received these supplies we had a huge party, and that 
day we recruited another 150 youths. We saw how we had developed: we told ourselves: 
“Those who think that the government will not know of us, now they can see that we are 
with the government”.214 
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Two Maï-Maï soldiers guarding the Headquarters of the Maï-Maï company in Hombo, Picture taken 
during field-trip in April 2005. 
 
The influence of Western action films emerge clearly in the body practices of the 
Maï-Maï. This theme has been studied by Bazenguissa-Ganga (1999) in the case of 
the militias Ninja, Cobra and Zoulou in Brazzaville, and by Jourdan (2004) in the case 
of Lafontaine’s Maï-Maï in North Kivu (primarily Banande). These analyses focus on 
the influence such films on the forms of violence, slang, gestures and body language 
of the militias and conclude that the militia members re-enact the attitudes and actions 
of the heroes of these action movies “who come from a fantastic Western Olympus” 
(Jourdan 2004: 163). This kind of ascesis was also at work Padiri’s group, especially 
among the kadogos, who used the model of the action hero as a beacon in their own 
processes of self-formation. But the body practices of the action heroes were not 
simply mimicked: instead the entire ethos of certain films in the “action” genre of 
Western cinematography was internalised. “Rambo” I, II and III (Sylvester Stallone) 
“Commando” (Arnold Schwarzenegger) seems to have impressed the kadogos 
especially deeply: 
We saw war movies. In these films the soldiers were all very well equipped and dressed, 
but we couldn’t do exactly the same thing as the whites do in their movies – they have 
everything. But we admired the bravery of certain soldiers like Rambo, who, like us, 
recovered the weapons of his enemy. This encouraged us.215 Commando didn’t have any 
friends, everybody was his enemy. […] We were like Commando: we armed ourselves, 
we supplied ourselves. […] Rambo was good because he hardened our hearts with his 
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ways […] he was invincible.216 What I learned from Commando was how to fight, how 
to take cover, which position to take and more;217 I would like to be Rambo myself.218  
As the quotes, show the ethos of Rambo and Commando delineates a mode of being 
which is particularly alluring to the kadogos because their situation seems familiar 
and because the characters are the embodiment of the freedom fighter. The 
dramaturgies of Rambo and Commando are saturated by the ethics of freedom and 
resistance, as well as with the theme of the eternal fight between the forces of evil and 
the forces of good, which resonates deeply with the Maï-Maï subjectivity. In these 
films the heroes are subject to grave injustices and are made to suffer immensely 
before through spectacular use of force they vanquish their enemies against all the 
odds. The sublime qualities of the hero such as manliness, bravery, initiative, innate 
sense of justice, strength, speed, masculinity, power, muscularity, warrior-skills, 
tactical abilities etc., assure him of victory in the end. Since Rambo and Commando 
provide the ethical recipe for victory and life in freedom, it is hardly surprising that 
the Maï-Maï kadogos modelled their struggle after those of Rambo and Commando, 
thus re-staging the films. The prowess of Rambo and Commando encourages the Maï-
Maï to fight on giving them hope by tracing a trajectory and a mode of conduct which 
will bring a final deliberation. It was not uncommon that the demobilised kadogos I 
interviewed to be stunned when I told them that these films were fiction and not 
reality underlining how effective the ethics and imagery of these films are in the 
formation of subjectivities. 
 
The allure of ascending to a modern way of life was manifested in many ways by the 
kadogos. There was a tendency among them to imitate and appropriate whatever 
symbol of the modern world they encounter. Petro, for example would wear a defunct 
plastic calculator around his wrist as a bracelet; although it had no battery, he thought 
it looked good. Others would fashion models of cell-phones and even my MP3 
recorder in wood and carry them around. Ferdinand had seen some Uruguayan UN 
soldiers with tattoos and had tried to make his own. But perhaps most revealing is the 
fact that most of the kadogos that I met seemed more curious to know something 
about the author and the West than telling anything about themselves. In fact when I 
asked Ferdinand what he wanted to do with his life he answered: “I would like to be 
you”.219 
 
To conclude my analysis of the armed governmentalities of the Maï-Maï and the 
formation of militarised subjectivities, I do not claim to have made either an 
exhaustive account of their governmentalities or the techniques through which their 
subjectivities have been formed. Instead, what I have tried to do is to make a foray 
into the rationalities and practices of resistance and liberation among the Maï-Maï 
group of General Padiri. Nevertheless, I claim at least to have made a sketch of the 
regimes of rationality and practices of resistance and liberation that this group has 
engaged in. It is safe to say that the armed governmentality of the Maï-Maï is neither 
“tribal” nor “without any clear objective”, nor is it a rationality grounded in magical 
beliefs, as is commonly thought. As Marcel Munga explained, when asked by a 
reporter of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) 
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Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), which specialises in providing 
“humanitarian news and analyses”:  
 
Question:  The Mayi-Mayi have a reputation for believing in mystical, magical powers. 
Can you discuss this with us? 
 
Asnwer:  You know, in each troop, in each body of the army, there are certain practices. 
If we are talking about invulnerability, these are techniques, combat tactics 
that we are not at liberty to discuss publicly. We are not fetishists, we are 
Christians. (IRIN 2003) 
The techne of the Maï-Maï resistance was a unique response to the intimately 
interwoven concrete and practical problems of building a nation state and liberating 
the Congolese people, which were both considered to be underdeveloped and thus 
insecure. In order to do this, the Maï-Maï thought it was necessary to harness the 
accumulated powers of the totality of the autochthonous population, a style of 
reasoning requiring that each Congolese citizen be revolutionised so that each could 
contribute to the salvation of the Congolese as a species. For the Maï-Maï, the 
situation of the autochthonous subject was so insecure that they considered it 
appropriate to use force if necessary in order to make sure that each and all 
contributed to the cause of securing the future existence of the Congolese. 
 
As for the subjectivity of the Maï-Maï combatant, this is forged in a piecemeal 
manner by often contradictory moralities, rationalities and practices forged through a 
myriad of processes of subjectification/objectification and self-
subjectification/objectification. For instance, it has been racialised and ethnified, both 
indirectly and directly, through colonial bio-political practices of racial segregation 
and ethnic pluralisation; it is loaded with Christian spiritual ethics (even if it is often 
articulated in opposition to Christianity); it is devoted to and strictly governed by 
ancient local regimes of practice and rationalities; it is disciplined by techniques of 
modern military training; and it is inspired and encouraged by Western action heroes. 
Moreover, the body of the combatant is adorned with trinkets of modernity and 
symbols of state authority, such as the uniform, as well as tattoos and relics containing 
the spirits of animals and plants, which, from the perspective of the Maï-Maï, not only 
reconnects the combatant with autochthonous culture, but increases the power of his 
body. The point here is twofold. First, the Maï-Maï mode of being cannot be reduced 
to or type-cast into such arbitrary and commonsensical taxonomies as 
“autochthonous”; “traditional”; “tribal” and “superstitious” without at best mystifying 
and misleading, and at worst disseminating evolutionary moralities and cultural 
ontologies, which have created such deep fractures between human beings in the 
geopolitical composite construct known as the Great Lakes Region. Secondly, the 
apparently contradictory processes of subjectification and self-subjectification are all 
in one way or other rooted in the overall telos of liberation: the liberation of the nation 
and the liberation of the self. What makes these bits and pieces part of a single regime 
of practice; “the point in which their simultaneity is rooted” (Foucault (2001 [1984: 
1416-7, my translation) is the coterminous problem of liberating and building a 
nation; they are in other words, practices of freedom. 
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All the different ascetic techniques of the Maï-Maï combatant can be seen as relations 
of power that the Maï-Maï subject makes with itself in order to attain national 
spiritual purity and to achieve national liberation. To imitate Rambo’s fight against 
the forces of evil, to abstain from sexual intercourse, to allow oneself to be sprinkled 
by sacred water, to wear the nerves of a gorilla in order to augment your strength, to 
pray, to recover the body of a fallen comrade in arms, to subject yourself to military 
training etc. are techniques with which to take care of the self, both individually and 
collectively. 
6. Conclusion 
In the end, who are we? 
- Richard, Major External Relations Officer, 15 May 2005220 
A Bukavian merchant who had been doing business with the Maï-Maï since the early 
1990s told me that, before 1996, the Maï-Maï of Bunyakiri, Masisi and Walikali had 
only limited knowledge of the outside world. According to him, “They didn’t know 
the difference between a radio and a computer screen, and they would even drink 
white paint thinking it was milk”. He told me that it was only when they started 
communicating with the outside world that they started “knowing something”. Very 
quickly, he told me, they began avidly consuming modern trinkets, most popular 
among the Maï-Maï being radios, “trainings” (track suits), jeans, T-shirts, batteries for 
their radios and audio cassette tapes: “They loved listening to music, especially the 
Congolese music stars like Koffi Olimidé and religious music. I assure you the Maï-
Maï could kill you for just a radio or even a battery – if you tried to resist, they 
wouldn’t tolerate it”. The narrative of the merchant is, of course, inscribed in the 
discourse which primitivises the Maï-Maï and the people of Kivutian hinterland. Yet, 
something did happen in that hinterland during the 1990s. The processes of 
subjectification changed dramatically as the people living beyond the Kahuzi-Biega 
National Park – the insurmountable civilisational barrier supposedly separating the 
primitive cultures of the Kivus (Batembo, Bahunde Banyanga etc.) from those already 
accustomed to a modern life (the Bashi and Bahavu, for instance,) – became 
embroiled in the regional conflict between Hamites and Bantus. 
 
In order to avoid their subjugation by other ethnic groups and to preserve their own 
way of life, since the colonial era the Batembo had been practicing a strategy of 
avoiding the state’s authorities: for instance, they avoided going to school and 
institutions of higher education, and were very hesitant in allowing themselves to 
become evangelised, because most of these institutions were situated in the areas 
populated and ruled by the other tribes. They might not have been allowed modern 
institutions of their own – not even a chefferie, which could have given them political 
representation at the regional and national levels and thus access to the state’s 
machinery of power – but they were not about to let themselves be dominated and 
ridiculed as “semi-pygmies”, “men of no value”, “half-monkeys”, “tree-dwellers” and 
so on, by their more developed neighbours; to a certain extent, therefore, they shun 
contact with these monuments of external dominance (Fidel, 14.04.05). After the 
massive influx of Hutu refugees and the subsequent involvement of former FAR and 
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Interahamwe or Impuzamugambi in the local conflict between the “autochthonous 
tribes” and the “Banyarwanda”, and after witnessing first hand the mass murder of 
Hutu refugees at the hands of the RPA and AFDL, many in the Batembo community 
realized that shying away from power was not a viable solution. In Richard’s words, 
“We knew that if we stayed in the bush without going for the power we would die, so 
we changed our strategy”. However, this was a strategy to ensure not just the 
existence of the Batembo tribe, but also of three communal identities: the tribe or 
ethnic group (the Batembo), the nation (the Congolese), and the race (the Africans or 
Bantu). The reason for this is that the fear of being pushed to the brink of extinction as 
an ethnic group was coextensive with the fear of being annihilated, or at least being 
subject to foreign occupation, as a nation and a race. This is why the different ethnic 
militias, the Katuku, the Batiri, the Ngilima, the Mudundu 40 etc., made the attempt to 
harmonise into one national movement, as well as why they worked closely together 
with Burundian and Rwandan Hutu insurgents in their war against the Hamites. As 
Roger told me, “After all, we were all Bantus”. 
 
The experience of being a subject embroiled in an eternal war between races, which is 
destined to bring about either total liberation or total obliteration, no doubt facilitated 
the militarization of the social space in the Kivus. The witnessing of the slaughter of 
Hutu refugees, the launching of the AFDL campaign and the start of the RCD 
rebellion a little over a year later prompted the Maï-Maï to ask questions such as: 
“Why are we being attacked by Rwanda?” “Why were the Hutu refugees massacred?” 
“Why are the Banyamulenge the majority in the army of the AFDL?” We now know 
what kind of answers they came up with. In general terms, the Maï-Maï understood 
this war as a comprehensive imperialist programme launched in order to ensure that 
the Congo’s natural resources (including human resources) could be used to enrich 
and develop the countries of their eastern neighbours (Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda 
principally), as well as certain western countries (USA, Britain and Belgium 
primarily). The point here is that one of the conditions for the mass mobilization of 
the autochthonous rural population was the internalization of geo-political and bio-
political rationalities. In other words, in the wake of the influx of Rwandan refugees 
and combatants in 1994 and the ensuing intensification of the fighting between the 
different ethnic, national and racial groupings in the Kivus, a vast new terrain of truth 
imposed itself upon the people of the Kivus. From this perspective, therefore, it is not 
entirely incorrect to say that the Maï-Maï started “knowing something”. In Bunyakiri, 
as in Bukavu, people were confronted with the fact that their country was now at war 
and that their mode of being – if not physical existence – was threatened by 
foreigners. This realization was accompanied by the further insight that economic 
underdevelopment, state collapse, political marginalization, military inferiority, 
human deficiencies, a lack of education, a lack of faith and most importantly the lack 
of a spirit of nationalism was directly threatening the security of the population and 
the state in the east of the country because it was weakening their capacity to defend 
themselves against better armed, better organized and technologically superior 
enemies. The truth of the consequences of the underdeveloped state of the Congolese 
mode of being was imposing itself with painful clarity: in other words, the silhouette 
of the figure of the Congolese native was outlined more clearly than ever at this 
moment when he was in the throes of death. 
 
The problematisation of the Congolese subjectivity as deficient, underdeveloped and 
therefore insecure is precisely the point where the thought-spaces of the Maï-Maï and 
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the international community overlap. Both the international community and the Maï-
Maï see the crisis of the Congolese subjectivity as being grounded in certain 
deficiencies that it has. Given that these deficiencies are framed as a lack of 
development of the Congolese subjectivity – and to the extent that the rationalities of 
the Maï-Maï resistance are drawing on this mode of knowing – I think it fair to 
conclude that the development discourse has become a powerful tool of resistance for 
the Maï-Maï. 
 
This is critical because it highlights the extraordinary efficacy of the developmental 
discourse, with its unwavering faith in the redemptive powers of the trinity of science, 
reason and progress. However, it underscores just as clearly that this unitary discourse 
of civilisation can be harnessed to any purpose by anyone. It is therefore not and 
never can be neutral, precisely because the deficiencies of the subject are framed as 
deficiencies in its development. 
  
The fact that the rationalities of development represent not just realignment to the 
natural order of things but are inherently ethical can be discerned through the constant 
problematisation of the relationship between “insecurity” and “underdevelopment”, 
which permeates the security-development dispositif. For the Maï-Maï as well as the 
international community, the deficiencies in the development of the Congolese 
subjectivity are seen as dangerous because they are counteracting the development 
and securing of the nation. This highlights another critical point of this dissertation: 
even if the practice of human security and the practice of resistance of the Maï-Maï 
authorize their respective security and development interventions in the lives of their 
target populations as attempts to create spheres of autonomy and freedom they are 
nevertheless both concerned with rooting out negative forms of freedom in restoring 
and reinforcing order. This demand for order requires assumed negative 
particularities to be neutralized in the name of the sovereignty of the collective. In 
extreme cases, even, the call for order authorizes the physical extermination of such 
subversive elements. The use of violence, whether it is employed by the international 
community or the Maï-Maï, can be studied as the effect of a bio-political rationality 
focusing on the care and defence of the population that has been taken to its logical 
conclusion.  
 
I have shown that, whereas in the Maï-Maï grid of visibility “insecurity” is the 
product of the activities of a particular dangerous race (the Hamites), in the grid of 
visibility of the international community, that “insecurity” is considered to spread 
through the activities of either inherently dangerous individual (psychopaths, for 
instance), or through the activities of the mass of unfortunate souls (the uneducated, 
the poor, the marginalized, the oppressed etc.), who are the victims of 
underdevelopment and thus have no means to resist divisive messages and as a 
consequence are at risk of becoming the foot-soldiers of the entrepreneurs of violence.  
 
One theme which is strongly represented in both cases is that of contamination. For 
the Maï-Maï, contamination is understood as the mental alienation of the 
autochthonous soul from its spiritually superior core framed as the spirit of the nation 
through contact with the foreigner. In the rationale of human security, contamination 
is framed as a multiplication and spreading of “risks” in global society. “Risks” are 
considered to multiply through radical divisive messages (especially ethnic and 
religious ones) and the spread of poverty, lack of statehood and so on, but these 
   
 127 
“risks” are all considered to be facilitated by the pursuit of excessive self-interest – a 
mode of conduct incarnated in the inherently dangerous category of individuals 
known as “entrepreneurs of violence” or alternatively as “spoilers”. In both cases, 
these subversive elements are liable for correction, disciplining, normalization and, if 
need be, physical extermination. The critical argument here is that both of these 
practices of security justify their interventions in the name of the promotion and 
securing of the life of the collectivity in the belief that the containment of negative 
elements assures the vitality of the social body. What this shows is that security 
interventions (whether employed through the use of force or of normalizing 
techniques of power) do not necessarily work through racial discourse as happens 
with the Maï-Maï; rather, security interventions are embedded in depoliticized 
regimes of practices and regimes of truth and as such require no other justification 
than objectifications of insecurity. To the extent that my argument and findings are 
accepted, I think it is reasonable to conclude that, inasmuch as the Maï-Maï have 
identified the malign spirit of their racial enemy as the source of the crisis in the 
autochthonous subjectivity – and in so far as the international community has 
identified the source of the increased risks in global society as the expansion of the 
scope of action of inherently dangerous individuals – both of these security rationales 
draw on depoliticized ontologies. The notions of “inherently dangerous” and “malign 
spirit” are metaphorically connected in so far that they both allude to a kind of natural 
permanent flaw, which cannot be corrected but must be eradicated, or at least 
incarcerated. By using the term “depoliticisation”, my meaning is that both of these 
projects are able to justify their actions as the restoration of the natural order of 
things. It is pertinent that both of these projects think that a united nation can be 
cultivated by developing what are considered to be universal natural substances. For 
the Maï-Maï, this universal substance is the spiritual ensemble known as the “spirit of 
the nation”; for the international community, it is the natural instinct known as 
“interest”. The moment when the “interests” of human beings are synchronized is 
coterminous with the birth of the community. Therefore, even though these two 
ethical substances seem to be totally unrelated, they are nevertheless imbued with a 
kind of natural magnetism; but whereas the Maï-Maï call this natural magnetism 
“fraternal love” or “love of the country”, the international community use the phrases 
“our shared interest” or “common interest”. Nonetheless, if properly cared for, this 
magnetism can gather dispersed individual souls and bodies into a single autonomous 
social body, whether this body is articulated as global society, an ethnic group, a race 
or a nation. The fact that both projects seek to govern their target populations by 
respecting and observing their presumed natural capacities as individual bodies and as 
total social bodies leads them both to draw on bio-political rationalities of nation-
building. 
 
I have argued that the notion of interest is a crucial principle of organisation in the 
techne of “human security”, but so are the “community” and the “state”. By the same 
token, I have argued that the Maï-Maï techne of resistance revolves around the notion 
of the “spirit of the nation”, yet it is also informed by notions of socio-economic 
development, political and legal sovereignty, geo-political themes, ethnographic 
knowledge, and local modes of knowing and so on. I would therefore argue that the 
security-development dispositif is an “assemblage” of discursive and non-discursive 
practices, of regimes of truth and conduct that possess an overall coherence without 
answering to any determinative principle or necessary logic. Yet for all of the 
diversity the contemporary security-development dispositif, it seems to revolve 
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around one relatively sustained problem: how to build a community, and how to 
secure and develop the life of this community as individuals and as a collective. 
 
From the point of view of the Maï-Maï, “tradition” and “modernity” represent 
opposite ends of an evolutionary continuum. This schism represented a palpable 
conflict within the Maï-Maï self. They knew that, in order to survive, in order to be 
able to live through their traditions, they had to embrace the possibilities that 
modernity had to offer them in terms of power; yet they also knew that in doing so 
they would change their mode of being. The solution to this dilemma was to split the 
inner domain of the native into a spirit and a soul. While the former was seen as a 
universal authentic autonomous core, the latter was seen as a universal, but malleable 
part of the human being. The former needed to be awakened, while the latter needed 
to be revolutionized, ideally allowing for a coterminous traditionalisation or 
authentication and modernization of the Congolese subjectivity. I suggest that this 
bifurcation in the Maï-Maï subjectivity is a product of the dividing practice of the 
discourse of development which for centuries has framed the Congolese mode of 
being as underdeveloped and as given to a traditional form of life but has 
simultaneously universalized the need for progress. The predicament of being neither 
fully modern nor fully traditional was constantly problematised. In 1945 Paul 
Lomami-Tshibamba had asked the question, “What will be our place in the world of 
tomorrow?” Sixty years later, Richard echoed the concerns of the great Congolese 
writer when he said, in an interview with the author: “After this long war we ask 
ourselves, in the end who are we?” 
 
I have argued that the Maï-Maï practices of resistance took shape through the 
experience of being subjects at war and that this experience intensified the impression 
that the Congolese subjectivity was in crisis. This mode of problematising the 
Congolese subjectivity created the realization that the Congolese subjectivity was in 
need of development, security and liberation, provoking and obliging the Maï-Maï to 
take up arms against their enemies in the name of the life of the population and of 
God. It was, from their point of view, a war between the forces of Good and of Evil. 
They therefore thought that, once the war was over, they would be received as true 
heroes. It is impossible to overestimate the disappointment, frustration and 
astonishment they felt when they discovered that no one in the transitional 
government was interested in their services. My fieldwork was carried out less than 
two years after the signing of the Final Act of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Sun 
City, which formally ended the Second Congolese War. From the point of view of the 
Maï-Maï, however, their own situation and that of the general population had not 
improved. It was truly a demoralized group of individuals whom I met. 
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Maps 
Map 1. 
 
 
North and South Kivu. The maps shows which groups controlled which areas in the 
spring of 2003. Source (Morvan 2005) 
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Map 2. 
  
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Source: University of Texas Austin 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/zaire.html 
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ANNEX A: TABLE OF INTERVIEWS 
 
ALIAS SE
X 
DAT
E 
TITLE  INSTITUTION STATUS PLACE 
François M 2103
05 
Territorial Administrator Administration/
Maï-Maï 
Burgomas
ter 
Bukavu 
Tristan M 2703
05 
Lieutenant Army/Maï-Maï FARDC Bukavu 
Claude M 0104
05 
Priest Catholic Church  Bukavu 
Jérôme M 0604
05 
Kadogo Army/Maï-Maï Demobilis
ed 
Bukavu 
Mudere
ka 
M 0604
05 
Kadogo Army/Maï-Maï Demobilis
ed 
Bukavu 
Jérôme M 1204
05 
Kadogo Army/Maï-Maï Demobilis
ed 
Bukavu 
Mudere
ka 
M 1204
05 
Kadogo Army/Maï-Maï Demobilis
ed 
Bukavu 
Ferdinan
d 
M 1504
05 
Kadogo Army/Maï-Maï 
(Mudundu 40) 
Demobilis
ed 
Bukavu 
John M 1504
05 
Kadogo Army/Maï-Maï Demobilis
ed 
Bukavu 
Simon M 1504
05 
Kadogo/Sergent Army/Maï-Maï 
(Mudundu 40) 
Demobilis
ed 
Bukavu 
Bahati M 1904
05 
Doctor Army/Maï-Maï 
(Mudundu 40) 
Demobilis
ed 
Bukavu 
Félix, 
Evariste, 
Dieudon
né 
M 2104
05 
Colonel, Lt. Colonel, Lt. 
Colonel 
Army/Maï-Maï All 
FARDC  
Bukavu 
Baptiste M 2204
05 
Security Agent Intelligence 
unit/Maï-Maï 
 Bukavu 
Amosi, 
André, 
Désire 
M, 
M, 
M 
2204
05 
Kadogos Army/Maï-Maï 
(Désire, 
Mudundu 40) 
All 
Demobilis
ed 
Bukavu 
Yves M 2304
05 
Colonel Army/Maï-Maï FARDC Bunyak
iri 
Olivier M 3004
05 
Public Relations Officer Army/Maï-Maï  FARDC Kisanga
ni 
Richard M 3004
05  
Major/External Affairs  
Officer 
Army/Maï-Maï  Kisanga
ni 
Roland M 3104
05 
Lieutenant Army/Maï-Maï FARDC Kisanga
ni 
Marcel M 3104
05 
Captain Army/Maï-Maï FARDC Kisanga
ni 
Deo M 0105
05 
Major/Doctor Army/Maï-
Maï/Bureau 6 
FARDC Kisanga
ni 
Joséphin
e 
F 0105
05 
Lieutenant Army/Maï-Maï FARDC Kisanga
ni 
Padiri M 0105
05 
Major General Army/Maï-Maï FARDC Kisanga
ni 
Soumali
ot 
M 0205
05 
Colonel Army/Maï-
Maï/former 
Simba 
FARDC Kisanga
ni 
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Valentin M 0305
05 
Major/Juridical advisor EMP/Maï-Maï  Goma 
Petro M 0805
05 
Kadogo Army/Mudundu 
40 
Demobilis
ed 
Bukavu 
Sophie, 
Sifa 
F, 
F 
0905
05 
Security agent, Security 
agent 
Intelligence 
unit/Maï-Maï 
 Bukavu 
Bernard M 1105
05 
Kadogo RCD/Maï-
Maï/FAC 
Demobilis
ed 
Bukavu 
André M 1205
05 
Kadogo Army/Maï-Maï Demobilis
ed 
Bukavu 
Evariste M 1205
05 
Lt. Colonel Army FARDC Bukavu 
Gabriel M 1205
05 
Kadogo RCD Demobilis
ed 
Bukavu 
Patrice M 1205
05 
Kadogo RCD Demobilis
ed 
Bukavu 
Augusti
n 
M 1205
05 
Kadogo Army/Maï-Maï FARDC Bukavu 
Venance M 1205
05 
Kadogo Army/Maï-Maï Demobilis
ed 
Bukavu 
Bahati M 1205
05 
Doctor Army/Maï-Maï 
(Mudundu 40) 
Demobilis
ed 
Bukavu 
Richard M 1505
05 
Major/External Affairs  
Officer 
EMP/Maï-Maï  Bukavu 
Gaston M 1605
05 
Major/“Sensibilisateur”/Infor
mation agent 
EMP/Maï-Maï  Bukavu 
Didier M 2405
05 
 
Assistant Territorial 
Administrator/Civil society 
activist 
Administration/
Maï-Maï 
 Bukavu 
Jacques M 2405
05 
Major/Doctor Army/Maï-
Maï/Bureau 6 
Demobilis
ed 
Bukavu 
Didier M 2505
05 
Assistant Territorial 
Administrator/Civil society 
activist 
Administration/
Maï-Maï 
 Bukavu 
Bahati M 2605
05 
Doctor Army/Maï-Maï 
(Mudundu 40) 
Demobilis
ed 
Bukavu 
Félix M 2605
05 
Colonel Army/Maï-Maï FARDC Bukavu 
Xavier M 2705
05 
Major/Doctor Army/Maï-
Maï/Bureau 6 
FARDC Bukavu 
Didier M 2705
05 
Assistant Territorial 
Administrator/Civil society 
activist 
Administration/
Maï-Maï 
 Bukavu 
Dieudon
né 
M 2905
05 
Lt. Colonel Army/Maï-Maï FARDC Bukavu 
Didier M 0106
05 
Assistant Territorial 
Administrator/Civil society 
activist 
Administration/
Maï-Maï 
 Bukavu 
Petro, 
André 
 
M, 
M 
0206
05 
Kadogos Army/Maï-Maï 
(Petro Mudundu 
40) 
Demobilis
ed 
Bukavu 
Didier M 0306
05 
Assistant Territorial 
Administrator/Civil society 
activist 
Administration/
Maï-Maï 
 Bukavu 
Bahati, 
Didier 
M, 
M 
0306
05 
Doctor,Assistant Territorial 
Administrator/Civil society 
activist 
Army/Maï-Maï 
(Bahati, 
Mudundu 40) 
Bahati, 
Demobilis
ed 
Bukavu 
Ladis M 1306 Kadogo Army/Maï-Maï Demobilis Bukavu 
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05 (Mudundu 40) ed 
Daniel M 1406
05 
Major Army/Maï-Maï Demobilis
ed 
Bukavu 
Mabuto M 1506
05 
Territorial Administrator Administration/
Maï-Maï 
 Bukavu 
Grégoire
,  
Bertrand 
M, 
M 
1506
05 
Guardians of the Batembo 
Custom 
N/A N/A Bukavu 
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